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ABSTRACT 
This thesis studies the dynamics of an arms race between South and North Korea, and South 
Korea's defence-growth relationship. 
The thesis begins with a description of the two Koreas' defence economy (Chapter 11) and a 
review of arms race literature(Chapters 111). Chapter IV empincally estimates the arms race 
between South and North Korea using a variant of Richardson's action-reaction model. The 
arms race during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods is also compared. Chapter k" 
reviews previous studies of defence-growth relationships using supply side, demand side, 
demand and supply side models, and Granger-causality analysis. Chapter VI empirically 
estimates South Korea's defence-growth relationship using the Deger-type demand and supply 
side model. The relationship is investigated using three stage least squares (3SLS) 
simultaneous equation as well as single equation methods (OLS and 2SLS). 
This thesis concludes that an asymmetric arms race' led by South Korea exists and the pattem 
of anus race changes between the Cold War and post-Cold War era. Also, South Korea's 
defence-growth relationship differs according to the economy's stage of development. 
I An asymmetric arms race is defined as a state of arms race which a party (or nation) reacts to its opponent's arms 
expansion, including defence spending, equipment and the number of military personnel, but the other party (or nation) 
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1.1. THE AIMS OF THIS THESIS 
Defence is one of the most important and controversial factors affecting the national 
economy in most countries. Resource constraints require the efficient allocation and 
utilisation ofresources in the defence sector. On the one hand, defence involves opportunity 
costs to maintain peace and national security. Through defence, a nation can attain its 
political and economic goals through the prevention of any external threat. By keeping 
peace, a nation might secure stable savings and investment, and induce foreign capital 
inflows. On the other hand, defence itself could be an important factor affecting economic 
growth. On the supply side, defence is one of the input factors to increase economic output 
through the production function. Defence helps the economy through externality effects 
(e. g. dams, transport, roads, training, etc. ) and technological spin-offs to the civilian 
economy. Defence also creates employment through military personnel and in related 
industries. By contrast, on the demand side, defence might have a negative effect on the 
economy by diverting scarce resources from more productive civilian uses to defence. 
Although defence is a necessary cost for national security, it could also harm the economy 
by restraining civilian savings and investment and reducing domestic output for civilian 
uses (crowding-out). Hence, examining the economic effects of defence spending is an 
important task in defence economics. 
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South Korea is an extraordinary country which has attained high economic growth whilst 
maintaining a high level of defence spending. Its geographical location surrounded by major 
military powers, including Russia, China and Japan, and the political and military tension 
with North Korea have led South Korea to ceaseless and continuous anus expansion, 
although there was a decline in defence spending during the latter 1990s. By October, 200 1, 
South Korea's defence spending was the I 3th largest in the world and accounted for 8.8% 
of the total East Asian and Australian defence expenditures (HSS, 2001). The Korean 
Peninsula is one of the world's most tense regions both politically and militarily. As a 
result, it is important to investigate the defence economy of the two Koreas, their arms 
races, and the effect of South Korea's defence spending on its economic growth. 
1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND PRIMICTIONS 
The Korean War (1950-1953) inflicted great damage on both the South and North, and 
created a deep distrust of each other. The US-South military alliance has effectively 
deterred the North's threat since the Korean War, but South Korea has suffered a 
continuing military threat from North Korea. Since the 1960s, South Korea has continually 
raised its defence spending to deter the North's threat and the North also has expanded its 
defence to cope with the US-South alliance. Until the 1970s, the US military grant 
contributed to South Korea's defence and economy, but it was considerably reduced from 
the late 1 970s, and South Korea began to share the costs for the presence of US forces from 
the early 1980s. However, South Korea could achieve rapid economic growth whilst 
preventing the North's threat due to the presence of US forces and US military aid 
providing free-riding effects. 
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South Korea's defence spending is believed to have an effect on its economic growth. In 
the beginning of economic development, South Korea focussed on a strong "self-reliant" 
defence policy with a rapid economic development and these were two primary goals under 
the President Park's regime (1962-1979). Hence, it is believed that defence spending made 
a contribution to promoting South Korea's economic growth in the beginning of economic 
development. However, the high level of defence spending might also have prevented 
higher growth in South Korea in this period. Also, the empirical results of defence-growth 
relationship might be different according to the time-period, because the effect of defence 
on growth could differ depending on the economy's stage of development. Thus, the 
defence-growth relationship in South Korea needs to be estimated in relation to the stage 
of economic development. 
There are three major research questions and predictions for this thesis: 
1) Does an arms race between the two Koreas really exist and what are the 
variables affecting any arms race between these two countries? An anus race 
between South and North Korea is predicted to exist, because the North's military 
threat to the South has not paused and the South's reaction to the North's threat has 
continued since the Korean War. The variables affecting the arms race between the 
two countries need to include inter-state conflicts and foreign military aid as well 
as the two nations' military spending. 
2) If a South-North arms race exists, has thepattern of any arms race changed 
between the Cold War and post-Cold War era? The pattem of anns race is 
pre icte to change between the Cold War and post-Cold War era, because the 
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South-North anns race is believed to have been affected by the US-USSR arms race 
which was more intense in the Cold War era. 
3) Does South Korea ý defence spendingpromote or inhibit its economicgrowth? 
Does the economy ý stage ofdevelopment change the defence-growth relationship 
in South Korea? The answer on the first question cannot be predicted yet, because 
South Korea's defence spending might have helped its growth by providing 
externalities and spin-offs, while it might have hampered growth by crowding-out 
more necessary and productive investment in its development process. However, 
the defence-growth relationship is predicted to change according to the economy's 
stage of development. Cross-section studies have found that the effect of defence 
spending on growth is different according to a country's income level. 
Besides these questions, an overview of the defence economy of the two Koreas will be 
described for an understanding of the circumstances in the Korean Peninsula. To answer 
these questions, data from the Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND), the Korea 
National Statistical Office (KNSO), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SEPRI), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)/Intemational Financial Statistics (IFS) and the World Bank will be used with 
other related sources from previous studies. Also, previous studies on arms races and 
defence-growth relationship will be critically reviewed for the empirical analysis of any 
arms race between the two Koreas and the effect of South Korea's defence spending on its 
growth. 
This thesis differs from other comparable studies in that: 
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1) It describes the defence economy of the two Koreas and also studies the changing 
military balance between these two countries from the 1960s to the present. 
2) It makes a contribution to the anns race literature through an empirical 
estimation using the Richardson arms race model. Other related variables, such as 
inter-state conflicts and foreign military aid are also applied for the analysis of an 
arms race between the South and North Korea. This modified Richardson model has 
not been used in previous studies of the South-North anns race. 
3) It makes a contribution to the defence-growth studies through empirical 
estimations using a demand and supply side model. The Deger-type demand and 
supplybased model is modified to reflect South Korea's specific circumstances, and 
this will improve the reliability of the empirical results. It will also show how the 
economyls stage of development affects the defence-growth relationship in South 
Korea. This has been shown in the cross-sectional studies, but has not yet been 
studied in a longitudinal single-country analysis. 
1.3. PLAN OF THE THESIS 
First, this thesis examines the defence economy of the two Koreas and the military balance 
of South and North Korea since the 1960s. It also studies the defence industry of South 
Korea and the future issues for South Korea's defence economy (Chapter II). Second, the 
dynamics of the arms race between South and North Korea applying the Richardson's 
action-reaction model are studied for the period 1963-2000. It focusses on detecting the 
existence of a South-North anns race during this period, because South Korea rapidly 
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increased its defence spending with its economic development and thus the two nations' 
an-ns race is believed to be intensified in this period. Two different sub-periods, 1963-1989 
and 1990-2000, representing the Cold War era and post-Cold War era are also estimated 
to study whether the pattern of arms race changed between the two periods (Chapters III 
and IV). Third, the effects of South Korea's defence spending on its growth are investigated 
based on the demand and supply side model for the period 1963-2000. Whether the effects 
are positive or negative, they have not been deeply studied in South Korea even though it 
is one of the extraordinary countries achieving high economic growth with a high level of 
defence spending. This study will also examine how South Korea's defence-growth 
relationship has been affected by its level of economic development for the two different 
sub-periods, 1963-1979 and 1980-2000. In South Korea, rapid economic development was 
attained with strong defences under President Park's regime (1963-1979), and South Korea 
is regarded as a developing country in this period, although the trend of a high growth and 
high level of defence spending has been maintained from the early 1960s to the mid- I 990s. 
But, there was a decline in its defence spending during the latter 1990s. Since the 1980s, 
South Korea became a semi-developed country and reached a developed stage in the 1990s 
joining the OECD. Hence, South Korea changed from a semi-developed to a developed 
country for the period 1980-2000. Since the 1980s, South Korea's defence has become 
more dependent on imports by weakening its "self-reliant" defence policy and US military 
aid also ended. Thus, South Korea could not enjoy the "free-ride" any more, and this might 
increase its defence burden in this period and crowd-out the civilian economy (Chapters V 
and VI). The impact of reductions in South Korea's defence spending and the prospects of 
a peace dividend are estimated in the Annex. 
This thesis mainly contributes to the defence and peace economics literature, but it will 
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also be helpful for the researchers of strategic studies, political scientists, public sector 
economists and also development economists. It is of interest to the researchers of strategi _1: 1 Ic 
studies because this study examines the arms race and military balance between South and 
North Korea and provides an insight into the regional conflict in the Korean Peninsula. It 
is of interest to political scientists because the defence-growth relationship is an important 
issue not only for the economists but also for the political scientists. It is of interest to 
public sector economists because defence spending is an important subject in public finance 
and also occupies a substantial proportion of the government budget in most countries. It 
is of interest to development economists because defence is one of the significant factors 
affecting the development of countries. In the development process, defence might affect 
the economy negatively by crowding-out productive investments or positively by providing 
extemalities. 
These integrated studies will not only provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
South Korea's defence economy but will also help research on the defence economies of 
countries progressing from a less developed country (LDC) to a developed economy'. The 
next chapter will describe the defence economy and military capability of the two Koreas, 
and also the defence industry of South Korea. 
I The LDCs and developed countries are characterised by the level of per capita income (or per capita GDP) 
in this thesis. However, it is difficult questions in the 21" century when interdependence and globalisation pressures are 
development characteristics of the LDCs and developed countries alike. 
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CHAPTER 11 
DEFENCE ECONOMY AND MILITARY FORCES OF THE 
TWO KOREAS' 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the economic and defence policies of both nations, South Korea's 
defence industrial base, and studies the military situation between South and North Korea. 
It provides necessary background to studying the arms race in the Korean Peninsula. 
Aspects of future defence policies in South Korea are also considered. 
Dunng te Cold War the security problems facing the Korean Peninsula depended on the 
interests of two superpowers, the USA and the fonner Soviet Union. The Korean War 
(1950-1953) completely devastated the Korean Peninsula and created deep distrust and 
antipathy between South and North Korea. Accordingly, the post-war military build-up was 
one of the most critical and urgent tasks for both Koreas. Korea was divided into two 
territories, North and South after the liberation from Japan in 1945. The North Korean 
leader Kim 11-Sung established the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), a 
communist regime supported from the Soviet Union. South Korea constituted an 
independent and liberal government through separate elections in 1948 and it was named 
This chapter was published in Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 14, No. 1. See Bae (2003). 
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the Republic of Korea (ROK). Until the late 1980s, the two Koreas focussed on 
strengthening their military capabilities to guarantee their security and protect their 
ideological systems. South Korea, under military regimes from the1960s to the1980s, 
accomplished high economic growth and military expansion due to US support and its 
strongly growth-oriented economic policy. By contrast, North Korea continued its military 
build-up with moderate economic growth pursuing a strong self-reliant defence system 
(Hamm, 1999). The North concentrated on investing in the heavy and chemical industries 
while it ignored the light industries to build a strong defence industrial base. In the 
beginning of the South-North arms race, North Korea's economic development plan was 
effective and contributed to maintaining the superiority of the North in both its economy 
and defence. However, North Korea's heavy concentration on the military build-up resulted 
in "unbalanced" economic development and a deteriorating national economy since the 
1970s. 
In the post-Cold War era, South Korea's democratic governments changed their unification 
policy from a hard-line stance into a more moderate attitude and steadily attempted to 
alleviate the tension and bring peace between the two Koreas. Democratization has exerted 
intense pressure on the South Korean govemment to pay greater attention to social welfare 
and other public services rather than defence (Moon and Hyun, 1992). Investment for 
social development had been extremely limited and crowded-out under military 
2 
governments. In contrast, North Korea continues to make great efforts to maintain a strong 
military power in spite of its severe economic predicament. By 2003, food shortages were 
2 The negative correlation between defence and social welfare, and also other public services is shown in 
II be in I Table 2.16. The crowding-out of civilian investment by defence wi II directly examined by est imating South Korea's 
defence-growth relationship in Chapter VI. Defence spending might affect growth negatively by crowding out necessary 
and probably more productive civilian spending. 
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the most serious and urgent problem which North Korea needed to solve, but the arms race 
and confrontation between both nations prevented it disarming. Hence, arms control is 
necessary not only for the South to escape from the economic burdens of defence spending 
and attain higher economic growth, but also for the North to reform its economy. The first 
South-North summit talks since the division of the Korean Peninsula occurred in June, 
2000, and were an important first step for peace between the two countries. These summit 
talks could be the threshold for alleviating the military tension between the South and 
North. Since the peace talks, the South provided considerable economic aid to the North, 
but there was still no sip of a reduction in the armed forces and weapons between the two 
countries. Instead, by 2003, North Korea strengthened its military training and 
approximately 65% of its armed forces, including up to 80% of its artillery and missile 
capability were deployed within 60 miles of the southern border. Moreover, North Korea 
attacked South Korea again in the borderline of the West Sea in June, 2002. 
Since the sudden death of Kim 11-Sung (8 July, 1994), North Korea has focussed on its 
internal cohesion and controlling its people to sustain the Kim Jong-11 regime in spite of 
international isolation and food shortages. Kim Jong-11 is trying to resolve North Korea's 
economic difficulties by taking South Korean assistance and improving its relationships 
with the US and Japan. On the other hand, he uses his nuclear development programme as 
a leverage for securing this political system against the US-South Korean alliance. North 
Korea attempts to follow the Chinese model in its economic development by making a 
special economic territory for openness. However, Kim Jong-11 is opposed to the complete 
openness of North Korea in order to maintain his dictatorship. This contradictory situation 
limits North Korea's efforts to reform and develop its economy. North Korean policy 
toward the West, including Japan appears to be changing, but by 2003, it is difficult to 
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judge whether it is completely altering its fundamental strategy toward South Korea. In 
other words, peaceful gestures toward the South may be tactics to improve its relationship 
wit the Western countries supporting the South Korean government. By doing so, North 
Korea is trying to move out of diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions from the 
Western countries, including the USA. As a result, most EU countries are attempting to 
restore or have already formed diplomatic relations with North Korea with the agreement 
of South Korea. Nevertheless, as long as North Korea does not relinquish its primary goal 
to communise the South, the military tension cannot easily be removed between these two 
countries and the North will remain a major security threat to the South in spite of peace 
talks. 
In summary, by 2003, the security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula was very 
delicate, because unstable peace and military tension have coexisted since the Korean War. 
In this potential conflict situation, the high investment in the defence sector of both the 
South (compared with other developed nations) and the North has not only distorted their 
economic policy-making but also deprived both nations of the opportunities for a peace 
dividend. In this context, studying defence and the economies of the two countries, and the 
military situation between the South and North provides the necessary background for this 
research. 
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2.2. OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC AND DEFENCE POLICIES 
2.2.1. The Economy of South Korea 
Since the early 1960s, the South Korean economy has recorded consistently high growth 
rates except for 1980 and the late 1990s caused by domestic political instability and 
economic crises, respectively. Table 2.1 shows the structural change of the South Korean 
economy for the period 1962-200 1. South Korea's real GNP grew at an average annual rate 
of 8.5% over the three decades from 1962 to 1995, much higher than the average growth 
rate of about 4% for the preceding period (1953-1962: Kim and Hong, 1997). During 
President Park's regime (1962-1979), South Korea accomplished phenomenal economic 
success, and its per capita GDP (in 1995 constant prices) rose approximately 8.5 times from 
US$ 1,273 in1962 to $10,823 inl995 (Table 2.1). Its export-oriented industrialization 
policy helped the rapid growth of the South Korean economy and contributed to changing 
its industrial structure. The export industries have also changed. In the early 1960s, South 
Korean exports depended heavily on primary industries, such as mining, fishery and 
textiles, while the share of manufactures was small in total exports. However, as seen in 
Table 2.1, manufactured exports which accounted for only 27% of the total exports in 1962 
reached up to 96% in 1995, although they slightly decreased in 200 1. In the 1990s the main 
exports included electronics and computers, transport equipment, shipbuilding, textile 
fabrics and semi-conductors. 
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Table 2.1. Major Indicators of South Korean Economy 
Economic Indicator 1962 1979 1995 2001 
Mid-year population (in millions) 26.5 37.5 45.1 47.3 
Per capita GDP (US$) (in 1995 constant prices) 1,273 3,930 10,823 7,853 
Annual growth rate of GDP 2.2 7.1 8.9 3.0 
Inflation rate (%) - 19.5 7.2 1.3 Unemployment rate 8.1 3.8 2.0 3.7 
GNP by industrial origin (% share in current 
prices) 
Primary industry 44.0 20.3 6.9 4.5 
Manufacturing 12.4 27.5 26.9 30.0 
Other industries and services 43.6 52.2 66.2 65.5 
Expenditures as share of GNP (% share in 
current prices) 
Private consumption 82.8 62.7 53.4 59.5 
Government consumption 14.0 10.1 10.4 10.4 
Gross investment 12.8 36.4 37.4 26.8 
Exports of goods and services 5.0 28.3 33.5 42.9 
Imports of goods and services 16.6 35.1 34.5 40.5 
Net factor income from abroad 0.9 -1.6 -0.9 - 
Statistical discrepancy 1.1 -0.9 0.6 - 
Exports and imports (in 1995 constant prices) 
Commodity exports (f. o. b. in US$ billion) 0.4 27.9 125.1 137.7 
Share of commodity exports in GNP (%) 2.0 22.9 27.7 27.6 
Share of manufactures in total exports (%) 27.0 90.1 96.1 91.6 
Commodity imports (c. i. f. in US$ billion) 1.8 37.6 135.1 129.2 
Share of commodity imports in GNP 14.3 29.8 29.9 25.9 
Note: 1. South Korea experienced serious reduction of GDP(in $US) in 1997-1998 induced by the fluctuation 
of exchange rate to US dollar. 
2. The numbers in 2001 are estimated based on GDP. 
Sources: Bank of Korea, National Income Accounts, 1984; National Accounts, 1994; Korea National 
Statistical Office, Korea Statistical Yearbook, 2002; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2000. 
The economic crisis of 1997-1998 in Asian countries was a serious blow to the South 
Korean economy and decelerated its speedy economic growth. From 1997 to 1999, South 
Korea struggled with high unemployment rates (6-7%), currency risks, and restructuring 
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the faltering economy, although it rapidly recovered attaining a high economic growth (an 
average annual growth rate of 7.7% from 1999 to 2001) due to its export competitiveness 
partly caused by a weak exchange rate. Nevertheless, by 2003, the prospects for the South 
Korean economy were still unclear because of the delayed economic restructuring, high 
government debt and the associated fiscal deficit. Moreover, a worsening global economy 
is affecting the rapid reform of the South Korean economy. The recent economic change 
in South Korea is expected to affect not only its civil investment but also its military 
spending. However, peace talks between the South and North may alleviate the military 
tension between these two nations and lead to anns reductions in the long term. Although 
North Korea's nuclear development programme is escalating military tension in the Korean 
Peninsula, current (2003) peaceful state between the South and North is necessary and 
important for South Korea to galvanize its economy by focussing on an increase in civil 
investment and the revitalization of its civilian economy. 
2.2.2. The Economy of North Korea 
North Korea's centrally-planned economic policy has restrained the opportunities to 
introduce the capital and technology necessary for economic growth. The North Korean 
economy has been based on a closed self-supporting system and strong nationalism. Since 
the 1990s, it has attempted to invite foreign capital to resolve its chronic economic 
difficulties, but US sanctions caused by the North Korean support for terrorism, arms sales 
and the development of strategic weapons are affecting its open-door policy. Although the 
North Korean economy enjoyed an average 8% of real GNP growth from 1960 to 1975, 
it began to be sluggish after the late 1970s and started to record a negative growth rate from 
the early 1990s. However, the financial exchange rate of North Korea is measured by two 
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different methods, namely official and commercial (or trade) rates, and the official rate is 
much overvalued compared with its real value. Hence, it is believed that the official 
economic statistics of North Korea are overvalued, and North Korea's economy is worse 
than its official figures. Furthermore, the collapse of communist countries, including the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, accelerated North Korea's economic failure. Its 
economic failure has also entailed a serious decrease of production. North Korea 
experienced about a 25% reduction of real GNP between 1989 and 1995 (Chun and Kim, 
1997). The industrial productivity of North Korea has decreased every year in most 
industries, especially in mining and heavy industry. Since the I 990s, although the service 
industry has grown slightly, a continuing shortage of energy and raw materials and ageing 
industrial equipment have also contributed to the declining growth rate. As shown in Table 
2.2, North Korea recorded a serious reduction in its gowth rate between the late 1970s and 
1997. It even had negative growth in the 1990s. A small trade volume also shows its 
economic isolation. In the case of agriculture, North Korea is introducing partial private- 
ownership, but it is still far from complete privatisation and this structurally inefficient 
agricultural system has resulted in a continuous reduction of agricultural production and 
serious food shortages. Consequently, the structural weakness of the North Korean 
economy has been reinforced by its closed economic policy, the irrationality of its political 
and social system, and the failure of international relations. Thus, subsequent economic 
failure compelled the North to adopt open-door policies and peaceful gestures toward the 
South and Western countries. 
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Table 2.2. Economic Statistics of North Korea 1965-2000 
(US$ million in 1987 constant prices) 
Year GNP GNP per 
capita 
Growth rate Imports Exports 
1965 9,782 788 8.5 (272) (210) 
1975 19,721 1,197 5.4 (1,273) (825) 
1980 23,263 1,293 3.8 (1,824) (1,627) 
1985 23,337 1,190 2.7 (1,785) (1,221) 
1990 21,302 995 -3.7 (2,760) (1,960) 
1992 16,829 760 -7.6 (1,640) (1,030) 
1994 13,735 599 -1.7 (1,270) (840) 
1996 11,284 484 -3.7 (1,250) (730) 
1998 (12,600) (573) -1.1 (880) (560) 
1999 (14,700) (600) 6.2 (960) (510) 
2000 (16,800) (757) 1.3 (1,410) (560) 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are current prices. 2. GNP per capita is in 1987 constant US dollars. 
Sources: Korea Statistical Office, Comparison of economic and social indices between South and North, 
200 1; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, various years. 
2.2.3. The Defence of South Korea 
Since the outbreak of the Korean War, the defence of South Korea has relied considerably 
on US military aid. Its defence capability was not strong enough to deter a North Korean 
attack until the 1970s, even though defence was one of the first priorities under military 
governments. Under President Park's regime (1962-1979), South Korea sought a self-reliant 
defence policy in spite of the presence of US troops. Following rapid economic growth, 
the arms build-up of South Korea was achieved rather easily under successive military 
governments compared to that of North Korea which experienced serious economic 
stagnation in the 1980s. During the 1980s, the rapid arms expansion of the South with US 
introduction co-operation greatly pressed the North Korean government. For example, the i 
of the US AirLand Battle doctrine in 1983, including pre-emptive strikes across the DMZ 
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(Demilitarized Zone) and counter-offensive operation which might possibly use tactical 
nuclear weapons, was a significant potential threat to the North. However, North Korea 
could not properly respond to the threat from the US-South alliance due to its chronic 
economic problems (Hamm, 1999). During the 1990s, South Korea has looked beyond 
immediate security concerns over the North and has planned a more self-reliant programme 
to defend a future unified Korea without US aid. The neighbouring countries such as China 
and Japan are emerging as a new future threat to South Korea. For example, China's 
defence budget has increased 10 times (in current price) for the past 15 years reaching 15% 
annual growth (SIPRI Yearbook). Accordingly, South Korea is now more concerned about 
Japan's and China's military capability. To implement its self-reliant programme, South 
Korea has focussed on enhancing naval and air forces and communications technology, 
including improved command, control, communications and computer processing (C4) and 
integrated logistic support throughout the armed forces (Huxley and Willett, 1999). These 
new capabilities helped the South to cope with the North's overwhelmingly large armed 
forces and superiority in weapons numbers. Some of the main projects planned by the 
Ministry ofNational Defense (MND) include building the core foundation for C41 systems, 
improving counter-surveillance and electronic warfare capabilities, upgrading tank 
capabilities, procuring attack helicopters, mass production of Korean-style Aegis-class 
destroyers (KDX-IWII[I) and next generation fighters (NIND, Defense White Paper, 2000). 
In 2001-2002, South Korea planned to procure US$ 8-9 billion of new generation combat 
aircraft to strengthen its command of the air (e. g. an improved model of F- 16 was selected 
as the new generation combat aircraft). 
South Korea's defence capabilities have grown rapidly with its economic success between 
the 1970s and 1980s and its number of armed forces personnel peaked in the early 1990s 
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(Table 2.3). However, South Korea has focussed more on the modernization and strength 
of its military equipment rather than increasing its numbers of military personnel. For 
example, the number of aircraft doubled between 1975 and 1985. South Korea's defence 
spending began to exceed North Korea's from the early 1980s. Since the 1980s South 
Korea's defence spending has completely overtaken North Korea's, although its armed 
forces and equipment are still numerically inferior to North. Hence, it is concluded that the 
North's numerical superiority in armed forces personnel and conventional weapons is being 
countered by the South adopting capital and technology-intensive forces. As shown in 
Table 2.4. South Korea's proportion of defence spending to its military personnel has 
increased since the 1970s, while North Korea depended more on its number of armed forces 
personnel due to reduced defence spending since the 1980s. This shows that South Korea 
has a capital-intensive defence structure, while North Korea has a more labour- intensive 
defence structure. According to Table 2.4, South Korea's defence spending per soldier 
increased from US$ 1,704 in 1970 to US$ 15,136 in 2000 in an annual flow ratio, while 
that of North Korea decreased from US$ 6,080 to US$ 1,733 for the same period (in 1995 
constant prices). Therefore, North Korea's reduced defence spending and financial 
difficulties in purchasing more advanced conventional weapons seem to be one of the major 
reasons why the North has attempted the development of strategic weapons, such as nuclear 
and biochemical weapons, and long-distance missiles since the 1990s. 
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Table 2.3. South Korean Defence Forces 
Year 1975 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Number of military 
personnel 
Army 560,000 520,000 650,000 520,000 560,000 
Navy 40,000 45,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 
Air Force 25,000 33,000 40,000 53,000 63,000 
Total 625,000 598,000 750,000 633,000 683,000 
Reserves 3095000 4800000 4500000 4500000 4500000 
Numbers of army 
equipment 
Tanks 1,000 1,200 1,550 2,050 2,330 
Armoured vehicles - 700 2,080 2,460 2,540 
Artillery 3,000 4,100 4,500 4,540 
Helicopters 250 347 538 410 
Numbers of navy 
equipment 
Combatants 113 120 140 162 138 
Support vessels 30 41 24 29 28 
Submarines - - 3 4 19 
Naval air - 44 59 70 52 
Numbers of air force 
I 
equipment 
Tactical aircraft 216 458 469 461 555 
Support aircraft 143 244 195 165 189 
Notes: 1. Number of military personnel includes both conscripts and volunteers. 
2. Number of support aircraft is the total of transport and training aircraft. 
Sources: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (various years) The Military Balance; The Ministry 
of National Defense (various years), Defense White Paper, The Republic of Korea. 
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Table 2.4. Defence Spending per Military Personnel in South and North Korea 
(US$ million in 1995 constant prices) 
Year South Korea North Korea 
ME MP 
(000's) 
ME/MP ME MP 
(000's) 
ME[MP 
1970 1099 645 1703.9 2511 413 6079.9 
1975 2411 625 3857.6 4522 467 9683.1 
1980 6689 601 11129.8 5858 700 8368.6 
1985 6198 598 10364.5 4647 840 5532.1 
1990 11666 750 15554.7 4280 lill 3852.4 
1995 14424 633 22786.7 5619 1128 4981.4 
2000 10338 683 15136.2 1875 1082 1732.9 
Note: ME= Military expenditures; MP= Number of military personnel; ME/MP= Military expenditure per 
military personnel (US$). 
Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies (various years) The Military Balance; Ministry of 
National Defense (various years), Defense White Paper, Republic of Korea. 
2.2.4. The Defence of North Korea 
North Korea's defence policy has focussed on a self-reliant system since the1960s and 
emphasized pre-emptive surprise attacks to occupy the entire peninsula. Until the mid- 
1970s North Korea had built up its military capability by developing conventional weapons 
and equipment focussing on quantity rather than quality. However, since the1980s it 
adopted a "blitzkrieg" strategy enhancing the capabilities of simultaneous attack on the 
front and rear lines, and developing a ballistic missile programme (Nodong and 
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Taepodong) 
.3 This is a response to the US-South Korean alliance and a source of hard 
currency earnings from exporting the missile technology to South Asia and the Middle 
East. ' The nuclear development programme is also a key tactical leverage for North Korea 
to obtain more economic aid. North Korea has often threatened to restart its nuclear 
development programme unless further funding is provided to resolve the hold-up of oil 
supplies and construction of nuclear power stations under the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization (KEDO). By 2003, North Korea re-started its nuclear 
development programme withdrawing from nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and 
is increasing military tension in North East Asia. 
According to the military expenditure data from SEPRI, IIISS, ACDA, and Korean research 
institutes, the defence spending of North Korea exceeded that of South Korea until the 
latel. 970s; but, it started to be overtaken by the South from the early 1980s with the 
beginning of its economic slowdown. Accordingly, its defence burden grew gradually from 
the 1970s reaching approximately 15 -25% of GNP and peaked in the mid- 1 990s and then 
fell to 14-17% of GNP after 1997. There are several reasons for this decline. First, North 
Korea cannot survive unless it decreases its defence burden and the reduction of defence 
spending is required to improve its economic performance. Second, North Korea focussed 
on the nuclear development programme instead of purchasing conventional weapons. This 
strategy created high military tension between the North and US-South alliance in the mid- 
3 Nodong is a modified model of Russian Scud missile with ranges of over 1,000 km and is capable of reaching 
main parts of Japan, including major US bases. North Korea is also developing Taepodong with ranges of over 1,500- 
4,000 km and test launched over Japan in 1998. In December 1998, it was reported that North Korea was building 
underground Taepodong launch sites (Huxley and Willett, ibid. pp. 73). 
4 In spite of the efforts of MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime), a number of countries continue 
with programmes to obtain ballistic and cruise missile inventories. Syria and Iran are believed to have acquired 
the Scud-C missile as a result of trilateral cooperation between themselves and North Korea. Iran, North Korea and 
Pakistan are also believed to cooperate in the development of a longer-range missile. The Shahab IV in Iran and the 
Ghauri 11 in Pakistan are both believed to be derivations of the Nodong I developed in North Korea or possibly 
export versions of this missile (SIPRI Yearbook 2000, p. 670-671). 
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1990s, but subsequently, the North acquired economic aid from the US-South alliance 
under the Clinton Administration on the condition that it would stop its nuclear programme - 
North Korea also obtained financial assistance to construct nuclear power stations and 
resolve its food problems. Finally, the "peaceful mood" between the South and North could 
contribute to the reduction of defence spending. South Korea's share of defence spending 
in GDP has also decreased since 1990. 
The number of conventional weapons in North Korea increased rapidly between 1970 and 
1990 and the data imply that North Korea stressed its military expansion to dominate the 
South in spite of its economic decline in this period. However, North Korea's high defence 
burden also seems to have adversely affected its economy in this period and subsequently 
contributed to its economic collapse in the 1990s. As shown in Table 2.5, North Korea is 
still superior to the South in the numbers of military personnel and equipment. 
Nevertheless, it is doubted that the quality of its weapons is superior to that of the South's, 
because North Korea's reduced defence spending might indicate its poor maintenance 
system, aged equipment and the inferior quality of its weapons. In the 1990s, the North's 
total military personnel was over I million and its number of army personnel was 1.7 times 
larger than that of South Korea. Although modem warfare depends highly on technology 
and the quality of weapons, North Korea's large numbers of armed forces and conventional 
weapons is still a great threat to the US-South alliance. ' 
5 Since the advent of the Bush Administration (2001 - ), the US-North Korean dialogue has stopped despite 
South Korea's appeasement policy to the North, The Bush Administration has called upon the North to reduce 
conventional weapons as well as to relinquish the development of long-distance missiles, and nuclear and bio-chemical 
weapons for the US-North peace talks. After the terrorist attack on September 11,2001, the U. S. government has 
scrutinized the missile development and exports of North Korea to the Middle East. 
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Table 2.5. North Korean Defence Forces 
Year 1975 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Number of military 
personnel 
Army 410,000 750,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 950,000 
Navy 17,000 35,000 41,000 46,000 46,000 
Air Force 40,000 55,000 70,000 82,000 86,000 
Total 467,000 840,000 13111,000 1,128,000 1,082,000 
Reserves 1840000 5000000 5000000 4700000 4700000 
Numbers of army 
equipment 
Tanks 1,130 3,275 4,100 3,940 4,060 
Armoured vehicles 200 1,690 4,200 2,200 2,500 
Artillery 3,000 4,750 8,100 9,700 10,400 
Helicopters - 170 277 283 320 
Numbers of navy 
equipment 
Combatants 169 340 369 413 336 
Support vessels - 175 150 183 277 
Submarines 8 25 22 25 26 
Numbers of air force 
equipment 
Tactical aircraft 588 854 782 589 
621 
Support aircraft 329 526 490 770 
528 
Note: Number of support aircraft is the total of transport and training aircraft. 
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, various years. 
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2.2.5. The Military Balance of the South and North 
South Korea rapidly increased its military power to compete with North Korea since the 
mid- I 970s and was spending approximately 5 -6 times more than the North in real terms in 
the late 1990s (Table 2.6). In other words, the military balance between the South and 
North has been completely reversed from North's superiority to South's domination since 
the 1980s. Figure 2.1 shows the dynamics of the arms race between these two countries 
over the period 1960-2000. The reasons for the reversal are: 
1) North Korea could not sustain its defence burden any more due to its economic 
problems which started from the 1970s and thus, could not catch up with South 
Korea's defence spending, even though it devoted a considerable share of its GNP 
to defence. 
2) Since the 1990s the gap between the South and North has widened and the North 
has focussed on developing strategic weapons such as long-distance missiles, and 
nuclear and bio-chemical weapons to deter the US-South alliance instead of 
purchasing new and expensive conventional weapons. 
3) In the late 1990s, peace talks between the South and North lowered military 
tension in the Korean Peninsula and contributed to the reduction of defence 
spending in both countries. 
Figure 2.1 describes the military balance between the South and North using both nations' 
defence spending in real terms. It shows that the military expenditure of South Korea was 
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approximately 6.8 times more than that of North Korea in 1999, although the gap was 
slightly narrowed in 2000. The Figure shows that the defence spending of South has rapidly 
increased since the mid- I 970s and the South began to dominate the North from the early 
1980S. 
The economic recession in South Korea starting in 1997 changed the pattern of military 
spending in both nations. The two Koreasdefence expenditures were considerably reduced 
in US dollars and the North's defence cut was more sizable than the South's. South Korea's 
defence spending was largely reduced in 1998 in real tenns, while North Korea had already 
started to reduce its defence spending in 1997. South Korea's defence reduction was 
probably caused by the devaluation of the Korean currency (Won) and more needs for 
social welfare, while North Korea seems to be changing its defence policy because its 
economy is incapable of sustaining its defence burden. Moreover, North Korea's arms 
expansion is not conducive to improving the relationship with South Korea and the West. 
The economic reform programme imposed by the PAF significantly cut South Korea's 
defence spending. Nevertheless, its defence spending will not be reduced so fast as long 
as the actual arms reduction in North Korea is not verified. Ultimately, the possibility of 
disannament depends on the search for peace between the two Koreas. 
In terms of the arms race between the South and North, Table 2.6 and Figure 2.1 imply the 
possibility of the existence of an arms race between these two countries. It is expected that 
the arms race between the South and North was led by the North until the late 1970s, but 
the leadership was changed to the South since the 1980s. North Korea's reaction seems to 
be submissive since the mid-1980s. The gap in the defence spending between the South and 
North began to widen from the early 1980s and the South was completely dominating the 
RK 
North in 2000. In other words, the defence expenditures of the two Koreas had increased, 
based on a tit-for-tat strategy until the early 1980s, but North Korea's economic failure has 
limited its defence spending after this time. South Korea's defence spending continually 
increased, as a whole, between 1960 and 2000, although it had small downswings for this 
period. Only one exception was 1998 when South Korea experienced a serious economic 
recession. In 1998 the South's defence spending fell from US$ 12.9 billion to US$ 10.9 
billion in real tenns. However, its defence spending rose again in 1999. In 2000, South 
Korea's defence spending decreased in both current and real levels probably owing to the 
South-North summit talk in June. North Korea's defence spending largely fell in 1997 and 
has been continually falling after this time. On the other hand, Table 2.7 shows US military 
aid to South Korea from 1960 to 1998. The US military grant to the South represented a 
substantial part in the defence spending of the US-South alliance and contributed to 
reducing South Korea's defence burden until the late 1970s. In fact, South Korea could 
achieve rapid economic growth owing to the US military assistance in its development 
process. Hence, it is expected that US military aid might contribute to South Korea's 
economic growth by providing spill-ins and preventing a crowding-out of civilian 
investment. In other words, regarding South Korea's defence-growth relationship, US 
military aid might have contributed to cutting South Korea's defence spending and raise its 
growth by helping South Korea to divert the resources released from defence to the civilian 
sectors from the early 1960s to the late 1970s. Even by 2003, US military support , including 
36,000 military personnel, 90 combat aircraft, and airborne warning and control system 
(AWACS) is significant to deter the North Korean threat. Without US military support, 
South Korea's defence spending would be largely increased. Therefore, even though South 
Korea has been paying for the presence of US troops since the early 1980s, the presence of 
US troops is not only symbolically but also strategically important in the security context 
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of the Korean Peninsula. In the simple correlation analysis, the two Koreas' defence 
spending is correlated at 0.59 and this indicates possible arms races between the two 
nations. But, South Korea's defence spending and its growth are not significantly correlated 
(see Appendices 11- 1 and 11-2). In Figure 2.1, the data from MND are used, because IIS S 
military expenditures data are only available from the 1970s. So, the military balance 
between the two Koreas will be mainly analysed using MND data. 
Table 2.6. Military Expenditures of the South and North Korea, 1960-2000 
(US$ million in 1995 constant prices) 
Nations South Korea North Korea 
Year IISS MND Share of liss MND Share of 
GNP(%) GNP(%) 
1960 736 7.0 742 7.8 
1965 - 508 3.7 - 1,170 8.6 
1970 636 1,099 3.7 978 2,511 16.2 
1975 1,373 2,411 4.4 918 4,522 14.4 
1980 6,609 6,689 6.1 1,350 5,858 15.5 
1985 8,592 6,198 5.1 5,675 4,647 17.4 
1990 12,677 11,666 3.7 5,434 4,280 23.8 
1991 12,146 12,638 3.5 5,328 5,166 24.4 
1992 13,731 13,130 3.5 5,087 4,819 25.7 
1993 11,645 13,002 3.4 5,305 4,804 25.5 
1994 12,764 13,625 3.3 5,412 4,990 26.6 
1995 14,359 14,424 3.2 5,232 5,619 (25.2) 
1996 16,172 14,245 3.0 (5,559) (5,559) (27.2) 
1997 14,732 12,930 3.0 (2,238) (2,238) (16.8) 
1998 10,461 10,923 2.4 (1,952) (1,952) (15-9) 
1999 11,331 13,104 3.0 (1,929) (1,929) (14.3) 
2000 
1 
11,453 10,338 2.8 (1,875) (1,875) (13.9) 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are quoting The Military Balance, IISS. 
2. North Korean GNPs are commercial or trade exchange rates. 
3. South Korean military expenditures are not including the US military aid. 
Sources: T. Y. Hamm (1999) "Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power pp. 93-96; IISS, 
The Military Balance, various years; Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, various years; 
D. G. Kim (1999) "North Koreanology. ", pp. 108; Korea National Statistical Office, Korea Statistical 
Yearbook 2000; SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook, various years. 
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Figure 2.1. Change in Military Spending of the South and North Korea, 1960-2000 












--a-- South North 
Sources: The Korean Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, various years; The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1963-2002. 
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Table 2.7. US Military Aid to South Korea, 1960-1998 
(US$ million in 1995 constant nrive,. ) 
Year South ME US military aid Total US aid/Total 
1960 736 1,059 1,795 59.0 
1962 654 905 1,559 58.0 
1964 475 825 1,300 63.5 
1966 630 771 1,401 55.0 
1968 861 938 1,799 52.1 
1970 1,099 1,286 2,385 54.0 
1972 1,470 1,297 2,767 46.9 
1974 2,008 513 2,521 20.3 
1976 3,600 698 4,298 16.2 
1978 5,693 433 6,126 7.1 
1980 6,689 161 6,850 2.3 
1982 6,703 63 6,766 0.9 
1984 6,261 (-38) 6,261 (-0.6) 
1986 6,278 (-98) 6,278 (-1.6) 
1988 9,375 (-260) 9,375 (-2.8) 
1990 11,666 (-194) 11,666 (-1.7) 
1992 13,130 (-299) 13,130 (-2.3) 
1994 13,625 (-366) 13,625 (-2.7) 
1996 14,245 (425) 14,245 (-3.0) 
1998 10,923 (-312) 10,923 (-2.8) 
Notes: 1. US military aid is the pure military grant to South Korea. 
2. Figures in parentheses are South Korea's share expenses for the presence of US troops. 
Sources: US DSAA, Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, 
various years; US AID, Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, 
various years; World Bank, World Development Indicators, various years; Korea National Statistical Office, 
Korea Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
According to the correlation test to detect South Korea's free-riding for the period 1960- 
1976, it is found that there is no significant relationship between South Korea's defence 
spending and US military aid, but South Korea's defence spending is negatively correlated 
to the share of US military aid in the total military spending of US-South alliance. It is 
significant at the level of 0.01 for both Pearson and Spearman tests and the coefficients are 
-0.89 (Pearson test) and -0.92 (Spearman test). 
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2.3. SOUTH KOREA'S DEFENCE INDUSTRIES 
South Korea's defence industry has been developed under President Park's "self-defence" 
policy since the early 1970s to cope with North Korea's arms expansion and the reduction 
of US military aid. Initially, there was free transfer of military technology from the USA, 
but South Korea's attempt to develop nuclear technology in the late 1970s made the US 
government more cautious about technology transfer. Accordingly, the free technology 
transfer from the USA ended in the 1980s and subsequently the South Korean government 
has focussed on expanding its defence industry and military R&D to build a more 
independent defence industrial base. The South Korean government has especially 
supported the development of high technology industries such as aerospace, electronics, and 
communication systems. As a result, the military R&D expenditures of South Korea 
increased steadily between 1986 and 2000 except for 1998, and accounted for 
approximately 5.2% of total defence spending in 2000. One of the plans of the South 
Korean govenunent includes increasing the defence R&D by up to 15% of total defence 
spending until 2015 (Table 2.8). 
Most South Korean defence equipments are produced in large corporate groups under 
government contract. In general, government has the initiative in defence R&D, but often 
co-operates with private conglomerates such as Samsung, Daewoo and Hyundai. These 
conglomerates are the main contractors of military production and they sub-contract with 
smaller suppliers. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) has the initiative using a 
monopsony position and affects the defence industry, and the procurement agency strictly 
inspects the defence products. Despite many regulatory conditions, the government also 
encourages private companies to participate in the defence industries by providing 
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favourable financial and technological support. In other words, the government provides 
advanced payments for the contract and also provides support for the essential technology 
through the goverm-nent-affiliated military institutes, such as the Agency for Defense 
Development (ADD) for defence projects carried out by private industry. Thus, military 
business is very helpful for the cash flow and technological progress of a company which 
attracts companies into the defence market, although it is not as profitable as civil business. 
For example, Samsung used profits earned from its non-military division, such as semi- 
conductor and electronics to develop military aerospace technology such as the KTX- I 
training-aircraft project and KTX-2 advanced trainer (Cheng and Chinworth, 1996). 
Table 2.8. Government Expenditure on Military R&D in South Korea 1986-2000 
(US$ million) 
Year 1986 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Military R&D (1995 170 440 460 510 342 590 663 
constant prices) 
Share of military R&D in 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.5 5.1 5.2 
defence spending (%) 
Sources: SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook, various years; Republic of Korea, MND (The Ministry of National 
Defense), Defense White Paper, Seoul, various years; Republic of Korea, The Ministry of Science and 
Technology, Annual Survey Report on R&D Activities, various years. 
Despite the increase of R&D investment, the South Korean defence industry has had 
difficulties in developing high levels of technology and productivity. For instance, in the 
aerospace field, there has been a chronic shortage of financial resources notwithstanding 
government support, a lack of experienced and qualified personnel, and also an absence 
of an efficient material acquisition system. Namely, South Korea did not have the 
technological capabilities to produce these materials locally and also the import of core 
technology was not simple. The other problem is that the South Korean defence industry 
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depends highly on the import of foreign components, raw materials and technological 
licences. According to the US government6, the defence procurement of the South Korean 
government depends highly on foreign supply, although the Korean Ministry of National 
Defense (MND) claimed that approximately 80% (Table 2.9) of its purchases are 
indigenous (Huxley and Willett, 1999). Probably, the gap between the two data implies that 
South Korea needs the imports of semi-manufactured or semi-assembled goods for defence 
production from foreign countries, particularly from the US with frontier technologies 
needed for the local assembly of weapon systems. Thus, it is assumed that many local 
defence suppliers import these semi-assembled materials and produce finished goods owing 
to a lack of technology. However, the South Korean government seems to regard these 
products as locally-produced goods. 
Table 2.9. Defence Procurement by Source 1990-1995 
(Won billion in 1990 constant prices) 
Year Defence procurement 
Total Domestic Share Foreign Share 
purchase imports 
1990 4,252 3,092 73% 1,160 27% 
1991 3,215 2,680 83% 535 17% 
1992 3,502 2,217 63% 1,285 37% 
1993 3,455 2,999 87% 456 13% 
1994 3,632 2,975 82% 657 18% 
1995 3,446 2,816 82% 630 18% 
Sources: Ministry of National Defense (MND), Defense White Paper (various years), Republic of Korea; 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics Yearbook (various years); Choi, J. C. 
(1998) "South Korea" in R. P. Singh (ed. ) Arms Procurement Decision Making Volume I. - China, India, 
Israel, Japan, South Korea and Thailand, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
6 According to the US Department of Commerce, it is estimated that only 20% of government procurement 
Is supplied locally in the defence sector in South Korea. (US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 
office of Strategic Industries and Economic Strategy, Pacific Rini Diversi/icalion and Defense Markel Assessment, 
Washington DC: DoC, 1994: p. 95). 
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Another problem for the South Korean defence industry is low offset rates on foreign 
imports, although South Korea is one of the major importers from the US defence market. 
South Korea's offset rate is low compared with major offset agreements between the USA 
and other major importers. For example, in 1990, South Korea's offset rate was only 46.2% 
while other countries, including Britain and Spain achieved over 100% (Choi, 1998). These 
low offset rates might be caused by the lack of South Korea's negotiation skill and the 
USA's arms export strategy preventing the transfer of high technology. South Korea's 
defence policy is to secure military technologies in order to accelerate the rate of 
indigenisation of defence production, but the USA is reluctant to provide the core 
technology and a high ratio of offset trade to South Korea. Hence, South Korea needs to 
diversify defence suppliers from the USA to other countries and choose the best option for 
its defence procurement, but it is not simple due to the US-South military alliance. But, 
recently, South Korea's offset rates have been gradually rising. The imminent F- I 5K fighter 
programme, for example, carries a large offset obligation amounting to 83%. 
South Korea's defence industry is also faced with low productivity. First, regarding the 
efficiency of the procurement process, contract forms and cost management systems are not 
developed so as to improve the productivity of defence suppliers and reduce unit costs. 
Defence contractors do not have incentives to reduce unit costs in the case of fixed-price 
contracts, because the military deducts the difference between the prime cost on the contract 
and the real prime cost after production (Choi, 1998). This means that fixed price contracts 
are re-negotiated. If the real prime cost after production (post-cost) is lower than the prime 
cost on the contract, government deducts the difference and cuts the price of equipment to 
reduce government expenses. That is, the profits from cost reduction do not go to the 
suppliers. Second, the South Korean government has encouraged arms exports to increase 
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the productivity and profitability of the defence industry, but South Korea's annual arms 
exports have not only been very small but they also have been declining even compared 
with North Korea (Table 2.10). North Korea has developed its indigenous missile 
technology by applying Russian Scud and strategically exported these missiles to the 
Middle East, India and Pakistan, while South Korea's defence Industries have depended on 
imports which entailed technology transfer from the US and Westem countries. 
Table 2.10. Arms Imports/Exports of South and North Korea, 1986-2000 
(US$ million, 1996 in constant Prices) 
Nation South Korea North Korea 
Year Import Export Trade Balance Import Export Trade Balance 
1986 849 177 -672 571 340 -231 
1988 953 102 -851 1,271 890 -381 1990 1,111 152 -959 234 246 12 
1992 1,314 33 -1,281 164 186 22 
1994 2,188 42 -2,146 135 63 -72 
1996 1,100 20 -1,080 0 50 50 
1998 1,002 36 -966 - - - 
2000 815 7 -808 
Note: It is doubted that South Korea's arms exports/imports data for the period 1996-2000 are undervalued. 
But, both ACDA and Defense White Paper (The Korean Ministry of National Defense) show similar results. 
Sources: U. S. Anns Control and Disannarnent Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditure and Arms 
Transfers 1997; The Korean Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, various years. 
From the late 1990s, with South Korea's economic crisis, the government has pursued 
downsizing and restructuring of its defence industries and has decided to reduce the number 
of major contractors and over-investment in the defence industry. For example, three major 
aerospace firins, Daewoo, Samsung and Hyundai, merged in 1999 to form "Korean 
Aerospace Industries" (KAI), now the sole aircraft manufacturer in South Korea (Lewis, 
1998). KAI started to produce the KT-1, a basic trainer aircraft developed indigenously 
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after it completed the initial Korea Fighter Program (KFP). K-Ad is also developing the T- 
50, an advanced supersonic trainer aircraft and preparing for long-term strategic programs, 
such as the F-X next generation fighter, a multi-purpose helicopter and marine patrol 
aircraft. However, South Korea's fighter market depends mostly on imports from foreign 
countries, mainly the USA. Table 2.11 compares the output, profit and the proportion of 
military sector to total output between the KAI and other major aerospace companies. 
According to Table 2.11, KAI is not yet competitive with other major companies in both 
scale of output and profitability. General Dynamics, a relatively small aerospace company 
is about 16 times larger than KAI in its total output and KAI did not make a profit by 2000. 
Thus, it is estimated that KAI is inferior to other major companies in both its economies of 
scale and associated productivity. Its dependence on the military sector is also higher than 
other major companies. Hence, KAI needs to penetrate the domestic market first by 
producing fighters and other aircraft meeting domestic needs, and develop niche markets 
for export in both the military and civil aerospace sectors. 
The South Korean defence industries may also have to face competition with foreign 
companies through the government's open market policy. The South Korean government 
has been very energetic in inviting foreign capital since the 1997 economic crisis and they 
are ready to permit not only the investment of foreign companies in local defence 
industries but also the ownership of these industries. However, by 2003, there was no case 
of foreign companies actually acquiring ownership of major South Korean defence 
industries. It is believed that the investment of foreign companies in local defence industries 
is not always desirable in tenns of the national security. Therefore, it is desirable that the 
government resolve the problems of defence industry domestically through restructuring 
and downsizing. In terms of the optimal structure of aerospace industry, it is better to be 
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monopolistic in South Korea, because South Korea has a relatively small aerospace market 
and few opportunities to export due to its technological weakness. In so doing, the economy 
can save resources by avoiding over-investment. 
Table. 2.11. Comparison between Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and Other Major 
Producers 
(US$ million in 2000 constant prices) 
Company Arms Total Profit Profit/ Military sector in 
sales output Sales (%) total output 
Korea Aerospace 483 568 -88 -15.0% 85% 
Industries (KAI) 
Lockheed Martin 18610 25329 -519 -2.0% 73% 
(USA) 
Boeing (USA) 16900 51521 2128 4.1% 33% 
BAE SYSTEMS 14400 18473 1440 7.8% 78% 
(UK) 
Northrop Grumman 6660 7618 608 8.0% 87% 
(USA) 
General Dynamics 6520 10356 901 8.7% 63% 
(USA) 
EADS 5340 22303 -832 -3.7% 24% 
(France/Germany/ 
Spain) 




Source: SIPRI, Yearbook 2002, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Korea Aerospace Industries, KAI Financial 
Report 2000, Seoul: KAI. 
There has been a positive effect of dual technologies on the South Korean economy. From 
the 1970s to the mid-1990s, South Korea's development of dual technologies contributed 
to its economy through technological spin-ons and employment. As illustrated in Table 
2.12, the production technology of machine tools and fuel injection systems was applied 
to developing rifles, and technology for manufacturing railcars, trucks, and special engines 
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for civilian uses was utilised in producing tanks and military vehicles. Also, technology for 
commercial electronics and communications technology, such as the development of video 
tape recorders, copy-machine drums, microwave devices, cordless telephones, navigational 
radar and marine electronics contributed to progressing fire control systems, 
communications and laser-ranging equipment (Kim, 1993). Under President Park's regime 
(1962-1979), government made efforts to commercialize military technology and develop 
dual-use technologies for civilian uses and such efforts were successful in some parts. 
However, as mentioned earlier, South Korea had a relatively weak base in develoPing 
military technology, and civilian firms had no capabilities and incentives to implement 
these projects (Hwang, 1996). Furthermore, it is doubted that dual-use technologies, 
especially from the military to the civilian sector, really contributed to the development of 
civilian technology and the economy. In most cases, it is difficult to apply the technology 
for military purposes to civilian uses. Thus, it is believed that the technology spin-offs from 
military to civilian sector were not much efficient in South Korea. Alternatively, as shown 
in Table 2.12, it must be considered to apply the civilian technology to the military sector 
to achieve a more economic efficiency. It is claimed that the application of military 
technology to civilian uses might increase the cost of products to resolve the technological 
difference between the military and civilian products. Thus, it might be more efficient to 
invest in the civilian technology directly. To some extent, these dual-use technologies were 
beneficial at the beginning of South Korea's economic development, because the military 
technology could be transferred to civilian purposes and bring an import- substitution effect. 
In the development process of South Korea, dual use technologies might have supplied key 
technologies to the defence industry and contributed to the development of civilian 
technology by providing its advanced know-how until the late 1970s. However, the 
importance of dual-use technologies has gradually ebbed since the 1980s. 
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Table 2.12. Examples of Spin-on 
Area Military technology Commercialization examples 
Metals; Machining Small arms manufacture Production of fuel injection 
Recoil system for 155 mm gun Hydraulic cylinders 
Parts for howitzers and Vulcans NC machine tools 
Aluminum welding technology Welded aluminium structures 
Transportation Armoured vehicle fabrication Transmissions 
Tool and die design 
Military engines 
Electronics and NKH missile-tracking device Laser range finders 
Communications Fire control system for guns Airborne meteorology equipment 
Production of aluminum fuses Military radio communications 
Fire control calculators Guided missiles and radars 
I 
Military teletype printers 
Source: Hwang, D. J. (1996) "The Role of Defense Industry in Innovation and the Development of Dual-Use 
Technology", The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 8(l): 153-176. 
Since the 1980s,, the South Korean defence industry has tended to rely on anns imports and 
technology transfer from the arms exporting countries, so that its defence industrial policy 
has seemed to be changed from indigenous technology development to licensed production 
and offsets (eg. F-16 co-production programme, Hawk, etc. ) due to South Korea's 
technological and manpower limitations. But, the opportunity cost should be estimated 
whether the foreign imports of defence equipment gave more benefits to the rest of the 
economy compared with indigenous development. On one hand, the development of 
indigenous military technology might have a negative effect on the rest of the economy by 
crowding-out necessary non-military public and private investment. On the other hand, the 
import of defence equipment has also a negative effect on the balance of trade and 
subsequently the rest of the economy. Also, depending wholly on the imports might cause 
the underdevelopment of indigenous technology. Hence, it is important for government to 
harmonise these two methods in making its defence industrial policy by increasing offset 
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rates, and nurturing technicians and industrial base. 
In terms of employment, the defence industry contributed to the South Korean economy 
throughout the 1980s. Table 2.13 shows that the South Korean defence industry increased 
its employment until 1995 (about 10,000 employees every five year), although it has 
declined with the economic slowdown since 1997. 









in defence industry 
(thousand) 
Share of employment in 
defence industry in total 
employment 
1985 14,970 3,504 40 0.3 
1987 16,354 4,416 40 0.2 
1989 17,560 4,882 50 0.3 
1991 18,677 5,026 50 0.3 
1993 19,328 4,677 60 0.3 
1995 20,432 4,797 60 0.3 
1997 21,106 4,482 55 0.3 
1999 20,281 4,006 50 0.2 
2001 21,362 4,199 
Sources: Bonn International Center for Conversion, Conversion Survey. - Global Disarmament, 
Demilitarization and Demobilization (various years) Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft; Korea 
National Statistical Office, Major Statistics of Korean Economy (2002), Seoul: Republic of Korea. 
Defence spending has also been a burden to South Korea in spite of its economic success. 
As shown in Table 2.14, South Korea has sacrificed its spending on social welfare, 
including health and housing, and public and private investment for the civilian economy 
due to the defence burden required for the North Korean threat. According to Table 2.14, 
government spending on defence has declined over the last 15 years, but is still high. In 
Table 2.15, compared with other OECD countries, including Australia and France, South 
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Korea's share of defence in total government spending is extraordinarily high. Although 
expenditures on social welfare and other public services have steadily increased, the social 
welfare sector has fallen behind compared with other OECD countries. Table 2.16 shows 
that government outlay on the defence sector is significantly and negatively correlated with 
outlays on the social welfare and other public and economic services. The correlation 
coefficient between defence and social welfare is highly negative at -0.86 and it is also 
negative at -0.96 for other public and economic services. But, government spending on 
education is positively correlated with its spending on defence, because both the share of 
spending on defence and education in government expenditures decreased for the period 
1980-2000. Thus , it is noted that the South Korean government has mainly focussed on the 
increase of social welfare and other public services at the expense of reducing the share of 
defence spending in government outlays. 





1980 1985 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Defence 35.6 30.6 25.0 25.9 23.7 22.1 19.3 17.0 
Education 17.7 20.1 20.4 19.4 19.3 18.9 16.6 14.3 
Social welfare 6.4 6.8 8.9 9.7 9.0 8.6 9.8 11.9 
Others 40.3 42.5 45.7 45.0 48.0 50.4 54.3 56.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: 1. Social welfare defines the social security and development such as unemployment benefit and the 
government subsidy to private social welfare facilities. Social welfare sector also includes health and 
housing. 
2. Others include expenditures on economic development, general public and economic services such 
as fuel and energy, agriculture, forestry, mining, and transportation and communication etc. 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office, Major Statistics of Korean Economy 2000, Seoul. 
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Table 2.15. Government Final Consumption of Major OECD countries by Function, 
1995 
Percentage of government final consumption (%) 
Function 
Country 
Defence Education Health Welfare Housing Others 
Australia 10.9 21.2 18.2 5.8 2.1 41.8 
Austria 4.7 22.7 27.1 17.5 - 28.0 
France 15.8 26.0 17.3 7.5 6.9 26.5 
Italy 10.5 26.1 20.7 4.2 3.1 35.4 
Japan 9.0 32.7 4.6 6.6 6.8 40.3 
Note: Others are general public services and various econornIc services such as fuel and energy, agriculture, 
forestry, mining, and transportation and communication etc. 
Source: National Accounts Statistics, Main Aggregates andDetailed Tables 1995, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs Statistics Division, UN: New York. 
Table 2.16. Nonparametric Correlations between Defence and Other Sectors in South 
Korea 
Sector Education Social welfare OtherS 
Defence 0.587** -0.863** -0.961 ** 
** Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed). 
Notes: I. Correlations are measured by the share of expenditures on each sector in the total government 
spending. 
2. Nonparametric correlations are examined by Spearman's rho test. 
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2.4. SUMMARY: FUTURE ISSUES FOR THE TWO KOREAS DEFENCE 
ECONOMY 
Since the Korean War, both the South and North re-started the anns build-up in spite of 
their devastated economies. North Korea began to increase its armaments in the early 
1960s and spent approximately 20-25% of GNP on military expenditure throughout the 
1990s, although it suddenly decreased in 1997 and 1998 (The Military Balance 2000/200 1, 
HSS). As a consequence, North Korea's high defence burden has seriously crowded-out 
civilian investment and caused an economic decline in its closed economy. By contrast, the 
defence spending of South Korea has escalated with its economic development since the 
1960s, heavily depending on US military aid, and has been maintained at about 3-6% of 
GNP, although it has steadily decreased since the 1990s. The South has spent more on 
military expenditures than the North since the early 1980s, but it is still inferior to North 
in the number of armed forces and weapons stock. In spite of this inferiority, the South 
could deter a potential threat from the North owing to the presence of US troops (with US 
commitment to aid South Korea in any conflict). 
Even though South Korea has spent more on defence for about two decades, North Korea 
has had a dominating military power over the South in the number of military personnel and 
equipment. Here, three factors are relevant. First, the North has substantial hidden costs 
which should be counted as defence expenditure but are not. For example, North Korea 
retains 189,000 security troops under the Ministry of Public Security and some 3,500,000 
Worker/Peasant Red Guard, but there are doubts as to whether the costs of retaining these 
forces are counted as military expenditure. In fact, the Korean Ministry ofNational Defense 
(MND) estimates that North Korea's actual defence spending is about 2-3 times larger than 
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its official data. Second, North Korea's cheap labour costs might have lowered its defence 
spending. In 1998 the gap of per capita income between the South and North was over 12 
times in current prices. Thus, it is inferred that the North might depend on its cheap labour 
cost to maintain its defence forces and industries owing to its conscription system and long- 
term military service. Hence, North Korea could have an advantage over the South, 
especia ly in labour-intensive defence industries and military forces. Third, the major 
conventional weapons of North Korea have low quality and value as they are mostly 
outdated and aged compared with those of the South which has constantly attempted to 
improve its quality of weapons and purchased new weapons. For example, South Korea's 
main com at aircra . F-16 series, imported from the US was introduced in the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s while North Korea's major fighters are still the MIG-21 series produced 
in the former Soviet Union from the late 1950s. 
Although the military gap between the South and North is being widened and South Korea's 
defence budget tends to increase annually, North Korea is still a major threat to South 
Korea. Thus, South Korea's dilemma is how to attain higher economic growth, maintain 
a strong military capability with a small defence burden and mitigate the North's threat. As 
a result, since the late 1980s, there have been many efforts at peace negotiation (entente 
cordiale), including the discussion for arms control between the two Koreas, but mutual 
trust has hardly improved' : hence, the military build-up is still the most secure way to 
survive in the competition between the two nations. Nevertheless, if peace talks between 
the two nations are continued, disarmament will be the key issue for both countries. 
Disarmament is essential to the North for its economic reconstruction while it is also 
7 Two Koreas made the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Co-operation 
between the South and the North in 1992, but there is no notable progress in disan-nament and both nations are continuing 
their military build-up and regular military training. 
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significant for the South for better economic prosperity. Since the peace talks, North Korea 
urgently requested economic aid, including food and energy; however they cannot wholly 
depend on the South and foreign assistance, and also need to finance themselves through 
reductions in defence spending. 
Another important issue concerns the defence industry of South Korea. It is expected that 
the South Korean defence industry will decline with the progress of peace talks between 
the South and North, but nonetheless, the South cannot reduce its arms production 
immediately due to the schedule of military procurement and its negative economic effects. 
A sudden shrinkage of military production may damage its defence industrial base and 
increase costs. Also, at the very beginning of peace talks, both countries need to continue 
their military build-up, because the disarmament through peace negotiation might fail. 
Therefore, on the one hand, South Korea needs to avoid the rapid decline of its defence 
industrial base and prepare for the adverse effects from disarmament, while on the other, 
South Korea should raise the competitive position of its defence and military R&D in the 
long-term. In this aspect, military outsourcing might be considered for improving the 
efficiency of South Korea's defence. The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) transferred its 
traditional 'in-house' activities, such as catering, security guarding and maintenance, 
engineering and supply, and training and instruction to private firms, and saved some 20- 
30% of cost (Hartley, 2002). However, the military outsourcing might increase the cost in 
South Korea, because the wage of military personnel is generally much lower than that of 
civilians owing to its conscription system. Hence, the cost and benefit of military 
outsourcing needs to be carefully analysed before awarding such contracts. Also, South 
Korea needs to prepare for the unification of the two Koreas and subsequent economic 
conversion of North Korea, even though it is unlikely to happen in the near future. 
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Basically, economic conversion must entail the gradual reduction of major weapons and 
arms expenditures, but mutual trust between the two nations is needed to attain this goal 
and this will require more time. 
From this chapter, three hypotheses might be suggested. First, the arms race between South 
and North Korea is expected to exist since the 1960s. Until the late 1970s, the defence 
spending of North Korea was superior to South Korea's, but since the 1980s, it was 
reversed. Hence, it is expected that North Korea led the South-North anns race until the 
1970s and South Korea led it from the 1980s. Second, US military aid is expected to 
provide a free-ride to South Korea. As mentioned earlier, South Korea's defence spending 
was not correlated to the real US military aid, but it was found that it had a significant 
negative relationship with the share of US military aid in the total military spending of US- 
South alliance. Third, it is expected that some positive or negative relationship exists 
between defence and growth in South Korea. At the beginning of South Korea's economic 
development, its defence might have a positive effect on growth through spin-offs and 
externalities, such as social infrastructure, human capital and the technology transfer from 
military to the civilian sector. By contrast, defence might harm growth after South Korea 
reached a middle-income country by crowding-out more productive non-military 
investment. In the next chapter, the existence of an arms race in the Korean Peninsula will 
be examined, beginning with a review of the related literature. 
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CHAPTER III 
A REVIEW OF ARMS RACE MODELS 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The arms race is one of the most important and widely pervaded phenomenon in today's 
world politics. Even though the Cold War has faded away since the end of the I 980s, big 
and small conflicts between regional rivals still exist in the post-Cold War era and China 
is rising as a dominant power confronting the US in East Asia (Buzan and Herring, 1998). 
In this changing environment, arms races between regional rivals are very important to both 
defence economists and political scientists. 
There is no common and widely accepted definition of an arms race, because it is a highly 
controversial topic and can be approached from many different angles. For example, at one 
extreme, the anus race between superpowers could be thought as a means to maintain the 
balance of power and thus secure world peace in the Cold War era. However, at the other 
extreme, an arms race is regarded not only as a main threat to international peace but also 
as a serious dilemma to world security. Anderton (1986, p. 9) defined an arms race as "a 
situation where two or more parties change the quantity or quality of their am-led forces in 
response to perceived past, current or anticipated future increases in the quantity or quality 
of armed forces of the other party(ies)". On the other hand, Albrecht(1990, p. 89) asserted 
that programs for major weapons systems of the leading military powers do not follow an 
action-reaction pattern, although he did not completely deny the existence of a race. In other 
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words, he suggested that the accumulation of weapons by both parties is something 
different from a race whether they are conventional or strategic. However, as generally 
defined, an arms race is two or more nations (or parties) actively involved in a competition 
to accumulate military strength against each other. 
Although anns races have always existed between conflicting nations throughout history 
and security has been one of the most important factors which sustains the state system, 
systematic research on military competition including war, armed conflicts, anns races and 
defence policy had not been performed deeply before Carl von Clausewitz (1832) wrote 
"On war". The theoretical studies on the arms race were started by L. F. Richardson in the 
1930s and "Arms and Insecurity"(1960) describing his general theory of the arins race was 
published posthumously in 1960. Accordingly, the history of arms race studies is relatively 
short and still has a long way to go. After the Cold War ended in 1989, research on anns 
races seems to be unnecessary in the age of peace. Nevertheless, many regional conflicts, 
small wars and terrorism are still continuing, and they are emerging as a new significant 
threat to international security. To describe these phenomena, some stylized facts are 
presented in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1. Change of Armaments in Regional Rivalries 
Nations Military expenditures (US$ Million) % of GDP 
1970* 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 
us 120655 270262 356994 262380 7.1 5.4 5.3 3.0 
Russia 93900 107300 203000 24883 9.7 - 12.3 3.8 
S. Korea 662 6689 11666 10338 3.7 6.1 3.7 2.8 
N. Korea 956 5858 4280 2049** 16.2 15.5 23.8 13.9 
Turkey 1655 3347 5502 9686 4.7 4.3 3.5 5A 
Greece 1044 4425 5059 6738 4.7 5.7 4.7 4.8 
Pakistan 874 1494 3111 3259 6.6 5.7 6.2 5.8 
India 3201 4408 7660 1 11838 3.4 3.0 2.9 3.1 
Notes: 1. Russian data before 1990 are the data from former Soviet Union. 
2. Military expenditure data are 1995 constant prices except for 1970 (1970 data are 1978 constant prices). 
3. Military expenditure of North Korea in 2000 is in current prices. 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook, various years (SIPRI); The Military Balance, various years (IISS). 
The trends in change of annaments in US and Russia, the Cold War superpowers, and three 
pairs of regional rivalries are shown in Table 3.1. This Table illustrates how the pattern of 
arms races has changed since the end of the Cold War. After 1990, the military 
expenditures of the two superpowers, US and Russia, rapidly reduced and those of the two 
Koreas also decreased. However, the gap of military spending between the two Koreas 
widened since the 1990s. In contrast, there are some differences in other regions. Turkey, 
Greece, Pakistan and India increased their military spending even though the Cold War had 
ended. Hence, these regional rivalries were not affected by the end of the Cold War. 
South and North Korea increased their defence spending since the Korean War (1950-1953) 
until the mid- I 990s, but they tended to decrease defence spending since the mid- I 990s. In 
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spite of its economic difficulties, North Korea's share of defence spending in GNP reached 
up to 25-27% until the mid- I 990s and its defence burden was unprecedentedly high in the 
world. As a result, North Korea's excessive defence burden precipitated its economic 
collapse. By contrast, South Korea steadily increased its defence spending owing to its 
economic success and caught up with North Korea in the 1980s. Although the share of 
North Korea's defence spending in GDP has reduced since the 1990s, it is believed that its 
actual defence spending was not really reduced, and the number of military personnel and 
weapons dominated South Korea's by 2003. South Korea's defence spending tended to 
decrease after its economic crisis in 1997. Consequently, there is no clear evidence that the 
arms races between these regional rivals disappeared. Among these countries, the military 
confrontation between South and North Korea is still continuing despite the end of the Cold 
War. Economic co-operation between the two countries is increasing, but military tension 
is still high in the Korean Peninsula. Although the anns race between the South and North 
tended to be alleviated since the 1990s due to the military superiority of the US-South 
alliance, North Korea is still a great threat to the South. Its development of nuclear and bio- 
chemical weapons is threatening peace in this region. Hence, it is important to study the 
arms race between South and North Korea experiencing rapid political change. Although 
there are many arms race models, only some key elements of those models related to this 
thesis will be briefly introduced and discussed in this chapter. Many arms race models 
include demand for military expenditure, because defence spending and an anns race are 
closely related to each other. Here, the major features of those models will be presented and 
critically assessed (Isard and Anderton, 1988; Sandler and Hartley, 1995; Intriligator and 
Brito, 2000). 
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This chapter discusses the classical Richardson model and its alternative model considered 
in the strategic aspects (missile war game) studied by Intriligator (1975) and Intriligator and 
Brito (1976,1977,1984). These two models are very important to the study of arms race 
theory. Richardson provided the first and most basic arms race model and showed that 
international relations could be explained by mathematical methods. Intriligator(l 975) and 
Intriligator and Brito (1976,1977,1984) developed a strategic missile war model strongly 
influenced by Richardson. This model not only introduced the Cold War arms race 
interaction, but it also represented strategic analysis concerning arms escalation, mutual 
deterrence and the outbreak of war. Hence, these two theories are necessary to describe the 
action-reaction process, one of the main hypotheses in explaining arms race phenomenon. 
Other necessary arms race models will also be introduced, but this survey will be mostly 
focussed on the models based on the Richardson's action-reaction process. 
3.2. ARMS RACE MODELS 
When two or more countries or alliances are involved in an competitive arms acquisition 
or increase of military manpower, the phenomenon is defined as an arms race. These arms 
racing countries or alliances usually have conflicting national goals and are often engaged 
in regional disputes. Most Richardson arms race models are characterized as an action- 
reaction or tit-for-tat processes in which a nation increases its arms expenditures in 
response to increases in its potential opponent's. However, it is found that this action- 
reaction process is not adequate to explain the entire arms race phenomena and often falls 
to demonstrate them. Consequently, an arms race is not caused by a certain factor, but is 
induced by a combination of various complex factors. In other words, arms races are 
caused not by a simple an-ned conflict but by various internal and external factors including 
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diplomatic disputes, the change ofpolitical, economic and social environment, the military- 
industrial complex and the revolutionary growth of military technology. For example, the 
post-Cold War US military expansion has been largely motivated by the development of 
military technology and political purpose to grasp world hegemony. Whereas the South and 
North Korean military competition has been induced by historical antipathy and distrust 
caused by the Korean war (grievance factor) under the Cold War system. Therefore, the 
arms race in the Korean Peninsula is affected by the combination of external (the Cold War) 
and internal (national conflict) factors. 
3.2.1. The Richardson's Action-Reaction Model and Its Variants 
3.2.1.1. The Richardson Model 
Lewis F. Richardson's seminal work (Richardson, 1960 ) which represented the first arms 
race model made a great contribution to the development of mathematical theories of 
international relations. Most of the arms race theories have been derived from his model 
and one of the important works on arms race study was developing a better model fitting 
the real world. Accordingly, a study on arms race models should start with Richardson's 
'action-reaction'model, because it is the most influential model in the arms race studies and 
a descriptive model of the dynamic processes of interaction in an arms race (Intriligator and 
Brito, 1990). The classic Richardson model starts from the following two hypotheses 
(Majeski and Jones, 1981): 
Hypothesis 1. For any two nations in a mutual arms race, changes in their military 
expenditures (or armaments) are determined by its opponent's military 
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expenditures(or armaments), its own military expenditures(or armaments) and a 
grievance factor. 
Hypothesis 2. Two adversary nations will be engaged in a competitive anus race. 
The Richardson model for two antagonistic nations, A and B, is shown by the following 
pair of differential equations: 
dM, 4 I dt = kMB+ aMA+g 
dMBIdt = 1MA+, 8MB+h 
where 
MA= military expenditure (or stock)' in nation A. 
MB= military expenditure (or stock) in nation B. 
k, 1= reaction (or threat) coefficients. 
a,, 8 = fatigue (or burden) coefficients. 
g, h= grievance (or emnity) tenns. 
Oga -< 
(1 >- 09 ß --< 0) (3.2) 
According to Richardson's equation, threat coefficients k, 1 should be positive, but fatigue 
coefficients a, 
P should be negative. Grievance factors g and h can be positive or negative. 
i Military stock can be defined as weapons stock, armed forces or any military stock possible to measure and 
compare with opponent's. For example, number of missile or number of aircraft can be compared between two rivals, 
although the quality of weapons might be different. 
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From these two equations, it is found that the change in the military stock or defence 
spending of one nation is linearly correlated to its adversary's military stock or defence 
spending and its own stockpile or expenditure. However, a variable (e. g. MBin equation 
(3.1)) indicating an adversary's military spending or armament stock gives a positive effect 
on the change in the military spending of a nation while the other variable ( MAin equation 
(3.1)) representing a nation's own military spending or armament stock gives a negative 
effect on it due to the fatigue effect caused by the economic burden from defence. In other 
words, in equations (3.1) and (3.2), k and 1 are "reaction (threat) coefficients" indicating an 
adversary's threat causing a nation's armaments, whereas a and 8 are "fatigue" or "burden" 
coefficients reflecting the economic burden or stress caused by a nation's own armaments. 
Hence, it is noted that reaction coefficients(or threat coefficients) induce both nations' 
armaments while fatigue coefficients motivate both nations' disarmament and suppress an 
arms race (Zinnes et. al, 1976). In short, the two pairs of coefficients, k, l and a,, 8 have a 
counterposing and restraining relationship with each other. Also, g and h are generally 
called "grievance(or hostility) factors" which indicate a nation's historical antipathy against 
its adversary nation or factors stimulating a nation's military expansion. Alternatively, they 
can express an amicable relation or alliance between two nations when they have negative 
signs. For instance, if two nations are historically and seriously hostile to each other, such 
as Greece-Turkey or India-Pakistan relationship, the grievance factor will be significantly 
positive. The grievance factor of South and North Korea is also assumed to be positive. In 
contrast, the grievance factor can be zero or even negative when two nations have a normal 
relationship or are allied politically, economically and militarily. The US-Canada 
relationship is a good example. 
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Wolfson (1968) introduced a variant of the Richardson model in which one nation contends 
with its adversary's armaments stock or expenditures. The model is represented by the 
following equation: 
dMA I dt = k(MB - 
MA) 
- aMA+g 
dMBIdt = l(MA - 
MB) 
-, 8MB+ h 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
In the above equations, the only difference from the Richardson model is that the change in 
one nation's military stock (or expenditures) is dependent on the difference between its own 
stock (or expenditures) and that of its opponent. The fatigue and grievance factors are the 
same as the Richardson equation. Another similar variant of the Richardson equation is the 
submissiveness model (Zinnes et. al, 1976; Hollist and Guetzkow, 1978; Isard and Anderton, 
1988; Sandler and Hartley, 1995): 
dMA / dt = k[l - O(MB - 
MA)]MB 
- caWA+g (3.5) 
The larger nation B's military stock (or expenditures) is than nation A's, the greater the 
negative effect on the change in nation A's military stock (or expenditures). An equation for 
nation B will also be analogous. In case of MA = MB the equation returns to the Richardson 
model. Also, if MA < M13 ,0 will give a negative effect on the change 
in A's military 
annaments, but if M, > m, 0 will give a positive effect on it. These models are a simple 
technical change of Richardson and are ultimately based on the action-reaction mechanism: 
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hence, they should be regarded as variants of the Richardson model. 
In Table 3.2. Richardson (1960) examined the European arms race of 1909-13 between the 
two alliances, France and Russia, on one side, and Germany and Austria-Hungary, on the 
other side. According to the Table, the defence expenditures of these nations increased 1.45 
times between 1909 and 1913, while the trade volume of these nations only increased 1.33 
times. In the an-ns race between these two alliances he regarded the trade volume as an index 
of their friendliness while he thought defence expenditures indicate their hostility against 
each other. Assuming that the trade is constant, he set the following differential equations: 
d(U+V)Idt=(k-a)U+V-IU +V -(g+h)l(k-a) (3.6) 
100 
The above equation can be rearranged as follows: 
d(U+V)Idt=k[(U+V)-(UO+Vo)]-a[(U+V)-(UO+Vo)]+(g+h) (3.7) 
where: 
U= alliance A's military expenditure 
UO = alliance A's trade volume with its opponent 
V= alliance B's military expenditure 
alliance B's trade volume with its opponent 0 
and k, cc ,g and 
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In his empirical estimation, Richardson did not test for U and V separately. instead, he 
examined the trend of the change of the sum (U+ V) in the 1909-13 arms races. Here, he 
found that the rate of increase of total military expenditures had a positive linear relationship 
with the defence expenditures of the two nations(or alliances) in this period. Hence, he 
asserts that the anus race between two alliances cannot be avoided as long as their defence 
spending overwhelms the trade volume between them, because the effect of arms build-up 
which symbolizes hostility between two alliances is stronger even though they have some 
trade relationship. As the result of data analysis, he estimated the slope of the line in the 
Equation (3.6) at 0.73. However, even in this simplistic approach serious inconsistencies 
could be found. As Rapoport (1957) pointed out, the trade volume indicating the 
friendliness between these potential adversaries did not remain constant, but it steadily 
increased after 1909. Hence, the slope of the line, that is, the change of military expenditures 
should have decreased, although the grievance terms might be able to explain this 
discrepancy. 
Richardson extended his model to more than two nations and focussed on deriving the 
stability conditions resulting from various values of constant parameters. Although he tried 
to develop various arms race models, empirical tests of the models were not supported in 
many cases. On the other hand, the debates on whether a nation responds to the opponent's 
current defence budget or to the opponent's accumulated expenditure (or weapons stock), 
and what really determines a nation's defence budget (internal vs external) have not been 
concluded yet. First, according to Richardson's classical equations, the rate of increase of 
military expenditure in a nation responds to the current military expenditure of an opponent. 
However, it is actually impossible to know the exact amount of an opponent's current 
expenditure as Majeski (1985) pointed out. The estImation of opponent's current 
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expenditure should be simply depended on expectations, but cannot be sure that it will be 
the same as actual expenditure. Hence, it will be more persuasive that the change of defence 
spending of a nation responds to the lagged value (whether it is one year or more) of defence 
spending of an opponent. Also, it was still not clear whether the arms race between nations 
was affected by their current defence expenditures or historical, that is, accumulated 
expenditures. Second, the defence budget of a nation can be affected by an opponent's 
defence budget based on the Richardson's action-reaction model to deter an enemy's attack, 
but it can also be deten-nined by internal budgetary decisions. In other words, the defence 
budgetary process reflects both external (e. g. coping with enemy attack) and internal factors 
(e. g. resource allocation plan in defence versus other civilian sector), but it was not 
concluded which factor is more influential on defence expenditure. Nevertheless, 
Richardson regarded the current defence budget of an opponent as the only important factor 
which determines the increase of defence expenditure of a nation. 
Richardson's classical arms race model was explained and conceptualized by Rappoport 
(1957) and Abelson (1963). Also, Lambelet (1971,1973), Wagner, Perkins and Taagepera 
(1975) tried to detect arms races using various approaches, such as non-linear models and 
reformulation of the Richardson model, but their tests did not escape from Richardson's 
classical model. Wagner, Perkins and Taagepera (1975) simply extended and rearranged the 
Richardson model to show the incompleteness of the Richardson test. That is, Richardson 
detected how the higher rate of total defence spending was affected by the defence spending 
of both alliances while they changed the variables into the increased rate of difference of 
military spending in both alliances and the difference of defence spending between two 
alliances. As a result, they could find a series of positive relationships between these two 
variables, namely, the increased rate of difference of military spending and the difference 
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of military spending between two alliances. 
The Lambelet model (1971,1973) resembles the models of McGuire (1965,1977), Brito 
(1972) and Gillespie et. al (1977). Lambelet attempted to test the strategic and conventional 
arms race between the two superpowers, the USA and Soviet Union, and also considered 
the social resource constraints by taking both security and civilian economic production as 
explanatory variables. For example, he regarded both opponent's military strength and own 
GNP as important factors influencing the arms race. In other words, he considered 
opponent's military strength as a "demand factor" consisting of the external stimuli to arms 
acquisition and expansion, while own GNP as a "supply constraint" reflecting limited 
resources which a nation can allocate to defence spending. 
3.2.1.2. Richardson: A Critique 
Richardson's empirical test is valuable, because it was the first attempt to prove his own 
arms race model. It provided an academic base for further empirical researches, although 
it has been criticised by many following scholars in tenns of its simplicity and 
incompleteness. As mentioned earlier, it will be more reasonable to change the explanatory 
11"k variable from current military expenditure to the lagged values of military expenditure, 
because it is difficult to observe the current military spending of an opponent. Also, 
although his empirical test perfectly supports his theory, the observable data were only a few 
years, namely, 1909 to 1913 which are insufficient to prove his model. If his model is tested 
with more data, it might provide a different result. Finally, Richardson regarded trade 
volume as a measure of friendliness between two nations, but it is possible to have a larger 
trade volume between more hostile nations than between friendly nations. For example, the 
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trade volume between USA and China is much larger than between USA and South Korea, 
however China has been emerging as a new threat to the USA since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Trade definitely contributes to peace between two nations, but it cannot be 
used as a measure of friendliness in an an-ns race. Due to these weaknesses, Richardson's 
empirical analysis needs to be re-tested and complemented in spite of his successful test 
result. In his test, A (U + V) / At representing the increased rate of total defence 
expenditures between two alliances was rapidly escalated before World War I from 5.6 in 
1909-1910 to 50.3 in 1912-1913. The rates of increase were 10.1 for 1910-1911 and 23.8 
for 1911-1912. Hence, he showed the existence of an arms race between these two alliances 
using his action-reaction model. 
In conclusion, the Richardson's arms race model is criticised for the following weaknesses: 
1) Signs of coefficients (except for grievance factor) are predetenninistic. There is 
no rationale why the reaction coefficient is positive while the fatigue coefficient 
should be negative. For example, in case one nation disarms regardless of its 
opponent's armaments because of economic shrinkage or change of government 
policy, the reaction coefficient can be negative. Moreover, in most cases the pattern 
of military spending does not necessarily follow an action-reaction process but is 
determined by a nation's defence policy related to long and short term military R&D 
plan, demand and supply of military manpower, political and security environment 
and economic capacity. Also, if one nation has a dominant defensive capability, it 
will not need to react to the other nation's armaments. NATO-WTO and US-Russia 
dyads will be the case since the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, if defence 
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spending stimulates the economic development of a nation, the fatigue coefficient 
can be positive and hence escalate the change in its armaments. This seems to be 
very usual in the developing countries, because the defence sector provides various 
spin-offs (e. g. technology, infrastructure etc. ) to the civilian economy (Sandler and 
Hartley, 1995). Accordingly, the signs of threat and fatigue coefficients should not 
be predetermined as they are dependent on a nation's defence and economic policies, 
and its stage of economic development. 
2) It is also doubted what exactly deten-nines the grievance factor. According to 
Richardson (1960) one of the important barometers is trade volume. He regarded 
absent or insignificant trade between countries as an indication of hostility whereas 
a large trade volume was a symbol of fiiendliness. However, these hypotheses are 
so simplistic that they do not exactly illustrate what really determines the grievance 
factor. Theoretically, if there is neither hostility nor friendliness between two 
nations, the grievance factor should be zero but he assumes that a grievance factor 
is only positive or negative. 
3) According to the Richardson model, the change of one nation's armaments is 
simply determined by how much its opponent and itself spent on defence in the 
previous period. In other words, the Richardson model is based not on a "stock" 
concept but on a "flow" concept. However, some cntics suggest that the 
effectiveness of defence spending does not appear in the short term and hence it 
should be considered on a long-term basis. That is, the change of military 
expenditure of a nation is not simply determined by the previous year's military 
spending of its opponent and own military spending but is accumulated since the 
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start of an arms build-up at some point of time (i. e. a stock rather than flow 
concept). 
4) The Richardson model is missing some important exogenous variables (e. g. 
foreign aid, sanction, etc. ) and endogenous variables (e. g. internal political and 
social factors) which can explain an arms race between two nations. Anns races can 
be affected by regional alliances, and internal political and economic circumstances. 
The arms race in the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula exemplifies this case. 
These variables need to be considered to make a more realistic model. Ferejohn 
(1976) and Gillespie et. al (1975) examined the effect of foreign military assistance 
on arms races. The domestic political and economic environment is also an 
important factor to increase (or decrease) arms expenditures in the bureaucratic- 
organizational politics model. Hence, it is necessary to include some complementary 
variables to analyse the complex arms racing mechanism in international relations. 
3.2.1.3. Neo-Richardson Models 
McGuire (1965,1977) analysed historical data to detect the anns race in strategic weapons 
between the USA and USSR. In his test, he focussed on how the interaction process 
between two countries influences the data, and deriving the stability conditions in their 
mutual competition. He analysed the US-Soviet missile race with the data from 1960 to 1973 
in the Richardson framework. In his empirical test, McGuire found the two lines, the US 
line of equilibrium and the Soviet line of equilibrium intersect where the USA retained 
2,560 missiles and the Soviet Union had 8,270 missiles. Hence, he asserted that the US- 
Soviet arms race could attain a stable equilibrium and the two nations could mutually deter 
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at this point. However, he did not expect the rapid technological changes and increasing 
returns to scale in arms production identified by Brito and Intriligator (1999). ' Strategic 
weapons production has more possibilities to be affected by these increasing returns to scale 
due to the rapid change of military technology. On the other hand, Brito (1972) and 
Gillespie et. al (1977,1978) introduced an optimal control and geometric lag model in 
analysing arms races. Brito provided a theoretical basis for an arms race using optimal 
control theory while Gillespie et. al attempted an empirical estimation with a geometric lag 
model. They estimated the US-USSR, NATO-WTO and Israel-Arab rivalries in the post- 
World War II era with distributed lag analyses. As a result, the threat coefficients are 
generally positive except for USA and the fatigue coefficients are negative except for Israel. ' 
Hence, they showed that their empirical results generally support the Richardson model by 
applying lags. Hamblin et. al (1977) recognized the asymmetric and non-linear aspects of 
the arms competition and focussed on the psychological factors causing an arms race. 
International tension is another important variable in an arms race model. Choucri and North 
(1975), Ashley (1980) and Zinnes et. al (1978) introduced the concept of "tension", the 
circumstances which can induce diplomatic or armed conflicts in an arms race between 
adversary countries. Choucri and North (1975) studied the pre-World War 1 (1871-1914) 
arms races for six countries divided into two alliances (Britain, France and Russia vs 
Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary) using a simultaneous equation model. In the model, 
they asserted that a nation's military expenditure is determined by its previous year's 
2 According to Brito and Intriligator (1999), increasing returns technology in an arms production, caused by 
the progress of infon-nation, electronics, computers and software, could change the dynamics of arms race. Increasing 
returns technology does not necessarily have a unique equilibrium. Rather it can have multiple stable equilibria with the 
possibility of a choice between them. 
3 The threat coefficients are -0.3 5 (US), 0.04 (USSR), 0.05 (NATO), 0.06(WTO), 0.290srael) and 0.34(Arabs). 
The fatigue coefficients are 0.20(US), 0.1 3(USSR), 0.40(NATO), 0.13(WTO), O(Israel) and 0.12 (Arabs). 
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expenditure, military expenditures of an opponent alliance, intensity of interactions', the 
colonial area of the nation, and its population and national income. They analysed the direct 
and indirect influence of world violence on arms races in the international framework. 
However, first, their explanatory variables have multi-collinear problems. For example, 
colonial area might reflect war between nations and needs for more military bases, and these 
are related to military expenditures. Also, the military expenditure is not only an explanatory 
variable determining a nation's intensity of interactions but it also depends on it. According 
to Zuk (1985) these interrelations understated the effects ofthese variables and subsequently 
Choucri and North's empirical results failed to support their model. Second, although most 
time-series analyses require an adequate number ofobservations to ensure reliable parameter 
estimates, they often violated this requirement, using comparisons and inferences from 
fifteen year time periods. As a result, their empirical analysis was seriously questioned by 
Zuk (1985) and other scholars due to the statistical unreliability. 
Ferejohn. (1976) also studied arms races in the international framework by focussing on the 
influence of foreign aid which can strongly affect the competition between rivals. Ferejohn 
analysed US aid to India and Parkistan using graphical methods and a utility maximization 
model, and reached the following findings. First, aid to nations in an arms race has the effect 
of imposing a burden on the domestic economies of the nations not receiving aid. Second, 
the effects of aid are continued for a while even though the aid policy is no longer 
implemented. Third, military aid programs can distort the budgetary process of anns racing 
nations with respect to the increase of defence spending. 
4 According to Choucri and North (1975) a nation's intensity of interactions is determined by the colonial area 
of own and opponents, own military expenditure and the violence behaviour (e. g. number of attacks or battles) toward 
others. 
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In conclusion, there have been various types of neo-Richardson models to amend and 
complement the classical Richardson model, but as shown above, most scholars established 
new models by simply changing equations from linear into non-linear or by adding 
plausible explanatory variables to the classical equation. In addition, they failed to suggest 
a clear answer for overcoming the weaknesses and limitations of the Richardson model, 
because their ideas were based on the Richardson framework. That is, these models cannot 
escape from the Richardson territory and can be categorized as a ramification of the 
Richardson model. However, their findings are meaningful because the Richardson model 
could be further developed by various ideas. Although serious weaknesses were often found 
in some of these models, they contributed to improving arms race models and studying 
existing arms race phenomena. 
3.2.2. The Intriligator-Brito Model 
The Intriligator-Brito model shows some strategic considerations which are associated with 
the Richardson arms race model. This model developed by Intriligator (1967,1975), and 
Brito and Intriligator (1976,1977,1984,1987) shows that the mutual deterrence ability, that 
is, the balance of armaments stock, the preparedness of attack and weapons, and strategic 
decisions regarding targeting and rate of fire, especially the intentions of the leader (strong 
nation) are deten-ninant factors in an arms race between two nations. The model is based on 
Intriligator's (1964,1967) hypothetical missile war model that could be used by military 
authorities to calculate deterrence and attack potentials in a computer simulation. The 
simulated missile war is described by the time paths for missiles and casualties for two 
countries, A and B as in the following equations (Intriligator, 1975): 
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MA aMA - 18')6MB 
fB (3.8) 
MB 
-':: -)qMB- a aMAfA (3.9) 
(3.10) 
CB -::::: (1 -a aMA t)A 
where 
M (t) stock of missiles at time t in nation i, i= A, B. 
dMi 
Mi 
dt - change in stock of missiles at time t in nation i. 
C (t) civilian casualties at time t in nation i. 
dCj 
Ci -= change in civilian casualties at time t in nation i. dt 
rates at which A and B fire their missiles at time t. 
proportion of missiles targeted counterforce by A and B. 
fA = the number of B's missiles destroyed by one of A's missiles. 
fB= the number of A's missiles destroyed by one of B's missiles. 
VA = the number of Bs casualties caused by one of A's missiles. 
VB= the number of A's casualties caused by one of B's missiles. 
in equation (3.8), - aMAindicates A's reduction in the stock of missiles caused by A's 
firing decision. Missiles might be aimed at not only enemy missiles (counterforce) (of 
I 
nation A) but also enemy cities (countervalue) and hence a implies A's counterforce 
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proportion and (I - a') indicates A's countervalue proportion. Hence, a'aM, implies 
A's missiles targeted at B's missiles while (I - ct')aMA means A's missiles targeted at Bs 
population. Subsequently, a'aMAfA indicates the loss of B's missiles caused by A's 
counterforce attack. Similarly, P'PM B fB indicates the destruction ofA's missiles caused 
by B's counterforce attack. On the other hand, (i - a)am, v, implies civilian casualties in 
B caused by A's countervalue attack. An analogous interpretation holds for the change in 
B's stock of missiles. 
At the stage of war initiation, if it is assumed that A starts the war, A will choose its 
maximum level of fire, a=a, entirely aiming at B's missiles (counterforce attack) and 
hence a' =I. Also, it is assumed that time span is indicated as 0..! ý t :!! ý 'r A, where 'r Ais the 
time interval for decision-making, and 8=0 because A attacks without a response from B. 
By these assumptions, the following equations are derived: 
MA (r 
A) = 
MA(O) exp(-a7A) (3.12) 
MB (r 
B) «: 
MB (0) - 
fA[l 
- exp(- ar A)] 
MA (0) (3.13) 
In above equations, it is noted that the missile stock of A 
is MA (0) exp(-a 1. A) at the stage 
of war initiation and it consumesMA 
(0)[1 
-exp(arA)l to destroy 
fA[I 
- exp(- ar A)IMA (0) Of 
B's missiles. 
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In its tit-for-tat, B will choose its maximum rate of countervalue attack targeting at A's 
population, denoted as and 0. Also, the time interval for retaliatory attack will 
be rA ý5 t :: ý TA +VBý where VB 
is the time interval for B's decision-making and 
a=0 because B attacks without A's response. Hence, under these assumptions the number 
of A's civilian casualties at the end of B's retaliatory attack is as follows: 
CAO' 
A +VB): ": VBIMB(0)-fA 
[I 
-exp(-aTA)]MA(0)1[1 - exp(-flV B)] (3.14) 
In equation (3.14), it is noted that B chooses its maximum level of fire with the rest of its 
missiles to retaliate for A's attack. The right-hand side of the equation means the product 
of the rest of B's missiles after A's attack and [I - exp(- representing the maximum 
level of B's fire and A's casualties. 
On the other hand, Intriligator and Brito derived the deterrence conditions for A and B, 
based on equations (3.8)-(3.11): 
MA 
- (t)BMB + 
CB IýA 
MB 0) AMA 
+ CA 'ýB 
where: 
WA =fA[l - exp(-aTA)] 
WB = fB 
11- 
exp(-ßr, )] 
ýA L)A exp(-aVA)] 




maximum rates at which A and B fire their missiles at time t. 
CA(t) = B's recognition of the minimum unacceptable civilian damage in nation A. 
CB(t) = A's recognition of the minimum unacceptable civilian damage in nation B. 
TA JB ý time interval of A's and B's first strikes. 
':::: time interval of A's and B's second strikes. VAIIVB ' 
If it is assumed that both A and B deter, each side must have enough missiles to inflict 
unacceptable damage on the other. If B thinks the minimum unacceptable damage to A is 
C, casualties, it must have enough missiles to inflict this number of casualties in a second 
stn e. Equation (3.16) shows the number of B's missiles needed to deter A as a function of 
the number of A's missiles. 
As shown above, equations (3.15) and (3.16) are, in fact, the Richardson-type reaction 





the grievance factors of both nations. Since the grievance terms are positive, a condition for 
the existence of a stable equilibrium is w AO)B <1. But, according to huiligator (1975), the 
"hardness" condition that more than one missile should destroy an enemy missile is a 
sufficient but not a necessary condition for stability. Also, the stability condition is 




5t)B In the case of two adversary nations, the equilibrium is 
always stable when 0) A 0) B ":: ý 
'is satisfied. If it is assumed that a stable equilibrium exists, 
the equilibrium point will be: 
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COB CA / L)BýB + CB / ')AýA 
O)ACOB 
(3.17) 
O)A CB / t)AýA + CA / t)B4 
O)ACt)B 
(3.18) 
Figure 3.1 shows the equations (3.15)-(3.16) graphically. In region 1, each nation retains 
enough missiles to deter its opponent. Both nations can reduce their level of armaments and 
stay within the cone of mutual deterrence. Such selective disarmament does not cause 
instability as long as they stay in this region. Regions 2A, 2B, and 3 can be interpreted as 
the cone of mutual attack avoidance (Anderton, 1992), where one nation cannot stage a 
pre-emptive attack against its opponent, because each nation holds enough missiles to repel 
the attack. Regions 4A and 4B represent an overwhelming military power of one nation. 
This imbalance of military strength may induce the outbreak of war, but if a dominant (or 
leading) nation pursues economic growth through disarmament and an inferior (or 
following) nation focuses on the military build-up, it may reduce an outbreak of war. 
Regions 5A, 5B, and 6 represent war initiation. In region 5A, nation A will not avoid pre- 
emption as A has enough missiles to attack B with impunity, however, simultaneously, 
neither has enough missiles to deter the other. A will be forced to attack or B will be forced 
to pre-empt, in either case leading to war. Region 5B is the obverse case. In region 6, each 
nation can attack the other, neither can avoid pre-emption nor can deter the other. These 
regions (5A, 5B, 6) start from the totally disarmed state and as a result of an anns race, both 
nations should move to a highly unstable situation. Subsequently, this unstable situation can 
induce an outbreak of war. In other words, at the initial stage of arms races, two rivalries 
have a high possibility of war, particularly when their anns level is very low. This does not 
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imply that disarmament can increase the possibility of war. As seen in Figure 3.1, balanced 
disarmament between two nations (inward movement of mutual deterrence lines) enlarges 
the cone of mutual deterrence and mutual attack avoidance (Region 1,2A, B and 3), and 
thus reduces the possibility of war. Through the Figure, Intriligator and Brito (1976,19775 
1984,1987) represented that the possibility of war is high at the beginning of an arms race, 
especia y between the two nations retaining a low level of armaments. This is a 
theoretically persuasive hypothesis. Heavily armed countries will not easily decide to go 
to war and will try to seek a diplomatic solution, because the outbreak of war between these 
countries inflicts a greater damage against each other than the war between those having 
a low level of weapons. The Cuban Crisis in the 1960s between the USA and Soviet Union 
is a good example. That is, heavily armed countries attempt to avoid the outbreak of war 
and secure the superiority of military power against their opponents. Today, numerous 
small wars and battles occur in various regions. However, most of them are between the 
countries having a low level of weapons and most localized warfare is caused by internal 
conflicts and civil war. 
The Richardson model suggests that an anus race between two nations is simply affected 
by the action-reaction process of a military build-up and the economic capability of each 
nation, but does not clarify the state of stability condition, while the Intriligator-Brito model 
has a unique prediction about the stage of an arms race between two nations and elucidates 
the stability conditions graphically. According to the stage of arms race, stability conditions 
are different as shown in Figure 3.1. 
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In some aspects, the Inriligator-Brito model provides a better explanation than the 
Richardson model. First, the Intriligator-Brito model gives a more specific description in 
terms of the equilibrium situation. The Richardson model does not explain whether the 
equilibrium is a state of peace or an outbreak of war. In this aspect, the Intriligator-Brito 
model provides more understandable interpretation. This model has various equilibria 
according to arms racing situations. As shown in Figure 3.1, each equilibrium reflects 
different states of an arms race. For instance, it is noted that an equilibrium where two 
deterrence lines meet (the intersection of mutual deterrence) means a state of peace, two 
equilibria where an attack line and a deterrence line meet indicate a state of tension and an 
equilibrium where two attack lines cross will be an outbreak of war. Thus, the Intriligator- 
Brito model provides more insights into the description of equilibrium than the Richardson 
model. Second, the Intriligator-Brito model is superior to the Richardson model in that it 
gives more detailed interpretation in conceptualizing the stage of a war. It considers the 
decision-making process and time interval in the warfare between two opponents and 
divides the attack into two categories (counterforce and countervalue). Hence, the 
Intriligator-Brito model is more descriptive and systematized than the Richardson model 
in analysing the war situation between two opponents. 
Nevertheless, the Intriligator-Brito model is regarded as a ramification of Richardson and 
has its own limitations. First, the Intrilgator-Brito model has the same structure as the 
Richardson's equation. Changes of one nation's military stock (e. g. missiles) are determined 
by the missiles used for its attack against an enemy and the missiles destroyed by the 
enemy Is counterforce attack (retaliation). Casualty equations are also determined in a 
similar fashion. Especially, because it was created to interpret the dynamics of warfare, the 
explanatory variables are very limited, and it shows strong similarities with the Richardson 
-73- 
model. Hence, the huiligator-Brito equations are the simple composition of action-reaction 
parameters and are not basically different from Richardson's equation. Second, according 
to the Intriligator-Brito model, there is more possibility to be engaged in an arms race and 
result in an outbreak of war when two enemy countries have a lower level of weapons. In 
contrast, when both countries maintain higher levels of weapons, they can avoid an 
outbreak of war, deter each other and bring peace. However, their theory has not been 
supported by an empirical analysis in spite of its well-organized mathematical introduction. 
Third, Intriligator and Brito analysed warfare by target. In other words, an attack against 
opponent's missiles is counterforce attack and an attack against opponent's cities (or 
population) is countervalue attack. However, it is difficult to discriminate between targets 
in modem warfare, although military technology is becoming more advanced. For example, 
even though one nation attacks only its opponent's missiles (or military base), it can also 
inflict civilian damage ifthe missile control system is not precise or the enemy camouflages 
its missile bases in a civilian area. Fourth, according to the simulated outbreak of war 
(Intriligator, 1975), one nation's pre-emptive attack should start from counterforce attack 
and the enemy nation's retaliatory strike should aim at its opponent's population 
(countervalue attack). But there is no theoretical basis on why the target should be 
predetermined. For example, if nation A's first strike against nation B's missile bases fails 
in spite of its maximum rate of fire, B's decision maker might target A's missiles instead of 
A's population. 
The Intriligator-Brito model represented the arms race appearances between two adversary 
nations during the state of warfare and especially considered civilian damage as a part of 
influencing an arms race. Hence, this model contributed to a description of a dynamic 
interaction of warfare and an arms race of two antagonists during the state of warfare. It 
-74- 
also illustrated the stability conditions of an arms race. Anderton and Fogarty (1990), 
Anderton (1992) and Wolfson (1992) analysed an arms race applying the Intri ligator-Brito 
model. Wolfson (1992) applied this model to his n-nation arms race analysis and examined 
the conditions for a stable cone in an n-nation arms competition. Anderton (1992) pointed 
out that the Intriligator-Brito model might need additional constraints such as the balance 
of weapons quantities, the qualitative state of weapons and the intentions of the dominant 
party (or nation) having a higher arms level and anns race initiative when identifying the 
zone of war initiation, and created an alternative Intriligator-Brito model which represents 
an optimistic state of an arms race .5 The builigator-Brito model is an adequate theory in 
a war time arms race because the decrease of an arms stock caused by warfare gives rise to 
an arms acquisition for both countries and subsequently will induce an unstable anns 
competition. Conversely, if both countries have enough arms stock to deter its counterpart, 
they will be reluctant to attack each other and this will bring a stable equilibrium of 
weapons level. 
Nevertheless, the Intriligator-Brito model is different from other arms race models such as 
McGuire's (1965). In peace time, the high level of weapons has more possibility to threaten 
the security of both nations and induce an accidental war. Critics might argue that there has 
been no war between major military powers since World War H, but there have been many 
proxy wars such as the Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan involving the superpowers. Also, 
the advent of nuclear weapons alleviated the possibility of war, and the quality of weapons 
5 As explained earlier, in the Intriligator-Brito model, the level of weapons quantities decides the probability 
of war. That is, a high level of weapons quantities reduce the probability of an outbreak of war while a low level of 
weapons quantities increases it. However, in the "optimistic" Intriligator-Brito model the attack lines of two opponents 
does not cross each other. In other words, a more optimistic view of a nation and its opponent's unwillingness to attack 
can shift both attack lines out so far that regions 5A and 5B disappear in Figure 3.1. Hence, the probability of war is 
relatively low, even at small weapons level as long as the weapons build-up is roughly balanced. In the optimistic model, 
It is an imbalance in weapons quantities, not high or low weapons quantities, that makes the probability of war high. 
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and military technology is more important than the quantity of weapons today. Hence, 
experience that an arms race between nations becomes stable when they attaln a higher 
level of weapons might be inadequate in the modem arms race. Furthermore, the 
Intriligator-Brito model has still not been proved by empirics as mentioned earlier. 
Therefore, it will be necessary to employ different variables to analyse the arms race 
phenomena in the Korean Peninsula. 
3.2.3. Bureaucratic and Organizational Politics Models 
The organizational politics model explains that defence decision-making is largely 
influenced by organizations and interest groups which affect the defence budgetary process 
(Crecine, 1969). Similarly, in the bureaucratic politics model, defence expenditure is largely 
dependent on the need and interests of the bureaucrats and politicians, including the 
government officials and members ofparliament making defence policy decisions. The two 
models have some differences in the decision-making process, but ultimately they view 
defence expenditures as the result of political consensus among interest groups, namely 
politicians, bureaucrats and the arms industry. In this light, they can be regarded as the 
public choice model or the military-political-industrial complex model studied by Thee 
(1978,1986). 
3.2.3.1. Rattinger Model 
Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky (1966) studied the US federal budgetary process (although 
it was not exactly the defence budgetary process) and developed the interactive decision 
equations between agencies, the Budget Bureau and the US Congress. On the other hand, 
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Rattinger (1975) developed a model which described the relationship between bureaucratic 
action and defence expenditures. According to the theory the request for an excessive 
budgetary increase compared with the previous year's defence budget might bring a 
massive reduction rather than increase by budgetary decision-makers, because they think 
the defence budget is overstated and try to reduce it. In contrast, the request for too small 
increase can motivate an overtightened budget because the decision-makers think the 
increase of defence budget is not necessary and try to maintain the status quo. Hence, some 
medium range which decision makers can approve- neither too large nor too small of the 
budgetary growth rates- should be settled to secure stable budgetary goals (Wildavsky, 
1964; Rattinger, 1975). By these considerations, Rattinger suggested the following 
equation: 
Etx = kAtx, (3.19) 
where E, x denotes the expected defence budget of nation X at time t and A, x, stands for the 
actual defence expenditures of nation X at time t- 1. Also k, indicates an approximately 
fixed rate of the budget increase. However, this equation simply specifies the budgetary 
mark-up process of a nation and does not describe an arms race between two adversary 
nations. Hence, he proposed an alternative equation as follows: 
A, x - Etx = k2(Aty i- 
Ely j) + gx (3.20) 
where 
actual defence expenditure in nation X at time t. 
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Aly = actual defence expenditure in nation Y at time t. 
E, x = expected defence budget in nation X at time t. 
Ely = expected defence budget in nation Y at time t. 
a defence coefficient 2 
a grievance factor in nation X. 
and Ety i= k3,4tyi-I * 
In equation (3.20), the difference between a nation's actual defence spending and its 
expected budget is linearly correlated to the difference between its opponent's actual and 
expected defence budget in some previous period. The same expression can be applied to 
nation Yand g' is a grievance factor in nationX. In his empirical analysis, Rattinger (1975) 
considered the international tension factor in the Richardson framework. His major findings 
were that the regular annual growth of defence expenditures predicted by the bureaucratic 
model was well explained by the data for the individual countries of European NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact, whereas the Richardson-type action-reaction and international tension 
were relatively low influential factors in detennining the increase of anns expenditures. 
Also, he asserted that comparisons between the two blocs (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) 
should be based on the analysis of their individual nations rather than their aggregate 
spending because there is no high-level coordination ofoverall NATO defence expenditures 
linking them to aggregate spending of the Warsaw Pact and vice versa. Some major issues 
found in his empirical test were that the values of R2are unusually low in most member 
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states of NATO in action-reaction model while it is relatively high in some states, such as 
France and Britain. Probably, it is believed that these two countries reacted to the threat 
from the WTO countries more sensitively than any other NATO member states in the Cold 
War system (i. e. these countries follow the pact leader). According to Rattinger (1975), 
France was more independent from the Western alliance in the post-World War H and this 
induced a higher reaction of defence spending to protect the country from external threat, 
while Britain's defence spending in the post-World War H period was more determined by 
reaction processes than by bureaucratic momentum. There is no clear reason explaining 
Britain's strong reaction to the WTO countries, but its major military role in the Western 
alliance could lead Britain to the higher responsiveness to the communist countries in the 
Cold War era (UK ranked as number 2 in NATO). Rattinger (1975) concluded that the 
defence expenditures of most NATO member states are determined by bureaucratic 
momentum rather than the Richardson's action-reaction mechanism besides these two 
countries. He also found that most WTO countries followed the action-reaction pattern, but 
they were also significantly affected by bureaucratic momentum. 
Nevertheless, there are some pitfalls in the Rattinger model. First, the statistical results 
cannot directly be compared from one nation to another, because they were derived from 
different time lags. In his empirical test, Rattinger applied various time lags from I to 4 
years to increase the overall significance (R'), although he failed to show the high 
significance of some countries in his model. Subsequently, his test lacks some objective 
comparability. Secon ,teR2s are generally higher for the WTO countries than for the 
NATO members, but dealing with the data of centrally planned economies should be 
cautious. They are often highly artificial and inaccurate reflecting the lack of data for some 
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of these countries. Third, it is necessary to consider the problem of autocorrelatlon. 
According to Kmenta (1971) the classical Durbin-Watson test is not applicable to 
regression equations in which the place of the explanatory variable is taken by the lagged 
value of the dependent variable or in which there is no constant term, although Rattinger 
(1975) showed the Durbin-Watson ratios are not significant for any nation or alliance in his 
analysis. The GLS (Generalized Least Squares) method could be used to obtain more 
unbiased estimators, but he only used OLS estimates. 
3.2.3.2. Ostrom Model 
Ostrom (1978) tried to combine the elements of three competing models: arms race, 
organizational processes and bureaucratic politics through a "Reactive-Linkage Model. " 
This model views the initial policy-making rule as a reaction to the changing conditions' 
in the international and domestic environments which is then filtered through the 
organizations such as President, Congress and Department of Defense (DoD) to determine 
the magnitude, scale and timing of the reaction (Moll and Luebbert, 1980). According to 
Ostrom the policy-making rules are expressed by the following equation: 
nk 
b., H. + boEj, + u,, (3.21) 
i=l j=2 
where 
6 Policy-making decision of US defence spending depends on the changing international and domestic 
conditions, such as increasing military conflict in the Middle East, increase of defence spending In the Soviet Union and 
domestic opinion for defence reductions. 
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Dil = the i-th organization's (the Department of Defense) decision on defence expenditure 
4. = i's historical base (previous decision-making of DoD ) 
policy-making parameters (rules of thumb) 
Ej, = the exogenous environmental factors (domestic and/or international factors affecting 
the decision) 
%= random disturbance terms 
Ostrom's model includes three factors which influence the military budget of the United 
States: the military services (e. g. Department of Defense), the President and the Congress. 
Interest groups such as the arms industry are excluded in his equation, because he thought 
that the US defence expenditures are determined by the interaction between these three 
groups. Based on equation (3.2 1), the services' request for a military budget can be derived 
as follows: 





+ Ult (3.22) 
where. x,, -, represents 
Soviet military expenditures in the previous year, X21-1 is the number 
of US battle deaths in the previous year, andX3, -, indicates the rate at which Congressional 
appropriations have increased (or decreased) over the two previous years. In his model, US 
defence spending is determined by the adversary's defence spending (external threat), the 
number of US battle deaths (grievance) and the increased rate of Congressional 
appropriation (economic constraint) - Therefore, it is found that 
basically his model has the 
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identical structure with the Richardson model. Thus, Ostrom's "Reactive-Linkage Model" 
can be regarded as a variant of the Richardson model, but it attempted to combine 
international and internal political-bureaucratic factors into one set of integrated equations. 
However, even though there were not many warfare and battle deaths of US soldiers for the 
sample period (1955-1973) except for the Vietnam War, US defence spending steadily 
increased in this period. Hence, the correlation between the US battle deaths and US 
defence spending is doubtful. Thus, his model has a problem in the choice of variables. 
Also, Ostrom's model not only shows a poor result in empirical tests but also does not 
demonstrate much superiority to the naive model representing the correlation between the 
defence spending of this year and that of previous year, even though it has seven 
independent variables in the reduced form. In his analysis of the US defence expenditure 
policy-making from 1955 to 1973, the Reactive-Linkage Model is only successful for the 
peno 1955,1957 and 1962-1968 with a single exception (1964) while the naive model 
shows more successful results for the period 1956-1961 and 1969-1973. For example, in 
the naive model, US defence spending was predicted to change from US$77,373 million 
in 1969 to US$ 75,084 million in 1973, whilst actual US defence spending changed from 
US$ 77,872 million to US$ 76,435 million in the same period. But, Ostrom's model is less 
accurate than the naive model. His model predicted that US defence spending would change 
from US$ 85,244 million to US$ 82,420 in this period. In his empirical analysis, the 
Reactive-Linkage Model is well-fitted in a war situation, because the empirical results 
show the increasing requirements of defence expenditures caused by the Vietnam War for 
the period 1966-1968. 
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3.2.3.3. Lucier Model 
Lucier (1979) proposed the organizational process model which deduced two propositions 
"t. about the occasions for changes in the value of the parameter. 
X, =qX1 (3.23) 
where X, is the defence expenditures at time t and q is the parameter representing policy- 
making rule which determines defence expenditures. First, he proposed that the value of 
parameter usually changes in the year following a revision of the armament Standard 
Operating Procedure (SOP). The organizational politics model (Tanter 1974; Lucier 1977) 
describes the state as a set of bureaucracies which decision-makers control. Decision- 
makers are surrounded by so many demands that they often prescribe standard operating 
procedures indicating a set of decision rules for government's policy goal, and delegate the 
responsibility for implementing the rules to the bureaucracies. Decision-makers prescribe 
varied decision rules, that is, standard operating procedures to execute various policies. 
Lucier (1979) asserted that the defence expenditures of a state are proportional to its 
previous defence expenditures by the implementation of these SOPs, and a change in 
parameter value generally occurs when decision-makers reconsider policy and revise the 
annament SOP. Second, he also suggested that the value of parameter changes in the year 
following a deadline whether it increases or decreases. Here, the deadline indicates a 
turning point where the SOP is changed. Namely, SOP could be changed due to the end of 
an arms agreement with a potential enemy, the termination of an existing SOP, a domestic 
or international event affecting defence plans and the replacement of decislon makers. 
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Hence, Lucier's contribution was conceptualising the value of parameter by introducing 
SOP. In contrast, Rattinger's model is ambiguous in deciding the value of the parameter. 
He confin-ned that SOP definitely affects the change of the value of parameter in his 
analysis of naval expenditures of Britain, Japan, and USA for the period 1919-1939. In the 
tests for three countries, the R2s are high at 0.990 for USA, 0.998 for Japan and 0.987 for 
Britain and the parameters are significant at 5% level. However, according to Dennis 
(1974), the domestic or international circumstances, replacement of leadership and other 
ma . or c anges do not always result in policy changes. He found no evidence that the value j 
of the US parameters had changed from 1950 to 1970 in spite of numerous changes of 
domestic and international environments in this period. Therefore, the value of parameters 
which decides the increase (or decrease) of arms expenditures cannot simply be defined by 
the bureaucratic organization model. Although Rattinger (1975), Ostrom (1977,1978), 
Lucier (1979) and Dennis (1974) all made efforts to find the parameter affecting an-ns 
expenditures, the decision-making process still seems to be a "black-box" as Moll and 
Luebbert (1980) mentioned. 
Majeski (1983) also studied the decision-making process ofUS military expenditures in the 
Ostrom framework. However, he asserted that the decision-making process is not 
characterized by a monolithic and unitary rational factor. He assumed that annual defence 
expenditures are the product of a series of decisions made by autonomous but interacting 
policy-making groups, namely, the Department of Defense (DoD), President and Congress 
pursuing different goals. The DoD will attempt to increase its defence budget, the President 
might focus on the next election and depend on opinion polls for decision-making, and 
Congressmen might focus on their electorate. Hence, the decision-making of defence 
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expenditures might reflect a consensus among these groups having different interests and 
obj ectives. 
3.2.3.4. Cusack and Ward Model 
Cusack and Ward (1981) examined the military expenditures of the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China by modifying the classical Richardson 
arms race formulation and assuming that the military budget is used by decision makers, 
in part, to respond to the domestic political and economic environment. In this aspect, they 
investigated the relationship between the military spending of each nation and the political 
and economic circumstances through an empirical analysis. The linear based functional 
form for US military spending is as follows: 
=A+ 81 (Electoral Cycle) 
+, 82 (Change in Aggregate Demand) 
+A(Prior Change in US Military Spending) 
+A(War Mobilization) (3.24) 
whereAthrough, 84 are regression coefficients and Y is change in US military spending. 
According to their model, US defence spending is affected by the electoral cycle, aggregate 
demand, the previous year's defence spending and war mobilization. The defence spending 
of the Soviet Union is determined by leadership tenure, economic performance, the 
economic planning cycle, and the previous year's defence spending. China's defence 
spending is determined by domestic violence, economic performance, the economic 
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planning cycle and the previous year's defence spending. They ignored the external threat 
from opponents and focussed instead on the domestic environment in their model. This is 
a basic difference from the Richardson and neo-Richardson models. In their empirical 
estimation of US defence spending from 1949 to 1978, all explanatory variables are 
significant and the overall explanation is also high at 0.81. Aggregate demand, previous 
year's defence spending and war mobilization are necessary variables to determine the 
demand for defence expenditure. The electoral cycle is also an adequate variable in that US 
defence budget is affected by the change of political power. Traditionally, the Republican 
party pursues a strong defence while the Democratic party attempts to reduce defence 
spending and increase the social welfare budget. In the estimation of Soviet Union (195 1- 
1976), they showed the significance of leadership tenure, but evaluated only Khrushchev 
and Brezhnev regimes, although Stalin's regime could be an important variable in this 
period. In the empirical test of China for the period 1960-1974, domestic violence (e. g. the 
Cultural Revolution: 1966-1971) is regarded as a major determinant affecting its defence 
spending, but the significance is different according to the data. In the SEPRI data, domestic 
violence is a significant determinant of China's defence spending, but it is not significant 
using other data such as Rubin (1978). Economic performance and the planning cycle are 
significant variables in the Soviet Union, however they are positive with some data while 
negative using other data. In China, economic performance has a significant and positive 
effect on its defence spending in the SEPRI data, but the planning cycle has a negative effect 
on it. According to Cusack and Ward (1981), the performance of the domestic political 
economy model is somewhat erratic from one country to another. It seems to be most useful 
for the USA, and the empirical results of the Soviet Union and China are different 
according to the source of data. Especially, the results from China are not generally 
consistent with the proposed model. 
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The domestic political economy model is not universal but somewhat inconsistent from 
one nation to another due to the difference of the domestic political and economic 
situations. Also, it excluded the Stalin regime from the Soviet empirical test and did not 
explain which domestic violence is included in the test of China. It is doubted that the 
Soviet and Chinese military spending are reliable in the Cold War era and whether the data 
from different sources could be compared with each other. For example, US national 
defense expenditures (NDEXP) are from US Defense Budgetfor Fiscal Year 19 79 whereas 
the Soviet military expenditure data series are from SEPRI Yearbook and the Military 
Balance (HS S). Also, the overall explanatory power of the equations is relatively low in the 
cases of Soviet Union (0.47-0.66) and China (0.27-0.61). 
3.2.3.5. Hartley and Russett Model 
Hartley and Russett (1992) studied the effect of public opinion on US defence spending for 
the period 1965-1990. They added public opinion on US defence spending as an 
explanatory variable to the traditional threat (Soviet defence spending) and fatigue 
(government deficit) factors in the Richardson framework. In their model, the explanatory 
Ables deten-nining changes in US military spending are changes in Soviet military vari ,, 
spending, changes in the difference between US and Soviet military spending, changes in 
the US federal budget deficit, and public responses to US military spending. In their 
empirical tests, they discovered that the increase (or decrease) of US military expenditures 
is strongly affected by public support. They found that if the percentage of public opinion 
favouring increases in military spending rises, then the level of military spending increases, 
while if the percentage opposing increases in military spending rises, then actual spending 
tends to decrease. Their model does not depend on public voting but instead uses survey 
-87- 
data as an indicator of aggregate public opinion on military expenditure. Using the survey 
data they found that changes in public opinion consistently exert an effect on changes in 
military spending. ' Public opinion changes according to the political and social 
circumstances. For example, since the 9.11 terrorist attack occurred in 2001, the increase 
of US military spending has been broadly supported by American public. As the results of 
empirical tests, they obtained a high R' at 0.77 and all independent variables are significant 
at 0.05 and 0.10 level except for the difference between Soviet and US military spending. 
The bureaucratic and organizational politics model has contributed to examining the 
internal factors determining the military expenditures of countries. These models, including 
the organizational politics model, domestic political economy model, and pubic opinion 
approach have shown that internal factors, such as interaction between interest groups, 
electoral cycle and economic performance could also be significant in explaining the 
decision process of military expenditures. The Richardson models often failed to prove the 
significance of the threat coefficient and provided poor empirical results. In this aspect, the 
organizational/bureaucratic politics model focussed on the internal factor stimulating 
defence spending and contributed to studies on defence expenditures and arms races. Most 
organizational/bureaucratic politics model attempt to combine some explanatory variables 
stimulating defence spending- whether they are a budgetary process or internal political 
events- with the Richardson's action-reaction process. Thus, the organizational/bureaucratic 
politics model could be regarded as another variant of the Richardson model. As a result, 
the basic equations of these models are not greatly different from the Richardson's classical 
7 All of the public opinion data used in their analysis can be found in "U. S. Public Opinion Data on Military 
Spending, 193 7-1990. " (Graham and Hartley, 1990). The survey data sources are as follows: Gallup, American Institute 
of Public Opinion, Gallup/Newsweek, Gallup/Times Mirror, The Roper Organization, National Opinion Research Center, 
General Electric/Trendex, CBS, CBS/New York Times, New York Times, Yankelovich, Skelly, and White/Times, and 
Yankelovich, Clancey, Shulman/Time 
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equation. However, they were not categorized as the neo-Richardson model, because the 
internal determinant for defence spending is more stressed than the external threat factor. 
But, the organizational/bureaucratic politics model has some pitfalls. Most budgetary 
processes are veiled, the decision-makers are affected by public opinion and interest groups 
and the organizational actions are not easy to quantify and measure. The parameter deciding 
the increase (or decrease) of anus expenditures, such as SOP is ambiguous and 
indeterminate in both Rattinger (1975) and Lucier (1979). Also, Ostrom's (1978) "Reactive- 
Linkage Model" did not show any superiority to the naive model even though it has seven 
independent variables. The empirical analyses often showed unsatisfactory results and fail 
to prove the overall significance of the variables. Also, the domestic political economy 
model proposed by Cusack and Ward (1981) regarded economic performance as an 
important variable explaining the military spending ofthe Soviet Union and China, but they 
had both positive and negative effects on their defence spending and thus obtained two 
different results according to data. Thus, it is doubted that economic performance is really 
a necessary variable for detennining the defence spending of these countries. In the 
organizational/bureaucratic politics model, it is difficult to estimate how defence 
expenditures are really determined. The decision-making of defence expenditures is 
difficult to be quantified, and the process is often vague and veiled. For example, SOP 
(Standard Operating Procedure) does not provide any clear standard for deciding the 
defence budget. Hence, they often present different results in the empirical tests according 
to the data and sample. Consequently, the organizational/bureaucratic politics models often 
reveal their weaknesses in the selection of variables and empirical results, and also have 
limitations in that they have the same action-reaction framework with the Richardson 
model. Table 3.3 surnmarises the major arms race models. 
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Table 3.3. Review of Arms Race Models 
Authors Model Arms race 
mechanism 
Conclusion 
Richardson (1960) Richardson model An action-reaction Arms races depend on 
basis adversary's and own 
military spending (or 
weapons stock) and 
grievance factor. 
McGuire (1965) Duopoly model Utility maximization in National utility is 
defence determined by own 
and adversary's anns 
level and wealth for 
defence. Utility is 
maximized at the 
intersection of two 
nations' reaction 
curves. 
Brito (1972) Utility optimization National utility National utility is 
model maximization determined by the 
trade-off between 
civilian economy and 
security. 
Intriligator and Brito Intriligator-Brito Strategic warfare At the initial stage of 
(1976) model model based on the an anns race, the 
Richardson's action- possibility of war 
reaction process increases, but once 
both nations retain 
high level of arnis 
stock and deter each 
other, it decreases. 
McGuire (1977) US-Soviet missile race An action-reaction The equilibrium of the 
basis number of missiles in 
two nations meets at 
some point. 
Ostrom (1978) Reactive-Linkage US decision-making US defence spending 
model process of arms is affected by Soviet 
expenditure defence spending and 
internal political 
process. 
Lucier (1979) Budgetary process Internal effect on US US defence budget is 




Authors Model Arms race 
mechanism 
Conclusion 
Koistinen (1980) Military-industrial Self-stimulative A main cause of arms 
complex model process build-up is internal 
military- industrial 
relations rather than 
external threat. 
Cusack and Ward Domestic political Self- stimulative Arms race is stimulated 
(1981) economy model process by internal political 
and economy 
Thee(1986) Military R&D- Self-stimulative Military technology 
industrial-bureaucratic motivation and a tit- plays a key role in 
complex model for-tat process contemporary arms 
races and technology 
race raises military 
spending. 
Hartley and Russet Public opinion model Self-stimulative Defence spending is 
(1992) motivation and a tit- affected by public 
for-tat process opinion. 
3.3. SUMMARY 
Studies on arms races and the determinants of defence spending will be a major part in this 
thesis. The arms race models shown in Table 3.3 have theoretical and empirical gaps as 
presented earlier, but most of them are based on the Richardson framework. In other words, 
most arms race models employ external threat and internal factors stimulating a nation's 
armament, although their expression methods are different from each other. The arms race 
between South and North Korea has rarely been studied and the literatures are also very 
few. The arms race model in this thesis will be based on the Richardson's action-reaction 
model, but it will include other variables, such as inter-state conflict and foreign aid factors 
reflecting the specific situation of the two Koreas. Since the Korean War (1950-1953), the 
two Koreas have had big and small political and armed conflicts, and the USA has 
militarily supported South Korea through the US-South military alliance. These two factors 
must be included to estimate the arms race in the Korean Peninsula. Including these factors 
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will also avoid the oversimplification of the Richardson model. The arms race model in this 
thesis will differ from previous models by estimating not only the defence spending of 
South and North Korea but also their number of military personnel and defence equipment. 
It is believed that these various approaches to modelling will provide more insights into the 
arms race between these two nations. The studies on arms races are also important for my 
further research on the defence-growth relationship, because defining the demand for 
defence expenditures is necessary to study the effect of defence spending on economic 
growth. Accordingly, the studies on the anns race between South and North Korea are 
closely related to the research on the defence-growth relationship. Therefore, arms race 
studies are an integral part of the research on the relationship between defence and 
economic development. 
Since the end of the Cold War, many theorists have asserted that the arms race between the 
superpowers was finished. However, this conclusion should be approached with caution. 
The US-Russian relationship seems to be in a mood of co-operation and the world is 
changing into an uni-polar system dominated by the USA. Nevertheless, regional conflicts 
have increased globally in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East and various parts of Asia, 
even though the anns race between the two superpowers has ended. Also, the increasing 
economic and military power of China may induce a future arms race in East Asia. 
Accordingly, it will be important to study arms races between regional rivals and analyse 
how the pattern of their races has changed. Especially, the study of an anns race in the 
Korean Peninsula, the last symbolic zone of the Cold War, is relatively unexplored and 
researched by few scholars considering its military and strategical importance. The next 




EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SOUTH-NORTH ARMS 
RACE 1963-2000 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The military tension between South and North Korea lasting since the Korean War (1950- 
1953) has always been a serious threat to peace in the Korean Peninsula. South Korea has 
prepared for North Korea's surprise preemptive attack since the cease-fire in 195 3, and the 
North has had to cope with the military alliance between South Korea and the USA. Hence, 
a distinctive feature is that this arms race has been a long-tenn one. During the Cold War, 
the military competition between the two superpowers, the USA and former Soviet Union 
might have intensified the South-North arms race. The arms expansion of the two Koreas 
was directly and indirectly supported by the two superpowers. The USA has supported 
South Korea through the ROK (Republic of Korea)-US Mutual Defence Agreement and 
military aid since the Korean War. The presence of US troops has contributed to deterring 
North Korea's potential threat. The fonner Soviet Union and China also had a great 
influence on North Korea in the Cold War era and it is believed that they provided military 
aid as well as political support until the 1980s. 
After the end of the Cold War, the South and North Korean governments have attempted 
to improve the relationship between the two countries and made considerable economic and 
political progress through the South-North peace talks (e. g. the enlargement of economic 
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cooperation, the reunion of separated families). However, they have never agreed on arms 
reduction in spite of the non-aggression agreement between the South and North. South 
Korea has continually increased its real level of defence spending until the mid-1990s, 
although both the real defence spending and its share in GDP have tended to reduce since 
the economic recession m1997. North Korea also maintained a high share of defence 
spen. ing in GNP (20-25%) until the mid-1990s in spite of its economic collapse. 
This chapter answers two major research questions mentioned in Chapter 1. One is whether 
an arms race between the two Koreas really exists and what are the variables affecting any 
arms race between these countries. The other is whether the pattern of any anns race has 
changed between the Cold War and post-Cold War era. First, the possible existence of an 
arms race between the two Koreas will be tested using defence spending, the number of 
military personnel and equipment (tactical aircraft) of both countries. South Korea has 
focussed more on increasing its defence spending and acquiring high technology weapons 
than North Korea. By contrast, North Korea has larger numbers of weapons and military 
personnel than South Korea, although its official defence spending is much lower than the 
South. Hence, as mentioned in Chapter 11, it is believed that the quality of North Korea's 
conventional weapons is lower than that of South Korea's and the North is also hiding many 
parts of its defence spending. In the 1990s, North Korea started to develop nuclear and bio- 
chemical weapons, and long-distance missiles to close the military gap with US-South 
alliance and strengthen its military deterrent capability. Second, the mechanism of the 
South-North arms race will be also examined. This is important because the an-ns 
competition between the two countries is believed to increase their defence spending and 
the increase of defence spending affects their economies. Thus, the investigation of an arms 
race between the two Koreas needs to be analysed before studies on the economic effects 
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of defence spending. US military aid to South Korea, the US-South alliance and inter-state 
conflict between the South and North are also considered in the South-North arms race. 
4.2. THE SOUTH-NORTH ARMS RACE MODEL 
Although various alternative arms race models have been developed since the introduction 
of the Richardson model, they are mostly derived from Richardson's classical action- 
reaction equation. The Richardson's classical equation is based on a two-person zero-sum 
game. Hence, it is criticised since the Richardson model is difficult to apply to the South- 
North arms race since the 1990s, because the major superpowers, including the USA, 
Russia, China and Japan are actively involved in the South-North relationship. Considering 
their active role, some scholars propose that the nature of South-North arms race is more 
likely to be a 6-players non-zero-sum game since the 1990s. Nevertheless, the Richardson's 
equation has represented the most basic fonn of South-North arms race model during the 
1960s to 1980s, and the military confrontation between the two Koreas has not diminished 
in the 1990s. These major powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula do not influence the 
two Koreas militarily but they do politically except for the USA. The Richardson's action- 
reaction paradigm has not been applied to the anus race in the Korean Peninsula, although 
it may have been one of the most relevant models to represent the military conflict in this 
region. Hence, a revised Richardson model will be applied to the South-North arms race 
studies. 
Assuming that the arms race between the South and North follows Richardson's action- 
reaction process, other variables reflecting Korea's special circumstances need to be added 
to his original equations. The annament of the two Koreas has been influenced not only by 
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the threat against each other, their economic capabilities and historical antipathy but also 
by inter-state tension, such as the political and armed conflicts between the South and 
North. Since the end of the Korean War, there have been frequent inter-state political and 
armed conflicts between the two countries, and the North has shown its hostile behaviour 
by intruding into South Korean territory. There have been many small battles between the 
South Korean army and the guerillas from North Korea. Furthermore, South Korea's first 
lady was assassinated by a North Korean terrorist in 1974. These events need to be reflected 
in the South-North arms race model as a dummy variable separately from the threat factor, 
because they might have affected the change of defence spending in both countries in a 
specific year. 
Besides the inter-state conflict factor, one of the important factors affecting the South-North 
anns race is US assistance to the South. Unlike the arms races in other regions, the South- 
North military confrontation has been strongly affected by the major powers surrounding 
the Korean Peninsula as mentioned earlier. Among those powers the USA has formed very 
strong ties with South Korea not only politically and economically but also militarily since 
the Korean War. US military grants were over 50% of the total defence budget of the US- 
South alliance until 1970, but they were under 5% in the late 1970s, and South Korea began 
to pay for the presence of US forces from 1983. Although US military aid to the South has 
rapidly diminished every year since the mid- I 970s, the firm alliance between two nations 
is still sufficient to deter the North Korean threat. Therefore, US military assistance will be 
considered as a key variable in the analysis of the South-North arms race. As a result, the 
alternative Richardson model describing the South-North arms races includes the demand 
factors for military expenditures, such as threat, spill-in (US military aid), income and 
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prices. ' Income and prices are reflected indirectly in the fatigue factor, because it is 
believed that a nation's income has a positive correlation with its own defence spending 
(Sandler and Hartley, 1995). Hence, the model for the South-North an-ns races can be 
presented: 
sNs dM, ' = a, M, -, +a 
M' +a Ic +a Us (4.1) 2 t-I 3 t-I 4t+9 
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ds M, ' = the change of real defence spending (armed forces, equipment) in the South. 
dM, N= the change of real defence spending (armed forces, equipment) in the North. 
real defence spending (armed force, equipment) in the South at time t. 
t= real 
defence spending (armed forces, equipment) in the North at time t. 
grievance factor of South (constant terrn)2. 
grievance factor of North (constant term). 
IC, = inter-state conflict dummies between the South and North (See Table 4.1). 
ICt = 1: inter-state conflict between the South and North at time t; 
IC, = 0: no inter-state conflict between the South and North at time t. 
I Prices can be dropped from the equation of demand for military expenditures without biasing results provided 
that price of military activities has inflated at the same general rate as that of non-military activities (Sandler and Hartley, 
1995). But, Solomon (2003) suggested that whether the unique defence market structure causes relatively higher price 
levels as opposed to high inflation is not confirmed. He found some evidence from selected defence capital projects in 
Canada which shows a persistent high inflation during the life of acquisition process unlike the rate observed in the 
overall economy. 
2 if g, known as a grievance term, is positively and significantly correlated to the dependent variable, it 
represents that a nation may augment its armament even though the other nation poses no threat. Grievance may be caused 
by a past defeat or else from territorial or religious disputes (Sandler and Hartley, 1995). 
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I TV = k-. /"l real level of US military grant to the South at time t. 
(Other variables were defined in Equations (4.1) and (4.2)). 
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) reflect not just the impact of the previous year's defence spending 
on the change of defence spending in both nations but also the importance of inter-state 
conflicts. In general, the defence spending of both nations is considered as the barometer 
of the arms race between the two nations, but it is not the only variable affecting the anns 
race. As shown in Table 4.1, since the 1960s, there have been several momentous incidents 
stimulating military expansion which might have led to increased defence spending 
between the two nations. They were mainly South Korea's domestic political changes or 
North Korea's provocative acts, including terrorism and guerilla attacks against South 
Korea's civilians and government officials. These incidents, namely, inter-state conflicts 
are basically different from the threat factor in that South Korea's defence spending (the 
number of armed forces and defence equipment) is not only affected by North Korea's, but 
also it might be affected by specific events whether political or military between the two 
countries. Thus, inter-state conflicts should be considered as another factor affecting the 
change of the level of defence spending in both nations. These equations also describe the 
South-North anns race more precisely than the original Richardson model by including the 
effect of US military aid (grant) to the South. Another feature of this model is using the 
lagged value of the new explanatory variables. The lagged values are also applied to the 
inter-state conflict factor, because incidents in the present year are expected to have an 
effect on next year's level of defence spending. In the case of the US military grant, both 
the lagged and present values are applied to the equations. The change of South Korea's 
defence spending is expected to be affected by the present US grant rather than the previous 
one. If present US military aid is large, South Korea's defence spending will be possibly 
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reduced, while if it is small, South Korea will spend more on defence. In other words, as 
mentioned earlier, it is expected that South Korea could enjoy a "free-ride" on US aid until 
the late 1970s. In contrast, North Korea will react to the previous year's military spending 
of the US-South alliance. 
Table 4.1. Major Conflicts between the South and North, 1963-2000 
Year Domestic events and Military tension between South and North 
1968-1969 US naval vessel Pueblo is kidnapped by North Korean warships. V 
1974-1975 South Korean first lady is killed by North Korean assassin. V 
1975-1976 Tunnels (for surprise attack) built by North Korea are found in the DMZ. V 
1976-1977 Armed conflicts between the US Army and North Korean soldiers in the DMZ.. / 
1979-1980 South Korean President is assassinated by his staff. * 
Declaration of the martial law. V 
1980-1981 Military coup and pro-democracy movement in South Korea. * 
Increasing military alert against North. V 
1983-1984 A number of South Korean cabinet members are killed in Burma by North Korean 
bomb terror.. / 
1987-1988 Korean Airline is exploded by North Korean terror.. / 
1988-1989 Olympic game is held in Seoul and rnilitary alert is increased.. / 
1994-1995 North Korean leader Kim 11-Sung dies and his son Kim Jong-11 succeeds his regime. t 
Nuclear crisis between the US and North Korea. V 
F19-99-2-000 
Warfare between the South and North in the West Sea. */ 
Note: * Domestic events in South Korea. 
t Domestic events in North Korea. 
*/ Military conflict between South and North. 
Source: Institute of International Studies Korean Defense Yearbook 1998-1999. 
In this model, the threat coefficients a, and bi will be positive by the tit-for-tat arms racing 
process and the fatigue coefficients, a2 and b2will be negative because of the economic 
burden induced by military spending if two countries have been involved in a long-term 
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arms race. Also, the coefficients of inter-state conflict will be positively correlated to the 
defence spending of both nations. It is expected that South Korea is more sensitive to inter- 
state conflicts, because it has suffered from North Korea's hostile acts since the Korean 
War. On the other hand, US military aid will give different effects on the South and North. 
South Korea would not need to spend on its defence when US support, including grant, 
weapons and troops was large, as in the 1960s, but it had to increase its defence burden 
with its rapid economic growth. However, the US contribution started to decrease fast with 
South Korea's economic and military growth. Accordingly, it is predicted that the 
coefficient ofUS military aid will be negatively correlated to the defence spending of South 
Korea (free-riding hypothesis). In contrast, the defence spending of North Korea will be 
positively correlated to that of the US-South alliance according to the Richardson's action- 
reaction mechanism. Therefore, the main hypotheses are summarised as follows: 
i) the threat coefficients: a, > 0, b, >0 
ii) the fatigue coefficients: a2< 0, 
b2 <0 
iii) the coefficients of inter-state conflict dummies: a3 :::,, 0, 
b3 >0 
iv) the coefficient of US military aid to South Korea: 
a4 <0 
v) the coefficients of the grievance factor (constant): g>0, h>0 
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4.3. DATA ANALYSIS 
4.3.1. Data 
There are some data problems for the empirical studies of the South-North arms race. First, 
many parts of military activities between South and North Korea are veiled due to the 
specific security enviromnent in the Korean Peninsula and the official defence data of both 
countries are believed to be unreliable. Although South Korea's military data are becoming 
more reliable, North Korea's real defence budget is still concealed and has hidden expenses. 
Hence, the actual defence spending of the North is unknown and most military research 
institutions use their own estimations by combining various data. Second, there are 
consistency problems. Although military data are provided by several institutions, such as 
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), HSS (International Institute for 
Strategic Studies) and ACDA (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department 
of State) on an annual basis, their estimations are different from each other and there are 
missing observations. In the empirical analysis of South-North arms races, the official data 
published by the Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND), SEPRI and IIISS will be used 
and compared, and the data generated by North Korean specialists will also be studied. The 
real level of defence spending from these institutions are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. 
However, the data on the numbers of military personnel and tactical aircraft are based on 
the Military Balance (HSS), because there is little difference between institutions (e. g. 
MNT)). ' SIPRI does not provide data on North Korea's number of armed forces and 
defence equipment: hence, the US S data will be used to examine the arms races of military 
3 SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) does not provide the data on the number of 
military personnel and defence equipment, and ACDA (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) only provides the 
data on the number of military personnel. 
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personnel and defence equipment (tactical aircraft) between the two countries for data 
consistency and comparability. Third, unfortunately, the historical data on the number of 
US armed forces and equipment in South Korea are unavailable. Only recent data (since the 
mid- I 990s) are available, but they are not enough to cover the anns race between the South 
and North over the period 1963-2000. Accordingly, the effect of US aid to South Korea is 
ignored in the test of arms races in the number of military personnel and tactical aircraft. ' 
Based on these conditions, the South-North anns races will be tested for the period 1963- 
2000, and also for two different sub-periods based on before and after the end of the Cold 
War in 1990. 
4.3.2. Data Analysis of Defence Spending 
As shown in Figure 4.1, South Korea's real defence spending has steadily increased, 
although it has some downswings for the period 1963-2000. There are some discrepancies 
between institutions, but they unexceptionally show that South Korea's real defence 
spending tends to continually increase for the sample period. According to these three 
institutions South Korea's defence spending peaked in the mid-1990s, but since the late 
1990s, it considerably reduced (Bae, 2003). But, it started to increase again from 2000 
according to SIPRI and USS. From these data, it is found that South Korea's defence 
spending rapidly increased from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, and also from the early 
1990s to the mid-1990s. South Korea's defence spending measured in US dollars 
fluctuated depending on its exchange rate. That is, the devaluation of local currency to US 
4 In this case, the South-North arms race equations will omit the US variable: 
dsI MINI + Ms Ic Mý' a a2 -, +a3 -, +g 




dollar could decrease its real level of defence spending. Sen (1995) argued that using a US 
constant-dollar value does not exactly reflect the actual value of defence spending because 
of the inadequate comparability of exchange rates. Thus, he argued that using constant 
value of local currency is adequate to accurately measure a nation's defence spending. 
Nevertheless, the value of constant US dollar is used in the South-North anus race, because 
South Korea is a major importer in the world defence market depending heavily on foreign 
imports for its weapons and South Korea's military strength changes according to its 
purchasing power in the international arms market. 
Figure 4.1. Comparison of Real Defence Spending in South Korea 














--a- MND v SIPRI m IISS 
Note: The data from IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) are for the period 1970-2000. 
Table 4.2 shows the high correlation of defence spending between the different institutions. 
According to Spearman's non-parametric test, three data from the above institutions are 
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correlated with each other between 0.94 and 0.96 at the 1% level of significance. MND 
(Ministry of National Defence) and SIPRI data are highly correlated at 0.96 and other data 
also show relatively high correlations. The Pearson test also shows high correlations 
between the data from these institutions. According to the Pearson test, the correlations are 
between 0.94 and 0.98 among institutions. Therefore, it is concluded that South Korea's 
defence spending data are relatively consistent and accurate between the above institutions. 
Table 4.2. Correlation of South Korea's Defence Spending Between Institutions 
Institutions and test NIND SIPRI IISS 
Spearman's rho 1.000 0.960** 0.949** 
NIND 
Pearson 1.000 0.976** 0.943** 
Spearman's rho 0.960** 1.000 0.944** 
SIPRI 
Pearson 0.976** 1.000 0.948** 
Spearman's rho 0.949** 0.944** 1.000 
IISS 
Pearson 0.943** 0.948** 1.000 
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
On the other hand, as shown in Figure 4.2, some major differences exist in the North 
Korean data between these same institutions. According to NIND, North Korea's defence 
spending rapidly increased until the late 1970s and since the 1980s, its level of defence 
spending had not changed much until the mid-1990s despite some downswings and 
upswings. But, HSS data show that North Korea's defence spending rapidly increased until 
the mid- I 980s and since then it has decreased slowly. Although the data from MND and 
JISS show a rapid increase of North Korea's defence spending until the late 1970s or the 
mid- I 980s, SEPRI does not present such a rapid change of North Korea's defence spending. 
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According to SEPRI, its level of defence spending slowly increased without such a big 
change until the mid-1990s and since then it started to decrease. Moreover, SEPRI data 
show quite large differences from those of MND and IISS in the real level of defence 
spending. These differences might be due to two reasons. First, the North Korean 
govenunent does not reveal its military expenditures and thus these institutions might 
depend on their own estimations and extrapolation. Although each institution might have 
its own inforination sources on North Korea's defence data, they can be inaccurate and 
unreliable. Second, North Korea's exchange rates are divided into official and commercial 
rates. In general, its official rates are much overvalued compared with its commercial rates 
and hence, the estimation of North Korea's defence spending might differ according to 
whether official or commercial rates are applied. Due to these reasons, its actual defence 
spending is veiled and institutions might not guarantee the accuracy of North Korean data. 
Figure 4.2. Comparison of Defence Spending in North Korea 












MND v SIPRI a IISS 
Note: The data from IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) are for the period 1970-2000. 
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In Table 4.3, North Korean data have lower correlations of defence spending between 
institutions than those of South Korea's. According to Spearman's non-parametric test, three 
data are correlated with each other between 0.49 and 0.89 at the I% level of significance. 
The SfPRI and HSS data are highly correlated at 0.89, but MND and HSS data show a low 
correlation at 0.49. The NfND and SEPRI data have also quite a high correlation at 0.7 1. The 
Pearson test shows higher correlations than Speannan's test resulting in the correlations 
between 0.51 and 0.90. Therefore, the correlations between institutions are much lower 
compared with those of South Korea's defence spending. The MND and HSS data do not 
show a meaningful relationship with each other, although IISS data represent only the 
period 1970-2000. However, these three institutions commonly show that North Korea's 
defence spending has decreased since the mid- I 990s. Although it is noted that North 
Korea's defence spending data are less correlated and inconsistent between these 
institutions, MND data are believed to be more reliable because SIPRI data are too low 
compared with other data and HSS data have missing variables. In this thesis, all three data 
sources will be used and compared with each other. 
Table 4.3. Correlation of North Korea's Defence Spending Between Institutions 
Institutions and test NIND SIPRI IISS 
Spearman's rho 1.000 0.707** 0.491 
NIND 
Pearson 1.000 0.736** 0.508** 
Spearman's rho 0.707** 1.000 0.889** 
SIPRI 
Pearson 0.736** 1.000 0.903** 
Spearman's rho 0.491** 0.889** 1.000 
IISS 
Pearson 0.508** 0.903** 1.000 
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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4.3.3. Data Analysis of Military Personnel and Tactical Aircraft 
The arms race might have occurred between the South and North not only in their defence 
spending but also in their number of military personnel and defence equipment. 
Investigating the change of the number of military personnel and defence equipment in 
tenns of the South-North anns race is necessary to study the defence structure of these two 
countries. As mentioned in Chapter H, South Korea's defence has focussed more on the 
increase of defence spending and quality of weapons. Whereas, North Korea has focussed 
on dominating the South in its number of military personnel and conventional weapons to 
cope with the capital and technology-based defence policy of the US-South alliance. As 
shown in Figure 4.3, the number of South Korea's military personnel peaked in the early 
1990s, but it could be a temporary oversupply caused by its conscription system. With the 
exception of these periods, its number of military personnel has been maintained at 
approximately between 600,000 and 700,000 since the early 1960s. Hence, the number of 
South Korea's armed forces might not be an important factor causing the anus race between 
the South and North. However, it had been much larger than that of North Korea's until the 
late 1970s, and this might stimulate North Korea to increase its number of military 
personnel. The gap between the South and North narrowed until the late 1970s and North 
Korea started to catch up with South Korea from the 1980s. Since the 1980s, the number of 
North Korea's military personnel steadily increased and the gap between the South and 
North has widened every year subsequently. According to Figure 4.3, by 2000, North Korea 
had almost twice the number of military personnel than South Korea. Therefore, Figure 4.3 
indicates that North Korea has focussed relatively on the increase in the number of military 
personnel in the arms race with South Korea and has a more labour-intensive military force 
structure than the South. 
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Figure 4.4 compares the number of tactical aircraft, including fighters, reconnaissance 
aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles between the South and North. For the sample period, 
North Korea's tactical aircraft has outnumbered South Korea's, although the quality of 
aircraft is questioned. ' It is noted that North Korea's tactical aircraft numbers rapidly 
increased from the mid- I 960s to the late 1980s, but since the 1990s, they tend to decrease 
in spite of a few upswings between the early 1990s and the mid- 1 990s. On the other hand, 
South Korea's tactical aircraft numbers also increased for the sample period, but it was not 
as fast as North Korea's. The gap was widest in the late 1980s and from the early 1990s to 
the mid-1990s, but since the mid-1990s, South Korea's tactical aircraft numbers have 
increased rapidly, while North Korea's have declined. Considering South Korea's capital and 
technology-intensive defence policy, it is believed that South Korea is more advanced than 
North Korea in the quality of weapons and this will explain the gap shown in Figure 4.4. Its 
growth in the number of tactical aircraft is also higher than that of the North's since the mid- 
1990s. In Figure 4.4, it is found that the number of tactical aircraft is highly correlated 
between the South and North for the period 1963-2000 unlike the number of military 
personnel. Table 4.4 illustrates the correlation of the number of tactical aircraft between the 
South and North. According to the Spearman's test, the number of tactical aircraft between 
the South and North is correlated to each other at 0.89 and the Pearson test at 0.95 shows 
the higher correlation between these two countries. 
5 By 2002, South Korea's main fighters are F-16C/D, F-5E/F and F-4D/E. Their maximum bombing powers 
are about 940-1,290 kt and maximum speeds are 1,082-1,485 mph. The operation ranges are 595-2,415 mile. By contrast, 
North Korea's main fighters are MiG- 17,19 and 2 1. Their maximum bombing powers and speeds are 617-1,203 kt/71 I- 
1,385 mph. The operation ranges are 426-1,230 mile. Hence, South Korea's fighters are slightly superior to the North's 
in the maximum speed and destructive power, but in general, they are much better in the operation range than the North's. 
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Table 4.4. Correlation of the Number of Tactical Aircraft 
South Korea North Korea 
Spearman's rho Pearson 
1 0.892** 0.954** 
1 
Note: ** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
4.4. Empirical Results 
4.4.1. Arms Races in Defence Spending 
In the empirical tests of anus races in defence spending between the South and North, the 
data from MND (The Ministry of National Defense), SIPRI and HSS will be used and their 
results will be compared. First, the South-North arms races using the original Richardson 
model in Equation (3.1) and (3.2), and the alternative model presented in Equation (4.1) and 
(4.2) are estimated by OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) method for the period 1963-2000. The 
results from both models will provide insights into the pattern of arms races between the 
two countries for the sample period. Second, dividing the South-North arms races into two 
sub-penods, the Cold War (1963-1989) and post-Cold War (1990-2000) anus races will be 
tested using the same estimating equation, because the arms races between South and North 
Korea are generally believed to be more intense in the Cold War era. This test will uncover 
whether it is true or not. The post-Cold War arms races are tested to examine the change of 
arms racing mechanism since the collapse of communist countries. The end of arms races 
between the two superpowers, USA and USSR might alleviate the South-North arms races, 
but it also might not be true, because the defence spending of the Asia region increased 
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,I 1ý. about 27% in the post-Cold War era (UNIDIR; Willett, 2002). Also, the increased tension 
in the Korean Peninsula caused by North Korea's nuclear development programme might 
intensify South Korea's reaction since the 1990s. Hence, it is difficult to hypothesise the 
pattern of post-Cold War arms races between the South and North. Even the pattern of 
South-North arms races might not be changed between the Cold-War and post-Cold War 
era. 
Table 4.5 shows the empirical results of the South-North arms races for the period 1963- 
2000 using the original Richardson model. In the Table, the change of South Korea's 
defence spending shows an R2 of 0.24-0.36, while the change of North Korea's defence 
spending has very low R 2of 0.07-0.17. In other words, the original Richardson model 
exp ains 24%-36% of the variation in South Korea's defence spending, but the explanatory 
value for North Korea is causally low at 7%-17%. The R2s might be raised by using 
additional explanatory variables, but these results show that the classical Richardson model 
has its limitations to explain the South-North arms races. Also, F-values are significant at 
1%-5% level for South Korea for all data, but it is only significant at 5% level for North 
Korea in the MND data. The F-values of SIPRI and IIISS data show no significance for 
North Korea. From the statistical results in Table 4.5, it is found that South Korea follows 
2 
the original Richardson's action-reaction process in spite of relatively low Rs, but the 
defence spending of North Korea does not follow the Richardson model. According to the 
MND data, it follows another variant of the Richardson model considering a submissiveness 
effect. Namely, the larger South Korea's defence spending is relative to North Korea's 
defence spending; the greater the negative effect on the defence spending of North Korea, 
ceterisparibus (Richardson, 1960; Smoker, 1964). This is quite a surprising result, because 
-III- 
it was assumed that North Korea's reaction must be more intense than South Korea's 
considering its provocative acts for the sample period. The results of SEPRI and HSS data 
only show that South Korea follows the classical Richardson process. Both the reaction and 
fatigue coefficients of North Korea are insignificant, and therefore, it is found that North 
Korea does not follow the classical Richardson model. As a result, Table 4.5 represents an 
asymmetric arms race led by South Korea. ' 
6 Tests of log-linear model such as log SM, =log NM, -, + 
log SM, 
_1 
+ C, where SM is South Korea's 
military spending, NM is North Korea's military spending and C is other variables including interstate conflicts and US 
military aid provide high R 2S compared with linear regressions. But, they do not meet the hypotheses of the alternative 
Richardson model presented earlier. For example, the test of South Korea's defence spending for the period 1963-2000 
results in a high R2 at 0.99, but the signs of coefficients are different from our expectations. Not only the threat but also 
the economic burden coefficient is positive and the coefficient of inter-state conflicts has a negative sign. Hence, only 
threat coefficient meets our expectation and other coefficients have completely different signs from the hypotheses 
provided earlier (see Appendix IV-1). 
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Table 4.5. Empirical Results of the Classical Richardson Model 1963-2000 
Dependent Coefficients of independent variables Statistical values 
Dependent Threat Fatigue Grievance R2 F-value DW 
variable 
(1) IVIND 
South 0.35 -0.11 -364.14 0.25 5.72*** 1.68 
(3.31)*** (-2.75)*** (-1.36) 
North -0.07 0.01 290.43 0.17 3.45** 2.55 
(-2.02)** (0.15) (1.31) 
(2) SIPRI 
South 0.98 -0.10 -244.35 0.36 9.46*** 
1.42 
(4.28)*** (-3.61)*** (-1.52) 
North -0.01 0.05 66.68 0.11 2.17 
1.18 
(-1.24) (0.46) (0.94) 
(3)IISS 
South 0.59 -0.27 622.31 0.24 4.34** 
2.26 
(2.59)** (-2.93)*** (1.31) 2 09 North -0.02 -0.08 417.70 0.07 1.05 . 
(-0.30) (-0.53) (1.38) 
Notes: I. Threat factor in North is the coefficient of the total defence spending of the US-South Korea alliance. 
2. Figures in parentheses in the coefficients of independent variables are t -statistics. 
3. IISS data represent the period 1970-2000. 
***. 0 1 level of significance; * *. 05 level of significance; *. 10 level of significance 
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Table 4.6 shows the South-North arms races using the alternative Richardson model 
represented in Equations (4.1) and (4.2). The overall R2s are increased to 0.40-0-46 
compared with the original Richardson model in Table 4.5. As shown in Table 4.6, South 
Korea leads the South-North arms races by the Richardson's action-reaction process, but 
this is not the only factor affecting the arms race between the two countries. 
Inter-state conflict is found to be a significant factor affecting the changes in South Korea's 
defence spending in MND and SIPRI data. The political and military conflicts between the 
two countries are expected to be a necessary factor to explain the South-North arms races. 
Since the end of the Korean War (1953), North Korea has attacked South Korea persistently 
and irregularly. It is assumed that chronic political conflicts, terrors, and sending guerillas 
into the South has led South Korea to increase its defence spending. For example, North 
Korean guerillas have frequently infiltrated the South Korean territory since the cease-fire 
in 1953 until the late 1990s, and have sought to weaken the military forces of South Korea. 
However, according to the empirical results in Table 4.6, it is found that North Korea's 
defence spending has not been affected by the inter-state conflicts. All the data from MND, 
SIPRI and HSS show no evidence that North Korea's defence spending was affected by 
inter-state conflicts with South Korea. 
The fatigue factor has a significant and negative effect on South Korea's defence spending, 
while it has an insignificant effect on North Korea's. This is different from our expectation, 
because the economic burden caused by previous defence spending is supposed to have a 
negative effect on present defence spending. The grievance factor measured by a constant 
terin has different results according to the data. In the NIND data, grievance is a significant 
factor explaining North Korea's defence spending at the 10% level, while it explains South 
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Korea's at 1% level of significance in the HSS data. The Durbin-Watson d statistics are 
1.65-2.14 for South Korea and 1.32-2.52 for North Korea and hence there is no evidence 
of autocorrelation, although some statistics are in the inconclusive zone. 
On the other hand, the test results show that US support to South Korea has no significant 
effect on the change of South Korea's defence spending except for the HSS data. That is, 
South Korea's defence spending steadily increased in spite of US military aid. ' 
Nevertheless, it is believed that US military aid alleviated South Korea's defence burden 
and provided a free-ride to the South until the late 1970s. As a result, it is found that inter- 
state conflicts can be added as a variable explaining South Korea's defence spending 
besides the defence spending of South and North Korea. By adding the dummy variables 
for inter-state conflicts and US military aid, the alternative model shows quite a satisfactory 
result for describing the mechanism of South Korea's defence spending compared with the 
original Richardson model. The R2 indicating the overall significance of equations were 
increased from 0.24-0.36 to 0.40-0.47 for South Korea, and hence it is better for explaining 
South Korea's defence spending. Nevertheless, the empirical test of the alternative model 
shows disappointing results for North Korea's defence spending and does not improve the 
overall significance of the equations. Therefore, it is doubtful whether Richardson's action- 
reaction process is adequate to explain the mechanism of North Korea's defence spending. 
7 From the late 1970s South Korea's contribution exceeded 90 percent of the total defence burden of US- 
South alliance, owing to the Force Improvement Plan (Yulgok project). The US military assistance programme ended 
in 1976 in spite of some deliveries of the past programme and some transfers of equipment from the US forces in Korea. 
Also, the foreign military sales (FMS) credit ended in 1986, but South Korea became fully responsible for its defence 
burden in 1983, as the repayment of the credit exceeded the new FMS credit as early as 1980 (Hamm, 1999; p. 147). 
-115- 
Table 4.6. Empirical Results of the Alternative Model 1963-2000 
Dependent Coefficients of independent variables Statistical values 
Dependent Threat Fatigue Conflict US Aid Grievance R2 F- DW 
variable value 
(1) IVIND 
South 0.27 -0.15 541.20 -0.49 2.27 0.40 5.28*** 1.84 
(2.50)** (-2.21)** (2.57)** (-0.48) (0.004) 
North -0.07 -0.01 106.44 364.19 0.18 2.47* 2.52 
(-2.04)** (-0.17) (0.55) (1.71)* 
(2) SIPRI 
South 0.92 -0.13 226.26 -0.47 80.73 0.47 7.00*** 
1.65 
(4.20)*** (-3.86)*** (1.93)* (-1.38) (0.26) 
North -0.02 0.06 78.54 59-01 0.18 2.49* 
1.32 
(-1.55) (0.62) (1.49) (0.92) 
(3)IISS 
South 0.53 -0.56 -271.38 -4.51 3512.21 0.46 5.39*** 
2.14 
(2.64)** (-4.58)*** (-0.56) (-3.17)*** (3.40)*** 
North 
-0.02 -0.06 37.52 428.83 0.07 0.70 
2.13 
(-0.39) (-0.44) (0-11) (1.27) 
Notes: I. Threat factor in North is the coefficient of the total defence spending of the US-South Korea 
alliance. 
2. Figures in parentheses in the coefficients of independent variables are t -statistics. 
3. IISS data represent the period 1970-2000. 
*. 0 1 level of signif icance; * *. 05 level of significance; *. 10 level of significance 
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4.4-1.1. Sub-Period : 1963-1989 
Table 4.7 shows the Cold War (1963-1989) anus race between the South and North. 
According to the empirical results, South Korea's arms race pattern follows the 
Richardson's action-reaction process in the NIND data, but other data show different results 
from Tables 4.5 and 4.6. Hence, the empirical results are sensitive to choice of data. In the 
Cold War era, the South-North arms races do not follow the Richardson's action-reaction 
mechanism using the SIPRI and IISS data. This is a surprising result because the South- 
North arms race is believed to be more intense in the Cold War era. It seems that both 
countries seek to expand their defence expenditures according to their economic capability 
and self-defence policy in this period. South Korea's defence spending is affected by the 
economic burden (MND, HSS), conflict (MND, SEPRI), US aid (IISS) and grievance (HSS) 
rather than threat (NIND). Hence, it is found that the arms race led by South Korea are 
insignificant in the Cold War era in the SIPRI and IIISS data, but it is still significant using 
the NIND data. The reaction coefficient is significant at the 5% level and slightly larger 
than the reaction coefficient for the period 1963-2000. North Korea's defence spending is 
still different from the Richardson's action-reaction process, but IISS data show that North 
Korea reacts to the threat from the US-South alliance at the 10% level of significance. 
However, the empirical results for North Korea have a very low R2 at 0.18 and thus it is 
difficult to conclude that North Korea actually followed the Richardson's action-reaction 
process in this period. According to Table 4.7, North Korea's defence spending is rather 
affected by the grievance factor in the Cold War era. 
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Table 4.7. Empirical Results of the Alternative Model 1963-1989 
Dependent Coefficients of independent variables Statistical values 
Dependent Threat Fatigue Conflict US Aid Grievance R2 F- DW 
variable value 
(1) MND 
South 0.37 -0.25 216.38 -0.14 -204.88 0.55 6.05*** 1.38 (3.66)** (-2.86)*** (1.90)* (-0.44) (-0.73) 
North -0.05 -0.002 105.62 263.23 0.10 0.80 1.84 
(-0.57)** (402) (0.77) (1.89)* 
(2) SIPRI 
South 0.22 0.02 283.82 0.09 -52.57 0.36 3.13** 
1.82 
(0.45) (0.18) (1.97)* (0.15) (413) 
North 0.03 -0.20 28.30 122.51 0.11 0.91 1.34 
(1.46) (-1.59) (0.63) (2.15)** 
(3)IISS 
South 0.35 -0.41 -809.88 -3.47 2998.77 0.42 2.75* 
2.19 
(1 46) (-2 69)** (-1 66) (-2 63)** 07)*** (3 
North . 0.14 . -0.25 
. 
-274.84 
. . 145.66 0.18 1.15 2.25 
(1.73)* (-1.49) (483) (0.51) 
1 1 1 1 
Notes: I. Threat factor in North is the coefficient of the total defence spending of the US-South Korea 
alliance. 
2. Figures in parentheses in the coefficients of independent variables are t -statistics. 
3. IISS data represent the period 1970-1989. 
***. 01 level of significance; **. 05 level of significance; *. 10 level of significance 
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4.4.1.2. Sub-Period: 1990-2000 
In the post-Cold War era (1990-2000), South Korea's reaction to North Korea's threat has 
intensified compared with the Cold War era. In Table 4.8, NfND, SIPRI and HSS data show 
that South Korea's defence spending follows the Richardson's action-reaction process, 
while North Korea's defence spending follows a submissive-type Richardson model. 
Namely, when South Korea's defence spending is increased, North Korea's decreased in the 
post-Cold War era. This might be caused by its economic difficulties and concentration on 
the ballistic missile and nuclear development programme. South Korea's reaction 
coefficients are also increased using the MND and IIISS data compared with those of the 
Cold War era. In other words, it is noted that regardless of the end of the Cold War and 
the peace talks between the South and North, South Korea's military expansion 
continued and intensified in the post-Cold War era. For example, South Korea's defence 
spending was 2.7 times larger than North Korea's in 1990 in real terms, but the gap between 
the two countries was 6.8 times in 1999, although it narrowed slightly in 2000. According 
to UNIDIR (2002), Asia's defence spending increased after the end of the Cold War, even 
though the defence spending of the two superpowers reduced in the post-Cold War era. 
Hence, it is not surprising that South Korea's reaction coefficient increased in the post-Cold 
War era. However, differently from our expectation, the nuclear crisis between the South 
and North reflected in the inter-state conflict dummy had no significant effect on South 
Korea's defence spending. South Korea chose a peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis 
instead of military countermeasure. 
uS military aid is only significant in the HSS data and the effect of grievance varies with 
the data. In the statistical aspects, both countries' R's are increased compared with those 
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of the Cold War era (1963-1989) and overall period (1963-2000). The R's are increased 
from 0.36-0.55 in the Cold War era test to 0.77-0.84 in the test of post-Cold War era for 
South Korea. For North Korea, they are also increased from 0.10-0.18 (Cold War) to 0.20- 
0.74 (post-Cold War), but it does not indicate that North Korea follows Richardson's 
action-reaction model. The submissive effect of its reaction coefficients was strengthened 
and it increased the level of significance in the post-Cold War era. It is thought that the 
widening gap ofmilitary spending between the South and North led North Korea to develop 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) such as nuclear weapons, because those weapons can 
incapacitate the dominant military power of the US-South alliance. Therefore, in the post- 
Cold War era, the alternative model shows better goodness of fit than any other period for 
South Korea, although it is a relatively small sample. Also, according to the empirical 
results, the submissive Richardson model represented by Richardson (1960) and Smoker 
(1964) seems to be adequate to explain North Korea's defence spending in the post-Cold 
War era. 
-120- 
Table 4.8. Empirical Results of the Alternative Model 1990-2000 
Dependent Coefficients of independent variables Statistical values 
Dependent Threat Fatigue Conflict US Aid Grievance R2 F- DW 
variable value 
(1) IVIND 
South 0.45 -1.09 997.88 -9.84 9207.46 0.84 6.81 2.03 
(2.41)* (-3,35)** (1.64) (-1.35) (3.52)** 
North -0.13 -0.12 857.81 1549.92 0.20 0.51 2.22 
(-0.33) (-0.31) (0.88) (0.34) 
(2) SIPRI 
South 0.80 -0.26 85.19 -3.18 1404.41 0.77 4.09* 
1.74 
(1.16) (-1.64) (0.24) (-0.63) (0.63) 
North -0.13 -0.08 227.47 1750.18 0.74 5.71 2.60 
(-3.74)*** (-0.46) (2.16)* (2.92)** 
(3)IISS 
South 0.65 -1.35 -1439.87 -24.37 8585.14 0.80 4.89* 
1.84 
(2.08)* (-2.94)** (-0.87) (-2.13)* (1.76) 
North 
-0.47 -0.10 -569.23 6413.05 0.42 1.42 
2.75 
(-1.88)* (-0.41) (-0.65) (1.79) 1 1 1 
Notes: I. Threat factor in North is the coefficient of the total defence spending of the US-South Korea 
alliance. 
2. Figures in parentheses in the coefficients of independent variables are t -statistics. 
***. 0 1 level of significance; * *. 05 level of significance; *. 10 level of significance 
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4.4.2. Arm Races in Military Personnel and Tactical Aircraft 
The arms race between the South and North can also be investigated not just in their 
defence spending but also in their number of military personnel and defence equipment. In 
Chapter H, it was found that South Korea has more capital-intensive defence forces than 
North Korea due to its economic superiority to the North. Thus, South Korea could lead the 
arms race with North Korea in tenns of defence spending. In this section, the South-North 
arms races are examined in the aspect of military personnel and high technology weapons. 
As shown in Figure 4.3, South Korea outnumbered North Korea in its number of military 
personnel until the late 1970s. But, in the 1980s it was reversed by the North and the gap 
has widened since the 1990s. Also, Figure 4.4 shows the anns race for tactical aircraft 
between the South and North. North Korea has maintained a larger number of tactical 
aircraft than South Korea since the early 1960s and the South has never overtaken the North 
during the sample period. In the empirical tests using military personnel and tactical 
aircrafý it is argued that the quality difference between the South and North should be 
measured, for example, the human capital investment in defence forces, such as nutrition, 
education and training. But, it is thought that North Korea's military forces are well-trained 
and have strong combat capability as South Korea's. North Korea gives more priority to the 
military than any other sector, even though it suffers from economic difficulties and food 
shortages. Therefore, there is no reason to underestimate the capabilities of North Korea's 
military personnel. Also, the quality adjustment cannot be applied in the arms race of 
tactical aircraft. South Korea's main tactical aircraft, F- I 6C/D and F-5E/F are estimated to 
be slightly better than North Korea's MiG- 17 and 19 in the speed and destructive power. 
But, North Korea's MiG-21 and 29 are faster and more destructive than South Korea's F- 
16CID and F-5E/F. South Korea covers these weaknesses with the F-4D/E which F-4D/E 
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is faster and more destructive than MiG-21, but its operational range is relatively small. 
Instead, F- I 6C/D and F-5E/F have much greater operational range than MiG-21 and 29. 
Hence, North Korea's fighters are focussed more on speed and destructive power, while 
South Korea's are focussed more on the operational range. In general, it is considered that 
South Korea's fighters are technologically superior and newer than North Korea's, but there 
is no simple standard to estimate the quality of tactical aircraft between the two countries. 
Table 4.9 shows the empirical results of the South-North arms races in the number of 
military personnel and tactical aircraft using the classical Richardson model for the period 
1963-2000. According to the Table, South Korea has been sensitive and reacted to the 
number of North Korea's military personnel, and followed the Richardson-type action- 
reaction process in its numbers of military personnel. The number of South Korea's military 
personnel has been also significantly affected by the economic burden and grievance 
factors. But, it is found that North Korea has been indifferent to the number of South 
Korea's military personnel and does not follow the Richardson model. 
However, North Korea has significantly reacted to the number of South Korea's tactical 
aircraft and follows the Richardson's action-reaction mechanism. South Korea's reaction 
coefficient is positive but not significant, and hence it does not seem to have reacted to 
North Korea in the number of tactical aircraft. This is a surprising result, but the increase 
of tactical aircraft in South Korea might not have followed the tit-for-tat strategy. As seen 
in Figure 4.4, from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, the number of South Korea's tactIcal 
aircraft have a somewhat different trend compared with that of North Korea's, although 
they show a high correlation with each other for the sample period. For example, the 
number of South Korea's tactical aircraft shows a very low growth during the 1980s, while 
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that of North Korea's rapidly increased during this period. However, it is doubted that 
Richardson's action-reaction framework is appropriate for the tests of the North's military 
personnel and the South's tactical aircraft, because their R' s are very low at 0.001 and 
0.05. 
Table 4.9. Empirical Results of the Classical Richardson Model in Military Personnel 
and Tactical Aircraft 1963-2000 
Dependent Coefficients of independent variables Statistical values 




South 0.04 -0.49 280103.70 0.25 5.53*** 1.60 
(1.91)" (-3.31)*** (3.25)* 
North -0.02 0.001 31248.57 0.001 0.01 1.95 
(-0.14) (0.06) (0.36) 
Tactical 
Aircraft 
South 0.05 -0.13 24.41 0.05 0.83 
2.18 
(0.72) (-1.00) (0.98) 
North 0.54 -0.31 105.74 0.23 6** 4.9 
2.05 
(2.93)*** (-3.14)*** (2.91)*** 
Notes: Figures in parentheses in the coefficients of independent variables are t -statistics 
***. 01 level of significance; **. 05 level of significance; *. 10 level of significance 
Table 4.10 representing the South-North anns race with the number of military personnel 
and tactical aircraft using the alternative model for the period 1963-2000 shows a similar 
pattem to Table 4.9. Although the overall R's are relatively improved compared with the 
Richardson model in Table 4.9, they are still low at 0.03-0.25. The statistical tests of the 
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number of military personnel for North Korea and tactical aircraft for South Korea result 
in low R2s at 0.03 and 0.13, and thus do not show any meaningful relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. Adding inter-state conflict dummies does not much 
improve the statistical results. Thus, it is thought that neither the Richardson nor the 
alternative model is adequate to explain these two cases. As a result, Tables 4.9 and 4.10 
show that the South follows an asymmetric Richardson model in the number of military 
personnel, while the North follows the same pattern in the number of tactical aircraft for 
the period 1963-2000. Therefore, it is found that South Korea regarded the number ofNorth 
Korea's military forces as a potential threat and more actively reacted to it, while North 
Korea was more sensitive to South Korea's air force for this period. 
Table 4.10. Empirical Results of the Alternative Model in Military Personnel and 
Tactical Aircraft 1963-2000 
Dependent Coefficients of independent variables Statistical values 




South 0.04 -0.50 -4722.74 286341.0 0.25 3.68** 1.59 
(1.94)* (-3.31)*** (-0.47) (3.25)*** 
North -0.04 0.01 -10139.30 44639.67 0.03 0.34 1.80 
(-0.28) (0.27) (-1.00) (0.50) 
Tactical 
Aircraft 
South 0.04 -0.13 30.74 23.18 0.13 1.66 2.07 
(0.66) (-1.07) (1.79)* (0.96) 
North 0.54 -0.31 22.24 104.85 0.24 3.52** 2.02 
(2.90)*** (-3.16)*** (0.86) (2.88)*** 
Notes: Figures in parentheses in the coefficients of independent variables are t -statistics. 
***. Ol level of significance; **. 05 level of significance; *. 10 level of significance 
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Table 4.11 presents the empirical results of the arms race between the South and North 
Korea using the number of military personnel and tactical aircraft in the Cold War era 
(1963-1989). Compared with Table 4.10, it is found that South Korea's reaction to the 
number ofNorth Korea's military personnel is insignificant, while North Korea follows the 
Richardson's action-reaction process in both the number of military personnel and tactical 
aircraft. Differently from the empirical test of defence spending, North Korea reacted to the 
number of South Korea's military personnel and tactical aircraft in the Cold War era. As 
a result, it is found that the South-North anus race in the number of military personnel and 
tactical aircraft was led by North Korea in the Cold War era. The R' of the equations are 
improved showing the range of 0.18-0.36, but they are not so satisfactory for the South's 
equations. In the Cold War era, the number of South Korea's military personnel is only 
affected by the economic burden and grievance factors, while its number of tactical aircraft 
is changed by the inter-state conflicts between the South and North. 
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Table 4.11. Empirical Results of the Alternative Model in Military Personnel and 
Tactical Aircraft 1963-1989 
Dependent Coefficients of independent variables Statistical values 




South 0.004 -0.50 3639.83 310197.90 0.24 2.37* 1.87 
(0.22) (-2.63)*** (0.49) (2.58)** 
North 0.61 0.07 -20770.2 -387971.0 0.25 2.53* 1.63 
(1.85)* (2.04)* (-1.66) (-1.90)* 
Tactical 
Aircraft 
South 0.07 -0.17 38.18 12.84 0.18 1.70 2.03 
(0.73) (-1.05) (1.82)* (0.41) 
North 0.76 -0.47 53.08 145.90 0.36 4.33** 1.52 
(3.23)*** (-3.41)*** (1.77)* (3.24)*** 
Notes: Figures in parentheses in the coefficients of independent variables are t -statistics. 
***. Ol level of significance; **. 05 level of significance; *. 10 level of significance 
In Table 4.12, the post-Cold War arms races using the number of military personnel and 
tactical aircraft between the South and North are described. It is noted that the number of 
military personnel in both countries does not follow the Richardson's action-reaction 
pattern in the post-Cold War era (1990-2000), although the overall R2s are relatively high 
at 0.31-0.55 compared with those of other periods. It seems that the numbers of military 
personnel in the South and North are not engaged in an anns race in the post-Cold War era. 
North Korea even relinquished its reaction to the number of South Korea's tactIcal aircraft. 
In Table 4.12, it should be noted that South Korea's reaction to the number of North 
Korea's tactical aircraft is also negative. In the arrns race with an opponent , it might 
be 
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regarded as the indication of disarmament or submissiveness. But, in this case, it should be 
explained differently. In general, it is estimated that South Korea's tactical aircraft are 
technologically advanced compared with North Korea's, although the specifications of their 
tactical aircraft are different from each other. Also, since the mid-1990s, the number of 
North Korea's tactical aircraft has continually reduced except for 1998, while that of South 
Korea's consistently increased for the same period. Hence, the negative sign of reaction 
coefficient does not indicate South Korea's reduction in its number of tactical aircraft. 
Nevertheless, 10 years are an inadequate period to measure the pattern of the post-Cold War 
arms race between the South and North. A longer time period is needed to estimate a more 
accurate arms race mechanism between the two countries. The DW statistics are generally 
low, but autocorrelations are not detected. 
Table 4.12. Empirical Results of the South-North Arms Race in Military Personnel 
and Tactical Aircraft 1990-2000 
Dependent Coefficients of independent variables Statistical values 




South -0.24 -0.79 -17849.3 778913.3 0.39 1.29 1.11 
(441) (-1.97)* (-0.46) (1.10) 
North -0.04 0.003 -11306.6 39915.36 0.31 0.89 2.86 
(-0.58) (0.03) (-1.53) (0.30) 
Tactical 
Aircraft 
South -0.60 -1.25 90.09 1686.01 0.55 2.42 1.23 
(-2.37)* (-2,58)** (2.18)* (2.67)** 
North -0.95 -0.95 66.16 2028.91 0.48 1.87 0.97 
(-1.15) (-2.20)* (0.94) (1.88)* 
Notes: Figures in parentheses in the coefficients of independent variables are t -statistics. 
***. 01 level of significance; **. 05 level of significance; *. 10 level of significance 
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4.5. SUMMARY 
Some conclusions are drawn from these empirical tests. First, it is found that the change of 
South Korea's defence spending positively reacts to North Korea's following the 
Richardson's action-reaction process, but the North's reaction to the defence spending of 
US-South alliance is different from the Richardson-type arms racing process. All three data 
show similar empirical results indicating an asymmetric Richardson-type arms race led by 
South Korea for the period 1963-2000. It is a surprising result, because the North has 
always been offensive rather than defensive in the South-North conflicts. However, it can 
be explained that South Korea has been more sensitive to North Korea's potential threat and 
tried to react to its military expansion. South Korea should always prepare for North 
Korea's attack and subsequently its defence spending has been affected by North Korea's. 
But, North Korea does not have to prepare for South Korea's pre-emptive attack, because 
it could rarely happen, and its defence spending is believed to be less sensitive to South 
Korea's. Second, in the tests of defence spending in the Cold War era (1963-1989), the 
MND data show that North Korea follows a submissive-type Richardson model, while the 
HSS data represents North Korea's significant reaction to the threat from US-South alliance. 
Thus, it cannot be concluded that North Korea follows the submissive model or Richardson 
model in the Cold War era, because the empirical tests provide different results according 
to the data. However, South Korea is believed to follow the Richardson's action-reaction 
process in the Cold War era according to the empirical results of NIND data. 
South Korea has reacted to the number of North Korea's military personnel, as well as its 
defence spending for the period 1963-2000, although its reaction was weakened in the post- 
Cold War era. North Korea has followed the Richardson process in the number of tactical 
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aircraft for the period 1963-2000. Unlike defence spending, North Korea has reacted to the 
number of South Korea's tactical aircraft for this period. In the Cold War era (1963 -1989), 
North Korea also significantly reacted to the numbers of South Korea's military personnel 
and tactical aircraft. The reaction coefficients in the Cold War era are larger than those in 
the whole period and hence, it is noted that North Korea is more intensely involved in the 
Richardson-type action-reaction arms race with South Korea in the number of military 
personnel and tactical aircraft in the Cold War era. It is thought that North Korea was 
threatened by the number of South Korea's military personnel and its air forces in the Cold 
War era, although the number ofNorth's tactical aircraft already overwhelmed that of South 
Korea's in this period. 
In the post-Cold War era, it is thought that the widening gap of defence spending between 
the US-South alliance and North Korea, caused by North Korea's economic difficulties has 
weakened the North's reaction to the threat from the US-South alliance. As a result, it 
shows a significant and negative reaction to the threat from the US-South alliance. Also, 
in the number of military personnel and tactical aircraft, the North's reaction to the South 
is alleviated and shows a submissive-type model in the post-Cold War era. But, it can be 
viewed in other aspects. North Korea's submissive reaction to the US-South alliance might 
be caused by its economic difficulties, but this phenomenon might suggest that North Korea 
concentrated on the development of nuclear weapons and long-distance ballistic missiles 
instead of purchasing conventional weapons. In so doing, it can reduce its defence burden 
and retain a deterrent to the US-South alliance to protect its political system. 
Inter-state conflict between the South and North significantly affects the change of South 
Korea's defence spending, while it is not an important factor explaining North Korea's 
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defence spending. As mentioned earlier, inter-state conflicts mostly caused by North 
Korea's provocative acts stimulated South Korea's defence spending, but North Korea was 
not much affected by those conflicts. Finallyý it is true that US military aid has contributed 
to the reduction of South Korea's defence burden, and to some extent provided a free-ride 
for the South until the late 1970s. However, only the IISS data prove that the US military 
aid is a significant factor affecting the change of South Korea's defence spending. 
In conclusion, two research questions were posed which can now be answered. First, the 
pattern of arms races between the South and North is different according to the time 
period and the data. The empirical findings show that the South-North arms race 
follows an asymmetric Richardson process led by the US-South alliance in defence 
spending and the military domination of US-South alliance is stronger in the post- 
Cold War era than in the Cold War era. Second, it is also found that North Korea led 
the South-North arms race in the number of military personnel and tactical aircraft 
in the Cold War era. North Korea's domination in the number of military personnel 
and tactical aircraft in the Cold War era might indicate its hidden cost in defence 
spending. Therefore, the domination of the US-South alliance in defence spending in the 
Cold War era could be caused by North Korea's hidden defence spending. 
The statistical results do not reflect all the features of the arms race between South and 
North Korea. In fact, the behavioural pattern ofNorth Korea has been more aggressive than 
South Korea for the sample period, and it should not be disregarded that North Korea is still 
superior to South Korea not just in the number of conventional weapons and manpower but 
also in the strategic equipment, such as nuclear and bio-chemical weapons. Therefore, even 
though South Korea's defence spending overwhelms North Korea's, it cannot be simply 
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concluded that South Korea leads North Korea in the South-North arms race. This chapter 
describes only a part of anns races between the two countries based on the Richardson's 
action-reaction model. For further research, besides the quantitative methods, a more 
comprehensive approach is needed to analyse the arms race between the South and North. 
For example, the geo-political factors such as major countries including Russia, China and 
Japan surrounding the Korean Peninsula might be considered in the South-North relations 
since the end of the Cold War. By 2003, these countries played an important role for 
alleviating the military tension between the South and North and were involved in the 
nuclear crisis in the Korean Peninsula. As mentioned earlier, the arms race between the two 
countries has increased their defence spending, and the increased defence spending might 
affect the economic growth of the two countries. The next chapter will examine South 




DEFENCE SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
AN OVERVIEW 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter IV, the empirical results of the South-North arms race showed that South Korea 
has followed the Richardson-type action-reaction process in its arms race with North Korea. 
Despite its heavy defence burden, South Korea attained rapid economic development and 
became one of the most successful countries which transferred from a developing economy 
to a developed economy. Hence, it is important to study how South Korea's defence has 
affected its economic growth and contributed to its economy. In Chapter I, two research 
questions were posed. One is whether South Korea's defence spending promotes or inhibits 
its growth, and the other is whether the economy's stage of development changes South 
Korea's defence-growth relationship. In Chapter VI, these questions will be answered. 
Before South Korea's defence-growth relationship is examined in Chapter VI, the previous 
studies on defence-growth relationship are briefly reviewed in this chapter. 
Since Benoit's (1973,1978) pathbreaking work asserting the positive effect of defence 
spending on economic growth, there has been considerable debate on his finding. His 
results were very surprising, because defence spending had usually been recognised as a 
growth-inhibiting burden for economic development. In general, most empirical studies 
(Lim, 1983; Faini et. al, 1984; Deger, 1986; Huang and Mintz, 1990,199 1; Sheetz, 199 1; 
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Ward and Davis, 1992) show that defence spending impedes economic growth or has no 
significant impact on it. Even when the supply-based Feder-Ram model supporting the 
growth-promoting effect of defence spending through technological spin-offs and 
externalities is used, only a few results have shown the positive impact of defence spending 
on economic growth mostly in Less Developed Countries (LDCs). Most LDCs experiencing 
a lack of social infrastructure (e. g. dams, airports, telecommunications) can promote 
economic growth by using defence spending to improve the social infrastructure (Benoit, 
1978). Defence also contributes to the growth in LDCs by providing nutrition, education, 
training to the military personnel, and these human capital enhancing activities can give a 
positive impact on the development of civilian economy (Sandler and Hartley, 1995). 
However, defence spending is still regarded as a necessary cost for national security rather 
than a benefit to the economic development. 
In the supply-side model, the defence-growth relationship is derived from the aggregate 
production function. In general, defence spending is expected to give a positive impact on 
economic growth, because defence is simply one of the input components with labour and 
capital affecting economic growth measured by output. In other words, the increase of 
defence level is predicted to generate more production. 
In the demand-side model, the Keynesian demand function is represented. That is, different 
sources of demand compete with each other under constrained resources and one source of 
demand necessarily crowds-out another source of demand unless total output is increased. 
As a result, an increase in the output devoted to the military sector is likely to reduce 
aggregate consumption, and public and private investment, although the military sector also 
creates consumption and investment in itself Namely, the resources diverted from civilian 
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economy to the military sector could deprive a nation of more opportunities for economic 
growth by crowding-out more productive civil investment. In this aspect, the demand-side 
models represent a negative impact of defence spending on economic growth considering 
the crowding-out of civilian production by defence. However, all economic activities result 
in crowding-out under full employment, but investment is regarded as a prionty in the 
civilian economy. For example, government could invest in the telecommunication system 
instead of the construction of military airports, if it is prior to other investment. But, 
defence basically crowds out these investment opportunities for civilian economy. 
In the Granger causality model, a different approach is needed. Both the supply-side and 
demand-side models are only interested in a unidirectional relationship between defence 
spending and growth. Their major interest is the impact of defence spending on economic 
growth while some studies are concerned about the bi-directional connection, the mutual 
relationship between defence and growth. Defence could affect a nation's economic growth, 
whereas a nation's economic growth (the growth of output) could itself be a determinant 
of defence spending. In other words, a country's income level and the growth of income can 
be significant factors influencing the increase of defence spending (Sandler and Hartley, 
1995). By using the Granger-causality test, some studies detected the presence and direction 
of causation between defence spending and economic growth whether it is unidirectional 
or bi-directional. However, this test only provides a statistical causation between defence 
and growth, and does not prove the economic causality of any defence-growth relationship. 
In summary, the impact of defence spending on growth can give different results depending 
on the type of model, sample, time period and testing methods, and according to whether 
it is a cross-sectional or time-series approach. When the supply-side model is employed, 
-135- 
it is generally expected that defence spending has a positive effect on economic 
development due to spin-offs and externalities, whereas the demand-side model is focussed 
on the competing demands under resource constraints. In the demand-side model, defence 
possibly contributes to crowding-out valuable civilian investment and hence, retarding 
economic growth. Through the Granger-causality test, the interaction between defence and 
growth is investigated as not only can defence spending cause economic growth but the 
growth of output can also stimulate defence expenditures. 
5.2. THE MODELS OF DEFENCE-GROWTH RELATIONSHIP 
5.2.1. Benoit's Study and a Critique 
Benoit's (1973,1978) study found that defence spending helps economic growth. It was 
based on the growth rates, investment rates, foreign economic aid and the growth in civilian 
products of 44 LDCs between 1950 and 1965. He used correlation as a statistical method 
for his empirical analysis. His study also included the sample case studies of India, South 
Korea, Mexico, Israel, the United Arab Republic and Argentina. He found that countries 
with heavy defence burdens generally attained high growth rates while those with relatively 
low defence burdens had low growth rates. 
He explained his results through two mechanisms. First, only a small part of any income 
not spent on defence is put into highly productive investments, especially in LDCs. Most 
goes into consumption or less productive areas and hence, the increase of civilian 
investment instead of defence does not contribute much to real growth. Second, although 
defence programs are not intended to contribute to the civilian economy, they may, in fact, 
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give a positive impact on it in indirect ways (e. g. social infrastructures, technological spin- 
offs, human capital enhancement, etc. ). However, his study has been criticised in that the 
empirical analysis is not merely partial but also dubious regarding statistical validation of 
the defence-growth relationship (Deger, 1986b). Deger (1986b), and Deger and Smith 
(1983) criticised Benoit for disregarding the simultaneity of the interrelationship between 
defence and growth without consideration of the overall effect of defence on growth. 
According to Deger and Smith (1983), the direct and indirect effects should be examined 
to accurately measure the defence-growth relationship. In other words, defence spending 
has a positive direct effect on economic growth while high defence spending also impedes 
economic growth by lowering savings and subsequently investment. Hence, defence has 
both positive and negative effects on growth but positive effects are offset by negative 
effects. Therefore, they concluded that defence spending, as a whole, should hamper 
economic growth and development. 
Benoit's study has also been criticised due to its statistical weaknesses and standard of 
country selection. Lim (1983) pointed out the functional problem' of Benoit model (1978) 
and analysed the defence-growth relationship in the Harrod-Domar framework. He found 
a negative impact of defence spending on economic growth. Also, Benoit depended on a 
simple correlation analysis rather than modelling a theoretical econometric equation (Smith, 
1980a, b) and as a result, his analysis was not comprehensive but partial (Deger 1986b). In 
terms of sample countries, the 44 LDCs which he chose were at the different stages of 
development and growth and hence, it is inadequate to compare these countries with the 
same standard. Also, there is no theoretical basis why he sampled these countries and the 
I Benoit hypothesized that a higher defence spending results in a lower investment and so a lower growth. But 
he used both defence spending and investment as determinants in his functional form. Lim (1983) indicated that defence 
spending and investment should not appear together as independent variables in the same estimating equation. 
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relatively short time period is another problem. Fredericksen and Looney (1983) extended 
Benoit's study using the same sample of countries and time period, but they obtained 
different results from Benoit's. They found that the sample countries are divided into two 
different groups: one is a resource-abundant group (relatively rich countries) and the other 
is a resource-constrainedgroup (poor countries). They showed that defence spending helps 
growth in resource-abundant countries while it rather impedes growth in resource- 
constrained countrieS2. 
Benoit's empirical results show that the defence burden has three times as strong a 
correlation with the growth of civilian products as does bilateral economic aid (0.35 vs 
0.12), although it has two-thirds as strong a correlation as does the investment rate (0.54 
vs 0.61). Anyhow, the defence burden has a positive effect on civilian growth in his 
analysis of partial correlations. However, the R2 representing the overall significance of 
his equation, including the defence burden, bilateral economic aid and investment rate as 
independent variables is very low at 0.23. 
Although Benoit (1973,1978) made a significant contribution to defining the defence- 
growth relationship in LDCs, he did not consider the overall effects of defence spending 
on economic growth and his empirical estimation is also disputed. He simply ignored the 
negative effects of defence spending on growth which might crowd-out more productive 
civilian investment and slow down an economy. In addition, as Smith (19 80a, b) mentioned, 
2 The resource-abundant group was characterised by high growth in foreign exchange earnings, high import 
elasticity, a low debt-service ratio, a low incremental capital-output ratio, a high cuff ent account deficit/GDP ratio, and 
a high government spending multiplier. On the other hand, the resource-constrained group was charactensed by low 
growth in foreign exchange earnings, a high incremental capital-output ratio, a low percentage of exports to GDP, a high 
debt service ratio, a low current account deficit as a percentage of GDP, a low government expenditure multiplier, and 
low import elasticity. 
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his myopic estimation method has brought some scepticism about the empirical reliability 
of his findings. Therefore, the study ofboth supply-side models using aggregate production 
functions and demand-side models applying Keynesian demand functions is needed for a 
balanced investigation of the defence-growth relationship. 
5.2.2. The Supply-Side Model 
5.2.2.1. Biswas and Ram Model 
Supply-side models explain the defence-growth relationship using aggregate production 
functions. In the supply-side model, defence is a partial component promoting economic 
output and thus expected to have a significant positive impact on growth. Feder (1983), 
Ram (1986) and Biswas and Ram (1986) contributed to developing the supply-based 
production function by applying export sector and government size. This model has also 
been extensively employed in the study of defence-growth relationship by Alexander (1990, 
1995), Mueller and Atesoglu (1993), and Huang and Mintz (1990,199 1). Adapting Feder's 
original model, Biswas and Ram (1986) developed a simple two-sector model assuming 
that the defence sector affects aggregate economic output and growth. There might exist 
externality effects or spin-offs from civilian to the defence sector. For example, social 
infrastructure for civilian uses (e. g. harbour, telecommunication network, roads) can be 
utilised for military purpose on occasion, and civilian technology can be applied to the 
development of military equipment. However, the two-sector model developed by Biswas 
and Ram (1986) considers only the externality and spin-offs from defence to the civilian 
economy, and does not include the crowding-out of civil investment by defence. 
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Assuming that labour (L) and capital (K) are two separate inputs contributing to economic 
output, and that the size of the defence sector (D) gives an impact on the rest of the 
economy (C) through externalities (e. g. dams, airports, roads and communication network 




5 Kc 5 D) (5.2) 
where subscripts represent the sectors. LD and Lc denote the labour inputs employed in 
the defence and civilian sectors, and K, and Kc are the capital stocks employed in both 
sectors. Subscripts on the inputs imply the allocation of inputs between the two sectors, so 
that: 
LD+ Lc (5.3) 
K=KD+ Kc (5.4) 
where L and K are the total labour and capital stocks in the economy. Total output (Y) is the 
sum of the output from the defence sector (D) and civilian sector (C) and can be written as: 
Y=D+C (5.5) 
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where the subscripts on D and C denote the partial derivatives of labour (L) and capital (K), 
and 6 represents the productivity index. According to Biswas and Ram (1986), if the 
productivity index 6 is positive, the defence sector is more productive than the civilian 
sector' and might have a positive impact on economic growth representing that the 
differential productivity is larger than I in equation (5.6). But, if it is negative (differential 
productivity is smaller than 1), the civilian sector will be more productive. In other words, 
in a positive 6, the defence sector shows a higher input productivity and results in an 
increase in total output for given resources as inputs are moved into the more productive 
defence sector (Ram, 1995). Biswas and Ram (1986) derived an equation for the growth 
of aggregate output applying above equations in the following form: 
dYl Y= CL (A / L)(L / Y) + CK(I / Y) +0 (dD / D)(D / Y) (5.7) 
where dY /Y denotes the growth rate, CL (L / Y) is an elasticity parameter, CK is the 
marginal product of capital in the civilian sector, I(dK) is aggregate investment, and the 
sum of the externality and the factor-productivity effects of defence on growth is: 
3 In the highly defence-oriented economy (e. g. former communist countries, North Korea), labour and capital 
centered on defence industry might be more productive than civilian industry, because human resources and capital 
investment are concentrated on defence. In this case, the economic output from defence could be larger than the output 
from civilian economy, and it might make a greater contribution to the national economy. 
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The two sector-model derived by Biswas and Ram (1986) is the most basic form of the 
supply-side production function explaining the defence-growth relationship. Using the two- 
sector model they found that the impact of defence on economic growth is insignificant. 
5.2.2.2. Other Supply-Side Models 
Feder (1983), and Biswas and Ram (1986) models were extended to the three-sector model 
(Huang and Mintz, 1990,1991; Sezgin, 1999) and even the four-sector model by Alexander 
(1990). Huang and Mintz (1990,1991) divided the public sector into the non-military 
public sector and the military sector while Sezgin (1999) considered a human capital factor 
in his production function. Alexander (1990) separated the export sector from the civilian 
economy in the three-sector framework. On the other hand, Atesoglu and Mueller (1990) 
investigated the effects of defence cuts on economic growth using the two-sector model. 
Although the supply-side models are expected to show a positive impact of defence on 
growth, those described above give different empirical results. Alexander (1990) tested the 
effects of defence spending on economic growth using the data of nine developed countries 
for the period 1974-85 and found no significant relationship between defence and growth. 
Huang and Mintz (1990,1991), and Mintz and Huang (1990) also found that there is no 
significant and direct effect of defence on growth, but defence spending tends to dampen 
investment and thus hamper economic growth. By contrast, Atesoglu and Mueller (1990), 
and Mueller and Atesoglu (1993) found a significant and positive relationship between 
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defence spending and economic growth in their US studies for the period 1948-1990. But, 
the responsiveness of economic growth to changes in defence spending was small and 
therefore, the adverse effects of defence cuts on the economic growth were expected to be 
small. Also, Sezgin (1999) obtained a significant and positive effect of defence on growth 
in his Turkish studies for the period 1955-1994. The results from empirical studies are 
different due to the variety of models, different time periods and samples, and the type of 
data. However, when estimating the Feder-Ram type supply-side models, time-series data 
for a single country are most appropriate, because cross-sectional data aggregate across 
countries with vastly different economic, political, and strategic characteristics (Chan, 
1985; Mintz and Stevenson, 1995). 
The supply-based models have some weaknesses in spite of their useful interpretation for 
the defence-growth relationship. First, the Feder-Ram model ignored the trade-off between 
defence and investment. In the supply-side production function, defence is a factor 
stimulating economic growth if its productivity index is greater than zero. However, 
defence spending may harm economic growth by shrinking public (non-defence) and 
private investment even though its externality effect is positive. Second, the Feder-Ram 
model did not allow the possibility of the reverse effect of economic growth on defence 
spending. In the supply-based model, the effect of externalities is always unidirectional 
from defence to growth. Nevertheless, economic growth may also cause the increase of 
defence spending because economic success often entails military expansion. In the demand 
function for military expenditures, income is an important determinant of defence spending. 
As GDP rises, a nation can secure more resources for defence, and thus defence spending 
and GDP are hypothesised to be positively correlated, so that defence is a nonnal good 
whose demand rises with income (Sandler and Hartley, 1995). As a matter of fact, a 
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significant and Positive effect of growth on defence spending has been found in some 
developing countries by Chowdhury (1991) and Kusi (1994) through Granger-causality 
tests. Hence, the causality test is very useful for detecting whether the causation is 
unidirectional or interactive. Third, if defence gives a net beneficial effect on economic 
growth, this is more likely to occur in LDCs where there are more avenues from which 
benefits can be derived (Sandler and Hartley, 1995, p. 202). However, Frederiksen and 
Looney (1983) found a negative effect of defence on growth for poor countries while a 
positive effect for relatively rich countries. Not only do these inconsistent results highlight 
the weakness of the supply-side models but most empirical tests also fail to uncover the 
significant and positive effect of defence on economic growth. 
The supply-based Feder-Ram model contributed to developing the aggregate production 
functions presenting a positive defence-growth relationship, but also showed some 
limitations by disregarding negative effects of defence on growth. Therefore, it is necessary 
to examine both positive and negative effects of defence on growth for a more 
comprehensive approach to the defence-growth relationship. In this aspect, the study of the 
demand-based models is also essential. 
5.2.3. The Demand-Side Model 
Defence may stimulate economic growth through supply-side factors such as technology 
spin-offs and social infrastructure as mentioned earlier. In contrast, defence may have a 
negative effect on growth by crowding-out savings and investment, and worsening the 
balance of payments. Demand-side models highlight these negative effects of defence on 




where Y is the total output, C is aggregate consumption, I is private and pubic investment, 
M is real defence spending and B is the balance of trade. When a Keynesian demand 
function is applied to the model, one source of demand competes for scarce resources with 
another source (Sandler and Hartley, 1995) and therefore, one source of demand might be 
crowded-out by other sources. 
Smith (1980b) derived a Keynesian demand-based function and found a significant 
negative relationship between defence spending and investment in 14 OECD countries 
studies over the period 1954-1973. His empirical studies include cross-sectional, pooled 
and time-series estimates for these countries. His tests focussed on the relationship between 
the military and investment, and whether the coefficient on the military term is 
insignificantly different from - 1. In the test, the assumption that the coefficient of the share 
of military expenditures is -1 in every year was accepted. In the various pooled estimates 
the coefficient was consistently around -1. In the times-series tests the coefficient of 
military expenditure was negative in all but two of the 14 countries, and the average long- 
run effect, measured by the weighted means of the coefficients, was -0.917. His empirical 
findings are significant, but it is already recognised that the military sector (M, and public 
and private investment (1) compete with each other. Hence, his empirical results are not 
surprising but expected. His model is based on the simple Keynesian demand equation and 
does not include the supply-side effect of defence on growth. In other words, the demand- 
side model disregards a possible positive effect of defence on growth. 
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5.2.4. The Demand and Supply-Side Model 
5.2.4.1. The Deger-Type Model 
Deger and Smith (1983), Deger (I 986a, b), and Deger and Sen (1995) developed demand 
and supply side models containing three or four stage simultaneous equations representing 
growth, savings/investment, the trade balance and defence. Deger's (I 986a) four stage 
simultaneous equation model is derived as follows: 
gy= ao +als+a2m+a3B+a4Y+a5A 
s= bo+ blm+ b2g + b3yg+ b4B + b5i 
B= co+ clm+ c2g + c3i + c4D (5.12) 
do +dly+d2GB+d3N+d4q+d5D (5.13) 
where: 
g average annual growth rate of GDP 
s national savings ratio 
m share of military spending in GDP 
B balance of trade 
y= per capita income at official exchange rate 
A= annual growth rate of agricultural output 
i= inflation rate 
GB = growth rate of government budget 
q= difference between per capita income across countries 
N= total population 
D= dummy variable for countries 
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In the growth equation, Deger (I 986a) considered that the military and agricultural sectors 
were more significant than health and human capital investment. She did not include the 
size of the labour force. Even though the specific features of an LDC's economy are 
considered, some necessary variables are absent in her model. These estImating equations 
(5.10)-(5.13) present both the direct and indirect effects of defence on growth by including 
the savings and trade balance sectors. Deger (1 986a), and Deger and Sen (1995) suggested 
that the application of a simultaneous equation system is needed to examine a more 
comprehensive defence-growth relationship reflecting the interaction between growth, 
savings, the trade balance and defence spending. Namely, the growth equation (5.10) 
reflects the traditional production function to show the supply-side effect of defence on 
growth, while the savings equation (5.11) reflects the Keynesian demand function to 
represent the demand-side effect of defence on growth. However, the choice of variables 
in the trade balance equation (5.12) is somewhat ad hoc and discretionary. The military 
equation (5.13) is derived from the demand for military expenditures. Hence, the Deger 
model includes both the supply and demand-side effects of defence on gowth. 
The growth equation (5.10) derived from a traditional production function includes 
agricultural growth, but this variable might be inadequate for industrial countries. In most 
underdeveloped countries, agriculture is an important sector for economic growth while in 
the industrial countries, agriculture is not a crucial variable detennining their growth. 
Hence, agricultural growth is not a universal variable across countries. In the savings 
equation (5.11), savings are affected not only by growth but also by the growth influenced 
by per capita income, because the countries with low per capita income have also a low life 
cycle effect. That is, the savings ratio depends on the growth rate, but the parameter 
representing the effect of growth on savings is not constant across countries and rather it 
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varies positively according to per capita income (Deger, 1986a). However, this variable is 
not necessary to estimate time-series data for a single country and also might cause the 
multi-collinearity problem with growth. The trade balance equation (5.12) reflects the effect 
of defence on growth in an open economy. Deger (1986a) expected that defence has a 
negative effect on the trade balance by diverting resources from civilian uses to defence and 
induces imports by increasing demands for defence and reducing exportable civil goods. 
The military equation (5.13) consists of the exogenous variables representing per capita 
income, growth of government budget, income differences between countries, total 
population, and dummy variables reflecting the strategic envirom-nent according to Deger 
and Smith (1983), and Deger (I 986a, b) . 
In the growth equation (5.10), all the explanatory variables are expected to have a positive 
effect on growth, but Deger (1 986a) disregarded more important variables such as the size 
of the labour force and the human capital. However, it is considered that these are more 
necessary factors affecting a nation's growth than the agricultural growth in the industrial 
countries. 
In the savings equation (5.11) derived from the output/expenditure function the share of 
savings in GDP is expected to be positively related to growth, per capita income, the trade 
balance and inflation. But, the defence burden is expected to have a negative effect on 
savings, since it is assumed to crowd-out civilian savings and investment. According to 
Deger (I 986a), there is a negative and indirect effect of defence on growth via savings and 
investment. 
In the trade balance equation (5.12), growth, defence burden, inflation and dummy variables 
-148- 
are expected to affect the trade balance, but Deger (1986a) did not include the exchange 
rates which can change the balance of payments. Defence is predicted to have a negative 
effect on the trade balance as mentioned earlier, but the expected signs of growth and 
inflation are unclear. Namely, the effect of growth on the trade balance might be different 
according to the industrial structure of a country. If a country follows export-promoting 
strategies, growth should give a boost to exports and thus have a positive effect on the trade 
balance. By contrast, if a country is at the stage of import-substituting industrialisation, it 
will require more imports to achieve fature self-sufficiency and this affects the trade 
balance negatively (Deger, 1986a). Inflation might also affect the trade balance since LDCs 
often have a fixed exchange rate regime. Deger (1986a) asserted that high inflation rate 
would distort the relative price structure against the rest of the world. But, she did not 
clarify the relationship between the inflation and trade balance as to whether it is positive 
or nega ive. 
In the defence equation (5.13), the share of military expenditures in GDP is supposed to be 
influenced by per capita income, government budget, income differences at purchasing 
power parity (PPP), total population, and dummies describing the oil producing Arab 
countries and the countries in regional conflicts, the Middle East, India and Pakistan. 
However, Deger's defence equation omitted some important variables related to the demand 
function for military expenditures. In the demand function for military expenditures, 
defence equation needs to include income, spill-ins, threat and price factors (Sandler and 
Hartley, 1995). A nation's defence spending might be affected by the spill-in from alliances 
or the spill-over to alliances and the arms race with opponent countries. However, Deger 
and Smith (1983), and Deger (I 986a, b) ignored these crucial variables in their model. in 
terms of dummy variables, Deger and Smith (1983), and Deger (1986a, b) applied two 
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categories of dummy variable in the 50 LDCs empirical tests. First, they used the oil 
dummy for the countries that had high balance of payments surpluses from oil exports and 
thus could import military equipment with these earnings. Second, they also employed a 
war dummy for the countries involved in severe inter-state armed conflicts or war during 
the sample period (1965-1973). However, the sample period is during the Middle East War 
and this might affect the defence spending of Arab countries. If it was peace time, it is 
difficult to link oil exports with the import of defence equipment. For example, among the 
major oil-exporting countries only Saudi Arabia and UAE (United Arab Emirates) are 
included in the 10 major arms importers in the world for the period 1996-2000 (SEPRI, 
2001). Hence, it does not appear that the oil-exporting countries spend more on defence. 
5.2.4.2. The Empirical Results of Deger-Type Models 
(i) Deger 
Deger (1986a) estimated the defence-growth relationship of 50 LDCs employing a three 
stage least squares (3SLS) method. In the empirical test of the growth equation, only 
savings and defence spending have a positive and significant effect on growth while other 
variables are insignificant. Therefore, the overall significance of the growth equation ( R' ) 
is relatively low at 0.32, and she failed to show a correlation between growth and other 
explanatory variables (the trade balance, per capita income and agriculture). By contrast, 
on the demand-side, the military burden significantly eroded savings and this result 
suggests that the indirect effect of defence on growth via savings is clearly negative. In her 
study, Deger (I 986a) measured a multiplier effect of defence burden on growth considering 
both the supply and demand-side effects and the result was purely negative (dgldm = -0-36). 
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In other words, the negative effect of defence on savings/investment and the trade balance 
outweighed the positive effect of defence on growth and thus the overall effect of defence 
spending on growth was negative. 
Deger and Sen (1983), Faini, Annez and Tayler (1984), Deger (1985), Scheetz (1991) also 
found a negative effect of defence on growth in the Deger framework. Deger and Sen 
(1983) found that the economic spin-offs emanating from the defence sector are actually 
very small and thus the positive effect of defence on economic development is insignificant 
even in LDCs such as India. Faini et. al (1984) discovered that a 10% increase in the 
defence burden leads to 0.13% loss of annual growth in their empirical estimation of 69 
countries over the period 1952-1970. Deger (1985) also found that the overall impact of 
defence on growth and development is negative in spite of some beneficial spin-offs from 
the defence sector. Scheetz (199 1) investigated the defence-growth relationship for the four 
LDCs, including Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Peru based on the Deger (I 986a) model, 
and as a result, he found that defence has a negative direct effect on growth as well as on 
savings and trade balance. ' Growth is positively correlated to defence spending in the 
growth equation of the Deger model (1986a, b) while Scheetz (1991) found that even the 
positive and direct effect of defence on growth turned out to be negative in his pooled 
empirical tests. This unexpected result might be caused by a relatively high defence share 
compared with the low growth of these countries. By contrast, in the individual country 
results, Scheetz (199 1) failed to show a negative and direct effect of defence on economic 
growth, because not only the overall significance of growth equation was mostly very low 
but the direct effects of defence on growth were also insignificant in the three countries 
4 According to Scheetz, the differences might result due to a partially different time period, the limitation of 
the study to four Latin American countries sharing greater similarities among themselves than Deger's 50 sample 
countries, and much improved data set. 
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except for Chile. In the pooled tests, the R' of the growth equation is very low at 0.26, and 
it is even lower in individual country tests. Accordingly, his empirical results are relatively 
weak to show the overall significance of defence-growth relationship and are unreliable to 
prove the negative direct effects of defence on growth. 
(ii) Roux and Sezgin 
In contrast, Roux (1996) discovered that the direct effect of defence on growth is negative, 
but the indirect effect of defence on growth via savings and trade balance is insignificant 
in his South African studies over the period 1960-1990. According to his results, defence 
spending harms economic growth directly but does not give any effect on savings and the 
trade balance. Dunne and Nikolaidou (2001) found that both the supply and demand-side 
effects of defence on growth are harmful for economic growth in their empirical test of 
Greece's defence-growth relationship. Namely, their empirical results show that the direct 
and indirect effects of defence on growth are significantly negative. But, Sezgin (2001) 
provided a totally different result in his Turkish studies for the period 1956-1994. He also 
used a four stage simultaneous equation model in the Deger framework. He included 
exogenous variables such as the size of the labour force, inflation rate, exchange rate and 
political dummies in the Deger-Sen model (1995) to specify the Turkish economy. His 
empirical results show that the defence sector is an engine for Turkish economic growth 
and hence does not hamper its growth. The negative effects of defence on growth through 
savings and the trade balance are insignificant. Therefore, the overall effects of defence on 
the Turkish economy are positive and conducive to its economic growth. His results are 
remarkably different from previous demand and supply side studies, and demonstrates that 
defence may help economic growth even in the demand and supply side framework. 
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Therefore, demand and supply side models provide different empirical results depending 
on sample countries, the time period and empirical methods. Even in a single country, the 
effect of defence on growth can be different according to its development stage. In the 
developing stage, a country's defence spending is expected to have a positive effect on its 
growth, because the defence sector helps to create demand through its externality and spin- 
offs and contributes to human resource development. In other words, it provides the base 
for economic development when the civilian sector is relatively weak. But, in the developed 
stage, defence does not have enough room to provide benefits to the economy. When the 
civilian economy is highly developed, defence could rather harm economic growth by 
crowding-out a country's resources for its civil investment. Also, the empirical results might 
be different according to which estimation method is used. As a result, there must be 
considerable doubts about the reliability of empirical results in this field. Also, the defence- 
growth relationship may not be generalised and standardised because the development stage 
and role of defence spending are different among countries, and the variables affecting a 
nation's growth could vary. 
The demand and supply side models developed by Deger and Smith (1983), Deger (1985, 
1986a, b), and Deger and Sen (1995) contributed to estimating both the supply and demand- 
side effects of defence on growth and measuring its overall impact. Thus, the Deger-type 
demand and supply side model is more comprehensive for explaining the defence-growth 
relationship than the Feder-Ram type supply-side model. They also adopted a more 
sophisticated and detailed econometric model(simultaneous equations) and estimation 
method (3SLS) to measure an overall impact of defence on growth. Although the selection 
of variables is ad hoc rather than well-organised and often fails to show strong empirical 
results as mentioned earlier, the demand and supply side model provides better insights into 
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the defence-growth relationship than either the supply-side or demand-side model by 
reflecting both positive and negative effects of defence on growth. Nevertheless, to improve 
the weaknesses of the demand and supply-side model, the selection of well-organised 
variables is important considering the relationship between dependent and independent 
variables. For example, Deger (1986a) regarded the size of population as a determinant of 
a country's military expenditures, although a country with small population could spend 
more on defence than a large population country according to its security environment. 
5.2.5. Causality Analysis of Defence-Growth Relationship 
A defence-growth relationship may be examined through a causal analysis using Granger- 
causality tests. Defence spending can affect economic growth, while growth may reversely 
stimulate defence spending or both factors may have a bi-directional relationship with each 
other. Granger-causality tests are a useful method to investigate the presence and direction 
of causation between defence and growth (Sandler and Hartley, 1995, p. 213). Joerding 
(1986) used Granger causality to examine defence-growth causation assuming the 
exogeneity of defence relative to growth. He found that defence spending is not a strong 
exogenous variable relative to economic growth. In the test of the hypothesis of Granger 
non-causality, he failed to reject Granger non-causality from defence spending to growth 
while he found some evidence that economic growth Granger caused defence spending. 
Also, Kinsella (1990), Chowdhury (199 1) and Kusi (1994) applied Granger-causality tests 
to the analysis of defence-growth relationship. Kinsella (1990) introduced more complex 
vector autoregression models to uncover the causal relationship between defence spending 
and economic perfon-nance, such as inflation, unemployment, interest rate and output in the 
US over the period 1943-1989. He concluded that there is no substantial causal relationship 
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between defence spending and these factors in either direction. Chowdhury (1991) also 
tested the causal relationship between defence and growth employing Granger- causality 
tests for 55 developing countries and suggested that the defence-growth relationship could 
not be generalised across countries because of the use of a different sample period and the 
different socio-economic background in each country. 5 He found no evidence of causal 
relationship between defence and growth in 30 countries, while some negative causality 
from defence to growth was found in the remaining 15 countries. In the other 10 countries, 
there existed some uni-directional causality from growth to defence and bi-directional 
causality between defence and growth. Thus, Chowdhury (199 1) did not find any positive 
effect of defence on growth in his 55 countries studies, but found some negative effect of 
defence on growth in 15 countries (27% of sample countries). However, over a half of the 
sample countries (5 5 %) did not have any causal relationship between defence and growth. 
Kusi (1994) obtained somewhat different results from Chowdhury (199 1) in his tests of 77 
developing countries. He found some positive causation from defence to economic growth 
in Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and South Korea. Kusi did not explain why these four 
countries have a positive effect of defence on growth, but it is considered that some 
externality effects of defence contributed to the economic growth in these countries. These 
countries have increased the level of defence spending with their economic development 
except for Indonesia and are surrounded by potential military threats. 
5 Granger Causality Tests for 55 countries: DS (Defence Spending), EG (Economic Growth). 
DS->EG: None 
DS->EG: Argentina, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, South Korea, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sudan, Syna, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
EG->DS: Chile, Ghana, Haiti, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia. 
EG->DS: Uganda. 
DS<->(+)EG: Egypt, Iran. 
DS<->(-)EG: Kenya. 
No Causal Relationship: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bolivia, Brazil, Bun-na, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kuwait, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Zaire, Zambia. 
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Although Granger-causality tests are useful empirical method for detecting the existence 
and direction of causation between defence spending and economic growth, some 
precautions are needed when applying these tests. In the Granger-causality equations, the 
current value of each series is supposed to be linear and covariance- stationary where 
disturbance terms are assumed to be independent and identically distributed. If the series 
are non-stationary, they should be altered into stationary by differentiation processes. The 
causation analysis using Granger-causality tests provides a simple and practical method to 
examine the causal relationship between defence and growth. However, the equations are 
often oversimplified and stress only defining the connection between these two variables. 
5.3. Empirical Results 
Table 5.1 summarizes the empirical results of defence-growth relationship based on the 
supply-side, demand-side, demand and supply-side, and Granger-causality tests. According 
to Table 5.1,12 cases show an overall negative effect of defence on growth, while only 3 
cases find a positive effect of defence on growth. However, most cases (14 cases) find no 
significant relationship between defence and growth. Therefore, about 40% ofthe empirical 
results show a negative effect of defence on growth, while only 10% show a positive 
relationship between defence and growth. The remaining 50% find no particular 
relationship between defence and growth. Exceptionally, Frederiksen and Looney (1983) 
found some positive effects of defence on growth in resource-rich countries while some 
negative defence-growth relationship in resource-constrained countries. Therefore, most 
empirical results show that the defence-growth relationship is overall negative or 
insignificant. 
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Table 5.1. A Summary of Literature Review on Defence-Growth Relationship 
Author (s) Model/Sample/Time period Conclusions 
Benoit (1973,1978) Ad hoc single-equation model/44 Positive and significant effect 
LDCs/ 1950-65 of defence on growth 
Smith (1980) Keynesian demand function/OECD Negative effect of defence on 
countries/1954-1973 investment 
Deger & Smith Keynesian three equation (SEM) Positive direct but negative 
(1983) model with supply side/50 LDCs/1965- indirect effect of defence on 
73 growth and total effect is 
negative 
Frederiksen & Benoit's sample and model/44LDCs in Positive effect of defence on 
Looney 4 groups/1950-65 growth in resource-rich 
(1983) countries, but negative effect 
in resource-constrained 
countries 
Lim (1983) Harod-Domar growth Negative effect of defence on 
model/54LDCs/1 965-73 growth 
Faini, Annez & Demand-side Keynesian model/69 Negative effect of defence on 
Taylor (1984) mainly LDCs/1952-70 growth 
Deger(1985) Keynesian four equation model with Negative effect of defence on 
supply side/50LDCs/1965-73 education 
Biswas and Ram Traditional Feder-type two-sector No significant effect of 
(1986) model /59ldcS/1960-70,1970-77 defence on growth 
Deger (1986a, b) Keynesian three/ four simultaneous Positive direct and negative 
equation (SEM) model /50LDCs/1965- indirect but overall negative 
73 effect of defence on growth 
Landau(1986) Neoclassical production function model Little effect of defence on 
/52LDCs/1960-80 growth 
Joerding (1986) Granger causality tests/57LDCs/1962- No evidence that defence 
77 time series causes growth 
Lebovic & Ishaq Deger-Smith type three equation Negative effect of defence on 
(1987) model/20 Middle Eastern growth 
countries/1973-82 
Alexander (1990) Feder-type four-sector modet/9 No effect of defence on 
developed countries/1974-85 growth 
Atesoglu and Mueller Feder-type two-sector model[US/1949- Small positive and 
(1990) 89 significant effect of defence 
on growth 
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Author(s) Model/Sample/Time period Conclusions 
Huang and Mintz Feder-type three-sector No significant effect of 
(1990) model[US/1952-88 defence on growth 
Huang and Mintz Feder-type three-sector No significant externality 
(1991) model[US/1952-88 from defence to economy 
Adams, Behrman & Feder-type three-sector model/73LDCs No significant effect of 
Boldin (1991) /1974-86 defence on growth 
Chowdhury (1991) Granger causality tests/55 LDCs/1961- Defence-growth relationship 
87 time series cannot be generalised 
Scheetz (1991) Deger-type three equation Negative macroeconomic 
model/4Latin American countries/1969- impact of defence on growth 
87 pooled time series 
Ward and Davis Feder-type three-sector Net negative effect of 
(1992) model[US/1948-90 defence on growth 
Chan (1992) Two equation ad hoc No significant effect of 
model/Taiwan/1961-88 defence on growth and 
inequality 
Chen (1993) Granger causality tests/China/1950-91 Causal independence 
between defence and growth 
Kusi (1994) Granger causality tests/77 LDCs/1971- Defence-growth relationship 
88 time series cannot be generalised 
Dunne & Keynesian SEM with supply-side/13 No significant effect of 
Mohammed (1995) countries /1967-85 defence on growth 
Roux(1996) Deger-type four simultaneous equation A significant and negative 
model/ direct effect of defence on 
South Africa/1960-1990 growth 
Heo (1997) Single equation model[Korea/1954-88 No significant effect of 
time series defence on growth 
Heo (1999) Keynesian demand model/Korea/ 1954- A Negative indirect effect of 
88 defence on growth 
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Author(s) Model/Sample/Time period Conclusions 
Dunneand Deger-type four simultaneous equation Not only indirect but also 
Nikolaidou model/ direct effect of defence on 
(2001) Greece/1960-1996 growth is negative. 
Sezgin (2001) Deger-type four simultaneous equation A significant and positive 
model/ overall effect of defence on 
Turkey/1956-1994 growth 
5.4. Previous Studies on South Korea's Defence-Growth Relationship 
South Korea's defence-growth relationship has been mostly discussed by political scientists. 
Hong (1990) found a negative impact of defence spending on growth, while Park (1993) 
found no significant relationship between these two factors. Park applied change in the 
share of defence spending in GNP, real defence spending and the logarithmic function of 
defence spending to his model to analyse the growth effect of defence in South Korea. As 
a result, any of these variables had no significant effect on South Korea's growth. South 
Korea's defence-growth relationship was studied extensively by Heo (1997,1999), and Heo 
and Ro (1998). Heo (1997,1999) studied South Korea's defence-growth relationship based 
on the Mintz-Huang's (1990,1991) three sector model over the period 1954-1988. He 
examined both the direct and externality effects of defence spending on growth using the 
OLS and GLS estimations. As a result, he found that South Korea's defence spending has 
neither direct nor externality effects on its growth. However, it was found that investment 
and non-military sector have a significant and positive effect on growth. By contrast, in his 
studies based on the Keynesian demand model, Heo (1999) found an overall negative effect 
of defence spending on growth in South Korea. Unlike the Deger (1986a) model, Heo's 
(1999) model consists of investment, export and growth equations. In his model, the 
immediate impact of defence spending on investment is not found, but the fourth lag of 
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defence spending shows a significant and negative impact on investment. The impact of 
defence spending on South Korea's export is immediate and negative. However, in the 
growth equation, he found no direct and significant effects of defence spending on growth 
in South Korea. Hence, he concluded that there is no direct relationship between defence 
spending and growth, but defence spending could affect growth indirectly and negatively 
through investment and export in South Korea. The empirical results of his tests are shown 
in Table 5.2. 
In the Granger-causality analysis, Chowdhury (199 1) found a negative effect of defence 
spending on growth in South Korea, while Kusi (1994) discovered that South Korea's 
defence spending Granger caused its economic growth positively. These different results 
might be caused by the difference of the time-period. Chowdhury (199 1) estimated the data 
for the period 1961-1987, but Kusi (1994) used data from 1971 to 1988. In the 1970s and 
1980s South Korea attained phenomenal economic growth with a high level of defence 
spending, and this might result in the positive defence-growth relationship. Therefore, the 
empirical results of South Korea's defence-growth relationship are different from each other 
according to models, the time-period and empirical methods. Nevertheless, most previous 
studies suggest that South Korea's defence spending has a negative or non-significant effect 
on its growth. 
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Table 5.2. Empirical Results of South Korea's Defence-Growth Relationship 
Author and model Stat. method Empirical results Findings 
Heo (1997) OLS Investment 0.002 (1.432)* No direct effects of 
Nonmilitary 0.014(2.382)*** defence spending on 
Mintz-Huang model Military -0.201(-0.077) growth 
Adjusted R'= 0.24 
DW= 1.68 
GLS Investment 0.956 (2.901)*** No externality effects 
Nonmilitary 0.612 (0.857) of defence spending on 




Keynesian-based Unrestricted Military->Investment -4.40 No direct effects of demand and supply distributed lag (p< 0.05) defence on growth, but 
model and GLS Military->Export -2.88 negative indirect 
(P<0.01) effects found. Hence, 
Military->Growth -0.091 overall negative effect 
(p<0.44) of defence on growth 
*Statistically significant at 0.10 level Statistically significant at 0.05 level Statistically significant 
at 0.0 1 level (two-tailed tests). 
5.5. SUMMARY 
Studies on defence-growth relationship define how defence spending influences economic 
growth or how they affect each other whether the relationship is positive, negative or non- 
significant. The empirical results vary depending on the adoption of model, data, and the 
time-period. Generally, supply-side models support a positive impact of defence spending 
on growth through externalities while demand-based models stress the dysfunction of 
defence for economic growth via the reduction of investment. However, the positive 
externalities from defence are usually very small and insignificant and hence, it is not 
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simple to find beneficial effects of defence spending on growth even with supply-side 
models. Accordingly, most supply-based models suggest that defence has no significant or 
very small positive effect on growth. In contrast, Keynesian demand-side models show that 
defence spending inherently crowds-out public (non-military) and private investments- 
supposedly more productive than military investment- and inhibits economic growth. 
Hence, defence is undoubtedly detrimental to growth in the demand-side model in spite of 
its contribution to the total output. Even in the Deger-type model combining the supply and 
demand-side equations, defence has a net negative effect on economic growth in spite of 
its positive externality effects. Therefore, as shown in Table 5.1, it is cautiously concluded 
that the net impact of defence spending on economic growth is, as a whole, negative or 
insignificant, although the results could be different according to model, sample and 
empirical method. 
Further research will be based on the application and evolution of the Deger's (I 986a) four 
stage simultaneous equation model containing both supply and demand-side approaches. 
By using the Deger model, both the direct and indirect effects of defence on growth are 
estimated and thus it is ascertained whether the overall effect is positive or negative. In the 
next chapter, the net impact of defence spending on growth in South Korea will be studied 
for the period 1963-2000 and two different sub-periods 1963-1979 and 1980-2000. By 
estimating three different time-periods, both the overall effect of defence on growth for the 
whole period and the defence-growth relationship according to the development stage might 
be examined. South Korea is extraordinary as it has attained a high economic growth 
despite its high level of defence spending to deter North Korea's potential threat. Hence, 
South Korea's exceptional case will provide valuable information and contribute to the 
study of the defence-growth relationship which is examined in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DEFENCE SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 
SOUTH KOREA: A DEMAND AND SUPPLY SIDE ANALYSIS 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the impact of defence spending on economic growth in South Korea 
using a demand and supply side (Deger-type) model over the whole period 1963-2000. Two 
different sub-periods (1963-1979 and 1980-2000) are also estimated to examine how the 
level of development affects the defence-growth relationship. For the period 1963-1979, 
South Korea pursued a strong economic development program under President Park's 
leadership and changed from one of the poorest countries in the world to a semi-developed 
country. In 1962, South Korea's per capita GNP was $938, but it attained $2,697 in 1979 
(1990 constant prices) owing to an effective economic and social development plan. In this 
period, South Korea pursued a "self-reliant" defence policy and started to nurture defence 
industries, although US military support was absolute. Accordingly, the government 
encouraged defence industries to develop indigenous technologies and to be interested in 
the development of dual-use technologies. However, since the 1980s, South Korea's 
defence started to depend heavily on imports rather than the development of indigenous 
technologies with the change of its defence industrial policy, and also focus more on 
military co-operation with USA. Economically, South Korea has changed from a semi- 
developed to a developed country owing to consistent economic development for the period 
1980-2000. 
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A demand and supply side model has its own weaknesses. The derivation of the equations 
is often theoretically unclear and is somewhat ad hoc, and if there is substantial mis- 
specification, it may contaminate the entire set of estimates (Ram, 1995). Nevertheless, this 
model provides more insights in analysing the defence-growth relationship than provided 
by the supply-side model only (Sezgin, 2001). A demand and supply side model enables 
us to investigate direct and indirect, and thus the overall effects of defence spending on 
growth. Such a model is applied to examine the overall effects of defence spending on 
economic growth in South Korea. 
This chapter consists of 5 parts. The second section reviews the link between defence and 
growth in South Korea. In the third section, the demand and supply side model based on the 
Deger model (I 986a) representing four multi-equation models and its specifications will be 
introduced. It is a typical model for most demand and supply-side studies, because it is well 
qualified to explain the defence-growth relationship in the open economy by including a 
trade balance sector. In this chapter, Deger' s (1986a) basic model will be modified by 
adding some different variables to explain South Korea's defence-growth relationship. For 
example, Deger (I 986a) considered the agricultural sector in the growth equation, but it is 
removed in the model for South Korea's defence-growth relationship, because agriculture 
is believed to have made little contribution to South Korea's economic growth for the 
sample period. Instead, human capital and technology sectors will be added in the growth 
equation, because they are more likely to have led South Korea's growth. Also, US military 
aid and North Korea's threat are included in the defence equation to explain South Korea's 
demand for military expenditure. In section 4, statistical results and major findings using 
ordinary least squares (OLS), two-stage least squares (2SLS) and three-stage least squares 
(3SLS) methods will be explained and conclusions will be presented in the final section. 
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6.2. DEFENCE-GROWTH LINK IN SOUTH KOREA 
Since the Korean War (1950-1953), responding to the military threats from North Korea has 
been one of the most critical issues and these external threats have necessitated a high level 
of defence spending in South Korea. Despite a strong economic development drive under 
military governments (1962-1988), the share of defence spending in GNP has reached 
ap roximately 5-6% representing an average 30% of the government budget. In other words, K- p 
the defence sector has been the major component of government expenditures. Although the 
annual share of defence spending in GNP has tended to decrease since the advent of 
democratic government, and since the 1990s it has reduced to 3-4% (annual average 3.2%), 
it is unclear whether this downward trend is temporary or permanent. Since the late 1990s, 
South Korea's engagement policy toward the North and ensuing peace talks between the two 
T7 - Koreas have increased the possibility of disarmament, but it is not expected that South 
Korea's defence spending will be rapidly diminished, because there is no clear evidence that 
North Korea's military threat has reduced as mentioned in Chapter 11. For example, North 
Korea's nuclear development programme is one of the major reasons why the South must 
maintain its level of defence spending. 
In terms of the defence-growth relationship in South Korea, many debates have been raised 
whether defence is growth-promoting or growth-inhibiting. As mentioned in Chapter V, the 
empirical results on the defence-growth relationship vary with the selection of model, data, 
and the time-period. In the case of South Korea, there are some complexities in studying the 
defence-growth relationship. On one hand, South Korea is one of the extraordinary countries 
which attained high economic growth with a high level of defence spending (Moon and 
Hyun, 1992). In absolute size, South Korea'defence spending is the 13 th largest in the world 
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(HSS, The Military Balance, 2002). In this respect, it seems that the defence spending of 
South Korea helps its economic growth or, at least, does not hamper growth despite the 
crowding-out of civil investment. However, the rapid economic growth of South Korea 
could also lead its military expansion. South Korea has actually maintained both strong 
defence and economic superiority to North Korea since the 1980s and defence has been one 
of the most important priorities under all successive governments. In spite of the "defence- 
emphasis" policy, South Korea's economic growth has been phenomenal and its civilian 
economy has also been very successful. In addition, until the 1970s, the government 
attempted to transfer military technology to civilian industry, and to some extent it 
contributed to raising the level of civilian technology. Hence, South Korea may be an 
example where defence has a positive effect on economic development. 
On the other hand, the large share of defence in government spending has restrained non- 
militarypublic and private investment. In otherwords, the defence sector might "crowd-out" 
investment in education, social security, health, and other necessary economic services, such 
as social infrastructure (e. g. transportation, roads and telecommunications etc. ). In fact, as 
shown in Chapter 11, South Korea's share of defence budget in government spending is 
much higher than other OECD member countries, while it spends relatively less on other 
welfare sectors. Specifically, human capital through education is definitely one of the 
significant factors promoting economic growth (Becker, 1993), but defence might have been 
detrimental to growth by hampering investment in human capital in South Korea. Also, the 
structural weakness of the South Korean defence industry might inhibit the economy's 
development. South Korea has depended heavily on the import of defence products, 
especially from the US even under the "self-reliant" defence policy due to its technological 
difficulties. The quality of weapons has also played a critical role in the arms race with 
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North Korea. For this reason, South Korea's balance of payments in the military sector has 
been negative and thus this might give a negative effect on growth. Consequently, using 
descriptive statistics, it is not simple to determine whether the defence-growth relationship 
in South Korea is positive or negative or insignificant. 
One of the necessary considerations which we must not ignore in South Korea's defence- 
growth relationship is US military aid to South Korea. Since the Korean War, US grants and 
military support to South Korea have played an important role in the economic development 
of South Korea. Owing to the US military assistance, South Korea could reduce its defence 
burden to some extent, even though its level of defence spending is still high. Obviously, 
US military aid must have provided an opportunity to "free-ride" for South Korea until the 
early 1980s, because the South Korean government could reallocate resources from defence 
to civil investment and lay a foundation for economic development. But, since the mid- 
1980s, the USA ended its grant to South Korea and South Korea began to share the costs 
of its US forces. However, the share of costs is only 2-3% of the total defence spending of 
South Korea and hence, it is not an influential factor determining economic growth in South 
Korea. Another external factor affecting South Korea's defence spending is the threat from 
North Korea. North Korea's threat has definitely affected the demand for defence spending 
in South Korea as shown in Chapter IV, and it must have escalated South Korea's defence 
spending. Thus, the threat from North Korea could indirectly influence economic 
development in South Korea. Consequently, both US military aid and North Korea's threat 
might have been significant determinants of the defence-growth relationship in South Korea 
whether they are positive or negative. 
In summary, there are many complexities in examining defence-growth relationship in 
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South Korea. There are many variables which should be considered, so that it is not simple 
to uncover the link between defence and economic growth in South Korea. However, the 
demand and supply side (Deger-type) model will provide valuable insights into the overall 
effects of defence on growth in South Korea. A modified model applying demand and 
supply equations will contribute to the analysis of defence-growth relationship in South 
Korea. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 represent the real GDP and defence spending of South Korea 
over the period 1963-2000. In Figure 6.1, South Korea's GDP has grown consistently since 
the 1960s except for 1980 and the late I 990s. Although political instability in 1980 caused 
a temporary economic setback, South Korea's economy quickly recovered after 1981 and 
recorded high economic growth again until 1996. However, the economic crisis in 1997 
seriously damaged the South Korean economy and GDP in 1998 fell sharply recording a 
negative GDP growth (-6.7%). South Korea's defence spending also grew in this period, 
although it had small downswings. Its defence spending rapidly increased from the mid- 
1970s to the early 1980s and from the late 1 980s to the mid- 1 990s, although it showed small 
downswings for the late 1980s and a large decrease in 1998. As shown in FigUres 6.1 and 
6.2, the trend of GDP and defence spending correspond to each other because the growth 
of the national economy generally entails a high level of defence spending in most 
developing countries. As the result of Spearman's rho test, the correlation coefficient 
between the two sectors is 0.97. Thus, it is noted that the real GDP and defence spending 
in South Korea are highly correlated. 
On the other hand, Figures 6.3 and 6.4 represent the real growth of GDP and real growth of 
defence spending in South Korea for the same period. Although South Korea's real GDP 
growth is relatively low until the early 1970s, it shows quite a consistent pattern. South 
Korea's GDP grew rapidly between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s with some 
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downswings, but it fell sharply in 1997 and 1998 even though growth recovered in 1999. 
The growth of South Korea's defence spending, as a whole, corresponds to its GDP growth 
for the period 1963-2000, although there are some exceptions in the 1980s. The growth of 
GDP and growth of defence spending are negatively correlated from the early 1980s to the 
mid-1980s and in the early 1990s. As shown in Figures 6.3 and 6.4, both GDP growth and 
the growth of defence spending peaked in 1988 and 1999. South Korea attained the highest 
GDP growth in 1988 and the growth of defence spending also largely increased in this year. 
Not only the high growth of GDP but the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul also might have 
stimulated the growth of defence spending in South Korea. The high growth of GDP and 
defence spending in 1999 seems to be a rally to retrieve the slump in the previous year and 
might be induced by the sea battle between the South and North in the West Sea near the 
southern borderline. The correlation between real GDP growth and the growth of defence 
spending is also high at 0.79. Unlike Figures 6.1 and 6.2, Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show how the 
change in real GDP and change in defence spending are correlated to each other in South 
Korea. In the empirical tests of South Korea's defence-growth relationship, the first- 
differenced form of real GDP and defence spending is employed to prevent possible non- 
stationarity. 
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Figure 6.2. Real Defence Spending of South Korea, 1963-2000 
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Figure 6.3. Real Growth of GDP in South Korea, 1963-2000 
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Figure 6.4. Real Growth of Defence Spending in South Korea, 1963-2000 
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6.3. SOUTH KOREA'S DEFENCE-GROWTH MODEL 
In the analysis of South Korea's defence-growth relationship, its unique political and 
economic development need to be reflected in the model. First of all, one of the most 
important contributions of defence in South Korea is that it could stabilise the investment 
climate ofthe South Korean economy by deterring North Korea's threat and securing peace. 
In so doing, South Korea could achieve steady economic growth by inducing foreign 
investment and developing its civilian economy. Domestically, South Korea has maintained 
a relatively high savings ratio in spite of a high level of defence spending and thus could 
secure domestic investment. Some demand and supply-side models used investment instead 
of savings in their equations. But, in the output/expenditure function, saving equals 
investment, and most demand and supply-side studies, including Deger (I 986a, b), Dunne 
and Nikolaidou (2001) and Sezgin (1999,2001) used saving in their equations. Hence, 
savings equation will also be used in the South Korea's defence-growth model. 
The trade balance is also important in South Korea, because the foreign trade has been an 
engine for South Korea's growth since the beginning of its economic development. 
Therefore, the demand and supply-side model of South Korea's defence-growth relationship 
comprises a four simultaneous equations, including growth, savings, the trade balance and 
defence equations. The defence equation based on the demand for military expenditures 
includes "spill-in" effects from the US military assistance, the potential threat from North 
Korea and also inter-state conflicts dummy between the South and North. Thus, the Deger's 
(1986a) demand and supply-side model needs to be modified to include these relevant 
variables describing South Korea's unique circumstances. The defence-growth model in 
South Korea can be represented by the following simultaneous equations: 
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g= ao +alm+a2s+a3TB + a4L+a5H+a6T (6.1) 
bo +blm+b2g+b3TB + b4NGE + 
b5i (6.2) 
TB = co +clm+c2g+c3EXCH + c4DUMecon (6.3) 
do + dPCY+ d2NGE + d3US + d4Nk I 
+d5DUMic 
where 
g= real level of gross domestic product (GDP) 
s= real level of domestic savings' 
m= real level defence spending 
TB= real level of trade balance 
L= size of employed labour forces 
(6.4) 
H= ratio of students entering high school (%) (proxy for human capital investment) 
T= civilian R&D expenditures to GDP (%) (proxy for technology) 
NGE = share of non-military government expenditure in total government expenditures 
i= inflation rate (%) 
EXCH = real exchange rate 
PCY = real per capita GDP 
US = share of US grant in the defence spending of the US-South Korean alliance 
NK-i = North Korea's real defence spending in the previous year 
DUMecon = impulse dummy variable for South Korea's economic crises in 1980 and 1998 
(DUMecon = 0: no economic crisis; DUMec,,,, =-I: economic crisis) 
I Investment (1) might be used instead of savings (s). 
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DUMic = dummy variable for Inter-Korean conflicts in the period 1963-2000. 
(All endogenous variables are real terms (US$ inl 995 constant prices) and ao ý 
bo 
5 CO ý 
do are 
constants). 
This model is based on the Deger (I 986a) framework, but it is believed to be more 
app icable to industrial countries, such as South Korea. Unlike the Deger (1986a) model, 
this model considers the human capital and technology sectors in its growth equation (6.1) 
instead of the agricultural sector. It is believed that these sectors contribute more 
significantly to South Korea's growth than agriculture. The savings and trade balance 
equations ((6.2) and (6.3)) are little different from the Deger (I 986a) model, but some 
additional variables, such as non-military government expenditures and the exchange rate 
are included to obtain more specific results. Also, the defence equation (6.4) representing 
the demand for defence spending includes income, spill-ins and threat factors. Additionally, 
it includes the conflict dummy between the South and North Korea, because this is 
considered as one of the important factors affecting South Korea's defence spending (Bae, 
2003). This equation might be used not only for South Korea but also for other countries 
involved in an arms race or military alliance. Therefore, this model modifies and improves 
the Deger (1986a) and other demand and supply-side models by employing alternative 
explanatory variables to estimate the defence-growth relationship in South Korea. 
Growth equation 
The growth equation is derived from a traditional production function: Y=f(K, L, T) where 
Y is output, K and L are capital and labour inputs and T is a measure of technology (Deger 
and Smith, 1983). The growth equation (g) (6.1) comprises four endogenous variables 
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(growth, saving, trade balance and defence spending) and three exogenous variables 
(employed labour forces, human capital and technology). Given these conditions, it is 
hypothesised that savings (s) and defence spending (m) have positive effects on growth, 
because the increase of saving raises investment and thus promotes economic growth. The 
increase of defence spending also contributes to growth through spin-offs and externalities 
for the rest of the economy in most developing countries (Deger and Sen, 1983; Deger and 
Smith, 1983; Deger, 1986a, b; Sezgin, 2001). By contrast, the sign for the coefficient of the 
trade balance is assumed to be negative, because net foreign capital inflows through a 
deficit of balance of payments might help economic growth (Deger 1986a). South Korea 
has depended heavily on foreign trade since the beginning of its economic development 
and the ensuing expansion of trade volume has played the role of locomotive for its 
economic growth. Especially, the rapid growth of exports contributed to the acceleration 
of GNP growth since the mid- 1 960s (Kim and Hong, 1997). On the other hand, the size of 
employed labour forces is expected to have a positive effect on growth as in other growth 
models (Deger and Sen, 1983; Deger and Smith, 1983; Faini et al., 1984; Deger, 1986 a, b). 
Human capital investment is expected to have a positive effect on growth as Becker (1993) 
explained and technology (knowledge accumulation) is an important input increasing 
economic growth in the traditional Solow (1956,1957,1960) production function. The size 
of the labour force and human capital investment are not multi-collinear, because the 
human capital investment is expressed as the ratio of students entering high school. 




The savings function is derived from the output/expenditure relation: Y= C+I+M-A where 
Y is total output, C is civilian consumption, I is total civilian investment, M is defence 
spending, and A is net capital flows (Deger and Smith, 1983; Sezgin, 1999; Dunne and 
Nikolaidou, 2001). Total civilian investment can be replaced by total savings (s). The 
savings equation (s: 6.2) includes three independent endogenous variables (growth, trade 
balance and defence) and two exogenous variables (non-military government expenditure 
and inflation). High economic growth might raise savings and accumulate resources for 
investment in terms of the life-cycle theories of consumption (Deger, 1986a, b; Lebovic and 
Ishaq, 1987; Dunne and Nikolaidou, 2001; Sezgin, 2001). Therefore, it is generally 
assumed that growth also promotes savings. Defence is expected to have a negative effect 
on savings by reallocating saving away from more productive private and public 
investment, and impede growth (Deger, 1986a, b), although South Korea has maintained 
a relatively high gross savings ratio (average 35% for the 1990s) compared with other 
developing countries. South Korea might have achieved a higher savings ratio if it had not 
spent so much on defence. However, Benoit (1978) argued that defence does not give a 
significant negative impact on savings, because only a small part of income not spent on 
defence goes to highly productive investment. Most income is spent on less productive 
social investment and consumption for consumer satisfaction. Sezgin's (2001) recent 
studies on Turkey show that the effects of defence on savings are insignificant in the 
simultaneous equation model. Despite Benoit's finding, defence is generally assumed to 
negatively affect savings in South Korea, even though its savings ratio has been high. The 
trade balance is expected to have a positive effect on savings through either income- 
multipliers or trade taxes (Deger 1986a; Scheetz, 1991; Sezgin, 2001). Non-military 
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government expenditure (NGE) is assumed to potentially affect government savings and 
investment decisions (Roux, 1996) .2 The 
increase of non-military government expenditures 
(NGE) might reduce the government savings and have a negative effect on the total savings. 
Inflation is expected to have a positive effect on savings by causing "forced savings" 
according to Deger (1986a). 
Trade Balance equation 
The trade balance equation (TB) (6.3) contains two independent endogenous variables., 
defence spending (m) and growth (g), and an exogenous variable, real exchange rate 
(EXCH), and an impulse dummy variable for the economic crises in 1980 and 1998. The 
trade balance equation represents two other equations, export and import equations, but 
Deger-type demand and supply-side models employ the trade balance to estimate the effect 
of defence on growth via the balance of payments (net capital flow) in the open economy. 
Defence spending is generally assumed to have a negative effect on the trade balance by 
increasing aggregate demand and constraining domestic supply. The subsequent reduction 
of exports might increase imports and lead to a deterioration in the balance of payments 
(Deger 1986a; Scheetz, 1991; Sezgin, 2001). However, it should be considered that US 
military aid was large until the mid-1970s. The US military transfer might contribute to 
alleviating the negative effect of defence on the trade balance in South Korea. Growth is 
expected to positively affect the trade balance, because South Korea has been one of the 
major countries pursuing export-promoting strategies. On the other hand, the exchange rate 
2 As the result of empirical tests, Roux (1996) found that both defence spending and non-militarygovernment 
expenditures had a negative effect on growth in South Africa for the period 1960-1990. The size of coefficient Is -1.51 
for defence spending and -0.87 for non-military government expenditures. By contrast, defence spending and non-military 
government expenditures had no significant effect on savings. 
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is expected to be positively correlated to the trade balance. The exports and imports of 
South Korea have been affected by the change of exchange rate since its economic 
development. it is considered that the exchange rate to the US Dollar and Japanese Yen is 
a major determinant of South Korea's trade balance. That is, when the rate is high 
(devaluation of domestic currency), generally, exports are increased and imports are 
decreased. In contrast, the revaluation of domestic currency tends to reduce the exports and 
raise imports. Hence, in general, the devaluation of domestic currency (Won) improves the 
balance of trade in South Korea. On the other hand, the impulse dummy variables represent 
the impact of economic crises in 1980 and 1998 on the trade balance. The sudden death of 
President Park- who ruled South Korea for 18 years- in 1979 led the country to unexpected 
political turmoil. In 1980, South Korea experienced another coup and the military leader 
came to power. However, during this period, South Korea underwent a serious economic 
recession. It has rapidly recovered since 1981 and so continued its growth. At the end of 
1997, South Korea met another crisis which came from the misjudgement of foreign 
exchange management and failure of foreign investment, especially, in Asian countries. 
Since 1999, the South Korean economy has rapidly recovered and achieved about 9.0% 
3 
annual GDP growth in 2000. 
Defence equation 
The general functional form of the demand for defence spending is: M=M (INCOME, 
SPILL, THREAT, PRICES) where M is defence spending, INCOME is a measure of real 
national income, SPILL is the real defence spending of allies, THREAT is the defence 
3 Although South Korea achieved a high GDP growth rate in 2000, the real GDP rather decreased due to the 
devaluation of domestic currency. As shown in Figure 6.1, the real GDP indicated by US dollar slightly decreased. 
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spending of the enemy, and PRICES is the relative price of defence as compared with non- 
military goods (Sandler and Hartley, 1995; Solomon, 2003). Based on this general demand 
function, the defence equation (m) (6.4) consists of the explanatory variables, namely, per 
capita GDP, non-military government expenditure, US military aid and the North Korean 
threat. Per capita GDP is assumed to be positively correlated to South Korea's defence 
spending in spite of the public good nature of defence spending (Deger and Smith, 1983; 
Deger, 1986a, b), because the defence budget has rapidly increased with its speedy 
economic development. In terms of the positive relationship between GDP and defence 
spending, defence might be regarded as a normal good, because demand rises with income 
(Sandler and Hartley, 1995). However, non-military government expenditure is expected 
to have a negative effect on defence as the increase of non-military government 
expenditures should generally entail the reduction of the share of defence spending in total 
government expenditures. In fact, the South Korean government spent approximately 30- 
35% of total government expenditures on defence until the late 1980s, but it decreased to 
17% in 2000. As shown in Chapter 11, through the Spearman test, it was found that defence 
had some trade-off relationships with social welfare and other public investments. US 
military aid is generally assumed to be negative to South Korea's defence spending, because 
South Korea could benefit from the US military grant (free-riding) and save resources for 
defence to invest in its economic development instead. But, the free ride' of South Korea 
ended in the early 1980s when it began to share the costs for the presence of US troops with 
USA (Hamm, 1999). As shown in Chapter IV, North Korea's lagged defence spending 
might affect the decision of South Korea's defence spending in the present year. South 
4 it is difficult to say that South Korea enjoyed a complete "free ride" owing to US military aid, because it has 
maintained a high level of defence spending. But it's military power was absolutely inferior to North Korea's until the 
mid- I 970s, and thus South Korea's rapid economic development might be impossible without US military support due 
to the heavy defence burden. 
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Korea has always been sensitive to the North Korean threat since the Korean War and this 
should be included in the defence equation. Therefore, it is expected to be positively 
correlated to South Korea's defence spending. The conflict factor is also expected to have 
a positive and significant effect on South Korea's defence spending (Bae, 2003; Galvin, 
2003). Table 6.1 shows the hypotheses for the possible effects of each explanatory variable 
on growth, saving, the trade balance and defence spending. 
Table 6.1. Predicted Effects for the South Korea's Defence-Growth Model 
Dependent Growth Savings Trade Balance Defence 
Coefficient Savings(s) + Defence (m) - Defence (m) - Per capital GDP 
Defence(m) + Growth (g) + Growth (g) + (PCY) + 
Trade Balance Trade Balance Exchange rate Non-military 
(TB) - (TB) + (EXCH) + government 
Labour forces Non-military GE Economic crisis expenditures 
(L) + (NGE) - (DUMecon) (NGE) 
Human capital Inflation (1) + US military aid 
(H) + (US) 
Technology North Korean threat 
(T) + (NK) + 
Inter-Korean 
conflict (DUMic) 
6.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.4.1. Test of the Deger (1986a) Model 
Before the test of my defence-growth model, Deger's (1986a) original model will be 
estimated for South Korea. Deger's (1 986a) model is represented in the Equations (5.10)- 
(5.13) in Chapter V. She used the three-stage least squares QSLS) for the 55 LDCs tests 
and hence, South Korea is also examined using the same empirical method to compare both 
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results. The aim of this test is to show whether my model is a better fit than Deger's (I 986a) 
for South Korea's defence-growth relationship. As shown in Table 6.2, the empirical results 
of defence-growth relationship in South Korea applying Deger's (1986a) model are very 
different from her original expectations explained in Chapter V. 
Table 6.2. Test of Deger's (1986a) Model for South Korea 
Sample Cross-Sectional LI)Cs South Korea 
(Deger) 
Equation Variables Coefficients & t-statistics Coefficients & t-statistics 
Growth Intercept . 4.2 (-1.56) 9.14 (3.23)*** 
s 0.58 (3.37)t - 0.30 (-4.33)*** 
M 0.29 (2.50)t 0.81(l. 64) 
B . 0.15 (-1.75) 0.08(1.58) 
y . 0.14 (-1.75) 0.01 (6.81)*** 
A 0.19(1.85) . 0.04 (459) 
R2 0.32 0.63 
Savings Intercept 12.5 (6.91)t 19.87 (4.46)*** 
M . 0.56 (-3.72)t 2.38 (2.59)*** 
9 0.74 (2.42)t -1.65 (-6.34)*** 
Y9 0.038 (3.92)t 0.30 (7.68)*** 
B 0.32 (4.22)t 0.10(0.83) 
i . 1.75 (-0.56) . 0.11 (-0.84) 
R2 0.79 0.74 
Trade balance Intercept . 2.33 (486) . 1018.65 (-0.12) 
M . 2.45 (-2.88)t 402.50 (0.22) 
9 1.22 (3.08)t 360.64 (0.51) 
i 0.16 (0.032) . 395.40 (-2.26)** 
DI 41.5 (7.08)t 
D2 23.6(0.92) 
Decon . 21513.90 (-1,89)* 
R2 0.67 0.25 
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Defence Intercept 1.47(l. 52) 13.40 (3.66)*** 
y 0.15 (2.80)t . 0.38 (-5.30)*** 
GB 0.16 (3.07)t 0.25(l. 04) 
N 0.0042 (1.32) . 0.17 (-3.22)*** 
q -0.25 (2.52)t 
D1 4.02 (3.42)t 
D2 11.2 (10.2)t 
USAID -0.68 (-8.15)*** 
NKLAG 0.41 (1.53) 
R2 0.87 0.79 
*** 1% level of significance ** 5% level of significance * 10% level of significance 
Notes: 1. Numbers in the parentheses are t-statistics of each variable. 
2. In the test of Deger (1986a), the level of significance is unknown. t only indicates that the variable 
is statistically significant. 
3. g= annual growth of GDP; s= national savings ratio; in= annual growth of Military expenditures; y= 
per capita income; B= balance of trade; A= annual growth rate of agriculture; 1= inflation rate; DI= dummy 
for capital surplus oil-exporting countries; D2= dummy for war economies: Israel, Jordan, South Vietnam, 
Egypt, Syria; Decon= dummy for economic crises in South Korea; GB= growth rate of govenu-nent spending; 
N= total population; q= difference between per capita income among countries; USAID= US military aid 
to South Korea; NKLAG= military expenditures of North Korea in the previous year (South Korea's data are 
1995 constant prices). 
Deger's (1986a) tests for the 55 LDCs showed the positive effect of defence spending on 
growth and its negative effect on savings, but it is found that the expected signs of 
coefficients are non-significant or completely different in South Korea. Furthennore, the 
R2S of the growth and trade balance equations are generally low. The R2 of the growth 
equation in Deger's (1986a) tests was lower at 0.32 and this indicates that the choice of 
independent variables does not fit well for the model. Other variables, such as growth in 
the savings equation and per capita income in the defence equation have different signs 
from our previous expectations. This might be caused by the difference between cross- 
sectional and time-series data. Hence, it is found that Deger's (I 986a) original model is not 
appropriate for South Korea. Also, the choice of explanatory variables, such as agriculture 
is problematic, because it is not an important variable for the growth in industriallsed 
countries, such as South Korea. Consequently, the new defence-growth model for South 
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Korea is expected to increase the goodness of fit of equations and improve the explanatory 
variables by considering the specific circumstances surrounding South Korea. 
6.4.2. Test of South Korea's Defence-Growth Model 
6.4.2.1. Period 1963-2000 
Three different statistical methods are applied to examine the effects of defence spending 
on economic growth in South Korea. As mentioned earlier, ordinary least squares (OLS), 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) and three-stage least squares (3SLS) methods will be used 
to obtain more consistent empirical results. In the estimation of over-identified structural 
equation belonging to a simultaneous equation system, the two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
method could lead to a consistent estimation (Kmenta, 1986; pp. 681). However, the 
ap lication of three-stage least squares (3SLS) might bring more efficient results than the K-P 
use of single equation method by avoiding the interrelationships between the variables and 
disturbances across equations, although 3SLS method needs both perfect information and 
much data in the simultaneous equation model. Most demand and supply-side studies using 
simultaneous equations (Deger, 1986a, b; Scheetz, 1991; Dunne and Nikolaidou, 2001; 
Sezgin, 200 1) apply 3 SLS method to obtain more specific and unbiased results. Thus, it is 
believed that single equation methods(OLS and 2SLS) are not enough for satisfactory 
empirical tests and the application of 3SLS is more effective in the analysis of defence- 
growth relationship in South Korea. As shown in Table 6.3, the test of real level data using 
OLS estimation provides high R' s except for the trade balance equation. According to the 
real level tests, defence spending and civilian R&D have a negative effect on South Korea's 
growth. 
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Table 6.3. Empirical Results of South Korea's Defence-Growth Relationship Using 
Real Levels 
Variable Equation 
Growth Savings Trade Balance Defence 
Intercept -78964.80 -39087.70 -15212.90 6281.65 
(-4.41)*** (. 1.11) (-1.05) (2.31)** 
m -3.93 1.40 -0.26 
(-1.86)* (0.90) (. 0.18) 




























R2 0.998 0.992 0.094 0.994 
Durbin-Watson 1.115 0.364 0.982 0.739 
*** 1% level of significance ** 5% level of significance * 10% level of significance 
Notes: 1. Numbers in the parentheses are t-values of each variable. 
2. g= real gross domestic product (GDP); s= real domestic savings; in= real defence spending; TB= real trade 
balance; L= size of employed labour forces; H= human capital investment; T= civilian R&D expenditures 
to GDP; NGE= share of non-military government expenditures in total government expenditures; i= inflation 
rate; EXCH= real exchange rate; PCY = real per capita GDP; US= share of US grant in the total defence 
spending of US-South Korean alliance; NKLAG= real North Korean defence spending in the previous year; 
DUMecon= impulse dummy variable for economic crises in 1980 and 1998; DUMic= dummy variable for 
Inter-Korean conflicts for the period 1963-2000 (All figures are 1995 constant prices). 
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However, the low Durbin-Watson statistics show serial correlations, and as the result of 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, most real levels are found to be non-statlonary. 
Accordingly, all the variables should be first differenced to avold serial correlations and 
non-stationary problems. Dickey-Fuller unit root test in Table 6.4 shows that first- 
differenced variables are stationary. Hence, it is necessary to use the first-differenced form 
to estimate South Korea's defence-growth relationship more accurately. The empirical 
results representing the defence-growth relationship of South Korea for the period 1963- 
2000 are shown in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.4. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Roots 
Variables Test Statistics Critical Values (Levels) Critical Values(1st differences) 
Levels 1st differences 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
9 -3.38 -3.75 -4.24 -3.54 -3.20 -4.25 -3.55 -3.20 
s -2.90 -4.21 -4.24 -3.54 -3.20 -4.25 -3.55 -3.20 
m -4.02 -3.79 -4.24 -3.54 -3.20 -4.25 -3.55 -3.20 
TB -7.48 -7.93 -4.24 -3.54 -3.20 -4.25 -3.55 -3.20 
L -2.09 -5.26 -4.24 -3.54 -3.20 -4.25 -3.55 -3.20 
H -3.53 -5.18 -4.24 -3.54 -3.20 -4.25 -3.55 -3.20 
T -3.21 -6.57 -4.24 -3.54 -3.20 -4.25 -3.55 -3.20 
i -6.31 -9.30 -4.24 -3.54 -3.20 -4.25 -3.55 -3.20 
NGE -5.19 -5.42 -4.24 -3.54 -3.20 -4.25 -3.55 -3.20 
us -3.77 -6.15 -4.24 -3.54 -3.20 -4.25 -3.55 -3.20 
NK -3.05 -5.56 -4.24 -3.54 -3.20 -4.25 -3.55 -3.20 
PCY -3.29 -3.76 -4.24 -3.54 -3.20 -4.25 -3.55 -3.20 
EXCH -5.41 -6.47 -4.24 -3.54 -3.20 -4.25 -3.55 -3.20 
Note: The trend and intercept are included in this unit root test (E-Views 3.1). 
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Table 6.5. Empirical Results of Defence-Growth Model in South Korea (1963-2000) 
Equation Variables Estimation Method 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Growth Intercept 114.10 1305.02 1305.02 
equation (0.07) (0.82) (0.82) 
A rn 6.08 4.57 4.57 
(3.41)*** (1.57) (1.57) 
As 1.82 2.00 2.00 
(13.12)*** (7.59)*** (7.59)*** 
A TB -0.65 -0.77 -0.77 
(-6.25)*** (-4.22)*** (-4.22)*** 
AL -3.92 -6.88 -6.88 
(-1.22) (-1.87)* (-1.87)* 
AH 246.83 274.32 274.32 
(1.66)* (1.60)* (1.60)* 
AT 3079.78 2823.73 2823.73 
(3.61)*** (2.80)*** (2.80)*** 
R-Square 0.98 0.97 0.97 
DW 1.65 1.68 1.68 
Savings Intercept -1134.32 -882.65 -882.65 
equation (-2.18)** (-1.60) (-1.60) 
A rn -0.46 0.85 0.85 
(-0.36) (0.50) (0.50) 
Ag 0.44 0.38 0.38 
(10.90)*** (6.89)*** (6.89)*** 
A TB 0.27 0.19 0.19 
(4.55)*** (2.19)** (2.19)** 
A NGE -130.23 -58.18 -58.18 
(-0.68) (-0.30) (-0.30) 
Ai 23.25 20.64 20.64 
(0.36) (0.33) (0.33) 
R-Square 0.93 0.92 0.92 
DW 1.33 1.65 1.65 
Trade Intercept 1853.80 1748.20 1748.20 
Balance (1.42) (1.44) (1.44) 
equation A rn -6.70 -5.61 -5.62 
(-2.40)** (-1.53) (-1.53) 
Ag -0.01 -0.32 -0.32 
(. 0.08) (-0.27) (-0.27) 
A EXCH -23.19 -22.59 -22.59 
(-3.35)*** (-3.44)*** (-3.44)*** 
A DUMecon -16057.68 -16182.63 -16182.63 
(-3.49)*** (-3.75)*** (-3.75)*** 
R-Square 0.65 0.65 0.65 
DW 1.73 1.76 1.76 
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(Cont. ) Table 6.5. 
Equation Variables Estimation Method 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Defence Intercept -123.92 -12.67 -12.67 
equation (-1.76) (-0.18) (. 0.18) 
A PCY 1.02 1.20 1.20 
(9.08)*** (11.20)*** (11.20)*** 
A NGE -17.92 -35.69 -35.69 
(-0.88) (-1.72)* (-1.72)* 
A us -20.75 -22.15 -22.15 
(-2.35)** (-2.30)** (-2.30)** 
A NKLAG 0.08 0.97 0.97 
(1.46) (1.60)* (1.60)* 
A DUMic 372.67 94.09 94.09 
(3.39)*** (0.93) (0.93) 
R-Square 0.89 0.85 0.85 
DW 1.37 1.32 1.32 
*** 1% level of significance ** 5% level of significance * 10% level of significance 
Notes: 1. Numbers in the parentheses are t-values of each variable. 
2. A g= real growth of gross domestic product (GDP); A s= real growth of domestic savings; A in= real 
growth of defence spending; A TB= real growth of trade balance; A L= size of employed labour forces (first 
difference); A H= human capital investment (first difference); A T= civilian R&D expenditures to GDP (first 
difference); A NGE= share of non-military government expenditures in total government expenditures (first 
difference); A i= inflation rate (first difference); A EXCH= real exchange rate (first difference); A PCY = 
real growth of per capita GDP; A US= share of US grant in the total defence spending of US-South Korean 
alliance (first difference); A NKLAG= real growth of North Korean defence spending in the previous year; 
DUMecon= impulse dummy variable for economic crises in 1980 and 1998; DUMic= dummy variable for 
Inter-Korean conflicts for the period 1963-2000. 
3. OLS tests have been carried out by SPSS 10.1., and the results from 2SLS and 3SLS tests have been 
computed by LIMDEP 7.0. 
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(i) Growth equation 
Table 6.5 shows the test results for the period 1963-2000. In the growth equation, domestic 
savings, human capital investment and civilian technology have a positive and significant 
effect on South Korea's economic growth in its 2SLS and 3SLS estimations. On the other 
hand, the trade balance and the size of the labour force have a negative effect on growth in 
both estimations, although the size of the labour force does not show any significant 
relationship with growth in the OLS estimation. The negative effect of the size of the labour 
force on growth is different from our expectations shown in Table 6.1, but the level of 
significance is relatively low at 10%. This is an unexpected result because most previous 
studies (Deger 1986a, b; Dunne and Nikolaidou, 2001; Sezgin, 2001) find a positive and 
significant relationship between the size of the labour force and growth in their empirical 
tests. Defence spending is found to have no significant direct effect on growth, although 
South Korea's defence spending is expected to have a positive direct effect on its growth. 
The R'of 0.97 shows a high overall significance of the growth equation and the DW of 1.68 
indicates no evidence of autocorrelation. Thus, as predicted, it is found that savings, human 
capital and civilian R&D investment have played an important role in South Korea's 
growth. 
(ii) Savings equation 
In the savings equation, growth and the trade balance have a positive and significant 
impacts, while other factors are all insignificant. The trade balance has a positive and 
significant effect on savings in all estimations. But, no meaningful relationship between 
defence spending and savings is found in this test. Most demand and supply side studies 
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(Deger and Smith, 1983; Deger, 1986a, b; Levobic and Ishaq, 1987) support the negative 
indirect effect of defence on economic growth via savings, but our test results do not 
correspond with these results. Therefore, it is found that defence spending has not crowded 
out the resources for savings and investment in South Korea for the sample period. Growth 
is positively correlated to savings and hence it is found that growth raises savings as well 
as savings stimulate growth in South Korea. By contrast, the relationship between non- 
military government spending and savings is not clearly defined. Roux (1996), and Dunne 
and Nikolaidou (200 1) applied non-military government spending to the savings equation 
as an exogenous variable, but they could not find any meaningful relationship between 
these two sectors. Our test results are also insignificant like previous studies and therefore, 
it is concluded that there is no significant relationship between the non-military government 
spending and savings in South Korea. Inflation is expected to have a positive effect on 
savings by causing forced savings in the developing countries according to Deger 
(1986a, b), but it is found that in South Korea, this is not the case. Inflation has no 
significant effect on savings in South Korea. In addition, the overall R2 is also high at 0.92 
and the DW test shows no evidence of autocorrelation. 
(iii) Trade Balance equation 
In the trade balance equation, it is found that defence spending has a significant and 
negative effect on the trade balance only in the OLS estimation. This is in accordance with 
our expectations in Table 6.1. Nevertheless, it shows no significant relationship with the 
trade balance in both 2SLS and 3SLS estimations. Also, according to Deger (1986a), 
growth is supposed to have a positive relationship with the trade balance, because South 
Korea has consistently pursued export-promoting strategies in its development process. 
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However, it is found that there is no significant relationship between the growth and trade 
balance in our tests. By contrast, the effect of exchange rate on the trade balance is found 
to be negative. It was expected to be positive in our hypotheses, because the devaluation 
of domestic currency stimulates exports and capital inflows, and thus might improve the 
balance of payments. However, it is found that the exchange rate is rather negatively 
correlated to the trade balance in South Korea. The impulse dummy variable for the 
economic crises in 1980 and 1998 is found to have a negative effect on the trade balance. 
The R 2of the trade balance equation is relatively low at 0.65 compared with other 
equations, but it is acceptable. Also, the Durbin-Watson d statistic is 1.76, so there is no 
autocorrelation. In conclusion, from the simultaneous equation tests, it is found that defence 
spending has no significant effect on the trade balance in South Korea for the period 1963- 
2000. 
(iv) Defence equation 
The defence equation reflects the unique situation of South Korea. Through the test, it is 
found that per capita GDP, North Korea's defence spending and the dummy for inter- 
Korean conflicts have a significant positive relationship with South Korea's defence 
spending, although the conflict factor is significant only in the OLS estimation. By contrast, 
US military grants to South Korea and non-military government spending are negatively 
correlated to South Korea's defence spending. In Chapter IV, it was found that real US 
military aid to South Korea has no significant effect on the change of South Korea's defence 
spending. However, in this test, the share of US military aid in the total defence spending 
of US-South alliance is found to be negatively correlated to the South Korean defence 
spending. In other words, South Korea's defence spending is affected by the share of US 
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military aid in the total defence spending of US-South alliance rather than real level of US 
military aid. On the other hand, it is also found that the growth of North Korea's defence 
spending has a positive and significant effect on South Korea's defence spending. In 
Chapter IV, it was proven that North Korea's defence spending has a positive effect on the 
South's defence spending. Hence, the defence spending of North Korea has been a 
significant factor determining South Korea's defence spending in this period. As predicted, 
non-military government expenditures have a significant and negative relationship with 
South Korea's defence spending in the simultaneous equation test. In Chapter H, the 
increase of non-military public expenditure reallocated resources from defence to other 
sectors, such as social welfare and other public services in South Korea. Therefore, it is 
found that South Korea's defence spending has been stimulated by income, threat and 
conflict for the period 1963-2000. However, aid from the alliance (spill-in) and non- 
military government spending have a negative effect in this period. 
In conclusion, the expected signs are confirmed by our empirical results except for the 
exchange rate. Through the results, it is found that defence spending has no significant 
relationship with economic growth in South Korea for the period 1963-2000. It has no 
direct and positive effect on growth, and also has no indirect and negative effect on growth 
via savings and the trade balance in South Korea. Therefore, it is concluded that South 
Korea's defence spending neither promoted nor impeded its growth for the period 1963- 
2000. 
6.4.2.2. Sub-Period 1963-1979 
South Korea's economic development is divided into two different periods according to its 
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development stage and defence policy. The period 1963-1979 is regarded as a developing 
stage, because its per capita GDP is not sufficient to be a semi-developed country. Also, 
South Korea's defence is expected to have a greater effect on its economy by focussing 
more on the "self-reliant" system in this period. Table 6.6 shows the empirical results of the 
defence-growth relationship in South Korea during its developing stage. 
The empirical tests for the period 1963-1979 show different results from those for the 
period 1963-2000 (Table 6.5. ). In the growth equation, it is found that defence spending has 
a positive and direct effect on South Korea's economic growth in its developing stage, but 
the human capital and civilian R&D investment have no significant effect on its growth. 
It is believed that the effects of defence on growth are stronger than those of human capital 
and civilian R&D in this period. In fact, civilian R&D investment was relatively low in the 
developing stage. Also, as predicted, savings have a significant positive effect on growth, 
while the trade balance has a negative effect on growth in both single equation and 3SLS 
estimations. 
In the savings equation, both the growth and trade balance have a positive and significant 
effect on savings, but other variables are irrelevant to the savings. Defence spending is 
found to have no significant effect on savings. Therefore, for the period 1963-1979, it is 
found that defence spending did not crowd-out the resources for savings in South Korea. 
Non-military government expenditure and the inflation rate have no significant effects on 
savings. 
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Table 6.6. Empirical Results of Defence-Growth Model in South Korea (1963-1979) 
Equation Variables Estimation Method 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Growth Intercept 2001.85 6428.80 6428.80 
equation (0.61) (1.67)* (1.67)* 
Am 6.79 9.33 9.33 
(2.18)* (2.56)** (2.56)** 
As 1.14 1.66 1.66 
(2.47)** (3.38) (3.38) 
A T13 -1.12 -1.27 -1.27 
(-3.62)*** (-3.87)*** (-3.87)*** 
AL -4.09 -9.99 -9.99 
(-0.82) (-1.56) (-1.56) 
AH 187.67 229.01 229.01 
(0.77) (0.99) (0.99) 
AT 2334.71 -7449.96 -7449.96 
(0.31) (-0.93) (-0.93) 
R-Square 0.94 0.92 0.92 
DW 1.93 1.81 1.81 
Savings Intercept -431.23 -550-99 -550.99 
equation (-1.02) (-1.48) (-1.48) 
Am 0.45 -0.75 -0.75 
(0.24) (-0.04) (-0.04) 
Ag 0.38 0.45 0.45 
(2.84)** (3.29)*** (3.29)*** 
A TB 0.47 0.67 0.67 
(1.95)* (2.37)** (2.37)** 
A NGE 4.83 41.66 41.66 
(0.04) (0.39) (0.39) 
Ai 9.75 20.61 20.61 
(0.28) (0.67) (0.67) 
R-Square 0.85 0.84 0.84 
DW 1.64 1.47 1.47 
Trade Intercept 629.56 638.48 638.48 
Balance (1.19) (1.36) (1.36) 
equation A rn 6.03 5.26 5.26 
(4.24)*** (3.54)*** (3.54)*** 
Ag -0.48 -0.44 -0.44 
(-5.20)*** (-4.92)*** (-4.92)*** 
A EXCH -0.27 -0.50 -0.50 
(. 0.11) (-0.24) (-0.24) 
R-Square 0.68 0.67 0.67 
DW 2.22 2.01 2.01 
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(Cont) Table 6.6. 
Equation Variables Estimation Method 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Defence Intercept -83.64 -23.08 -23.08 
equation (-0.93) (-0.36) (-0.36) 
a PCY 1.38 1.42 1.42 
(3.34)*** (4.14)*** (4.14)*** 
A NGE -33.55 -48.55 -48.55 
(-1.62) (-3.23)*** (-3.23)*** 
A us -16.47 -13.62 -13.62 
(-2.00)* (-1.82)* (-1.82)* 
A NKLAG . 0.08 0.95 0.95 
(0.59) (0.79) (0.79) 
A DUMic 186.86 153.13 153.13 
(1.48) (1.35) (1.35) 
R-Square 0.82 0.80 0.80 
DW 1.79 1.61 1.61 
*** I% level of significance ** 5% level of significance * 10% level of significance 
Notes: 1. Numbers in the parentheses are t-values of each variable. 
2. A g= real growth of gross domestic product (GDP); A s= real growth of domestic savings; A in= real 
growth of defence spending; A TB= real growth of trade balance; A L= size of employed labour forces (first 
difference); A H= human capital investment (first difference); A T= civilian R&D expenditures to GDP (first 
difference); A NGE= share of non-military government expenditures in total government expenditures (first 
difference); A i= inflation rate (first difference); A EXCH= real exchange rate (first difference); A PCY = 
real growth of per capita GDP; A US= share of US grant in the total defence spending of US-South Korean 
alliance (first difference); A NKLAG= real growth of North Korean defence spending in the previous year; 
DUMecon= impulse dummy variable for economic crises in 1980 and 1998; DUMic= dummy variable for 
Inter-Korean conflicts for the period 1963-2000. 
3. OLS tests have been carried out by SPSS 10.1., and the results from 2SLS and 3SLS tests have been 
computed by LIMDEP 7.0. 
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The trade balance is affected by the defence spending and growth. Surprisingly, defence 
spending has a positive effect on the trade balance in this period, while growth is found to 
be negatively correlated to the trade balance. The negative effect of growth on the trade 
balance might be caused by the chronic trade deficit of South Korea. South Korea's trade 
volume was increased with its rapid growth, but its trade deficit was also increased in this 
period. 
The test results of defence equation are very different from those of the period 1963-2000. 
North Korea's defence spending and inter-Korean conflicts are changed to be non- 
significant to South Korea's defence spending for the period 1963-1979. These are 
unexpected results, because it is believed that the arms race between the South and North 
was more intense in this period. The trade-off relationship between defence spending and 
non-military government budget is also found to be significant in this period. US military 
aid is found to have a negative and significant effect on South Korea's defence spending 
and shows an evidence of free-riding. As the result of the test for the period 1963-1979, it 
is found that South Korea's defence spending had an overall positive effect on its growth 
both directly and indirectly in its developing stage. As shown in Table 6.6, the equations 
have high R2s at the range of 0.67-0.92 and the DW tests show no autocorrelation. 
6.4.2.3. Sub-Period 1980-2000 
Table 6.7 represents the empirical results of South Korea's defence-growth relationship for 
the period 1980-2000. The test results show that defence spending has a positive and direct 
effect on South Korea's economic growth in both single and simultaneous equation tests. 
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The human capital and civilian R&D investment (technology) have also significant effect 
on its growth in the semi-developed or developed stage. The size of the labour force did not 
help South Korea's growth like other periods. This implies that South Korea's growth 
depended more on the development of technology and education than the simple increase 
of the size of the labour force. Savings and the trade balance have also a positive and 
negative effect on growth respectively in both single equation and 3SLS estimations. 
In the savings equation, both the growth and trade balance have the same positive effect on 
savings and other variables are insignificant for the savings. Defence spending is found to 
have no significant effect on savings. Hence, defence spending had no indirect and negative 
effect on growth via savings in this period. Non-military government expenditure and the 
inflation rate are not significant like other periods. 
In the trade balance equation, defence spending has a significant negative effect on the trade 
balance unlike the developing stage. The negative effect of defence on the trade balance 
might be caused by South Korea's import-substitution defence policy in this period. Since 
the 1980s, South Korea has depended heavily on the import of weapons and became a 
major importer of defence equipment in the world defence market. The exchange rate and 
dummy variable for economic crises have a negative effect on the trade balance. The 
negative effect of the exchange rate on the trade balance implies that the devaluation of 
local currency did not raise the balance of trade. 
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Table 6.7. Empirical Results of Defence-Growth Model in South Korea (1980-2000) 
Equation Variables Estimation Method 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Growth Intercept -6310.70 -5265.24 -5265.24 
equation (-1.66) (-1.60) (-1.60) 
Am 7.91 7.68 7.68 
(2.99)*** (2.78)*** (2.78)*** 
As 1.78 1.82 1.82 
(9.13)*** (8.17)*** (8.17)*** 
A TB -0.51 -0.63 -0.63 
(-3.37)*** (-4.24)*** (-4.24)*** 
AL -1.90 . 5.07 -5.07 
(-0.42) (-1.25) (-1.25) 
AH 317.64 304.94 304.94 
(1.60) (1.67)* (1.67)* 
AT 5418.54 5460.29 5460.29 
(3.15)*** (3.79)*** (3.79)*** 
R-Square 0.98 0.98 0.98 
DW 1.92 1.92 1.92 
Savings Intercept -1707.28 -1610.09 -1610.09 
equation (-1.56) (-1.57) (-1.57) 
A rn -1.48 -1.35 -1.35 
(-0.70) (-0.62) (-0.62) 
Ag 0.47 0.46 0.46 
(7.37)*** (6.33)*** (6.33)*** 
A TB 0.27 0.26 0.26 
(2.93)** (2.65)*** (2.65)*** 
A NGE -127.41 -114.88 -114.88 
(-0.26) (-0.27) (-0.27) 
i 102.91 111.03 111.03 
(0.47) (0.60) (0.60) 
R-Square 0.94 0.94 0.94 
DW 1.15 1.18 1.18 
Trade Intercept -1169.95 -65.15 -65.15 
Balance (-0.51) (-0.03) (-0.03) 
equation A rn -14.08 -8.99 -8.99 
(-3.67)*** (. 1.91)* (. 1.91)* 
Ag 0.24 0.84 0.84 
(1.78)* (0.53) (0.53) 
A EXCH -49.51 -45.60 -45.60 
(-4.72)*** (-4.60)*** (-4.60)*** 
A DUMecon -26141.20 -23383.34 -23383.34 
(-4.28)*** (-3.98)*** (-3.98)*** 
R-Square 0.83 0.81 0.81 
DW 1.40 1.63 1.63 
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(Cont. ) Table 6.7. 
Equation Variables Estimation Method 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Defence Intercept -229.27 -338.91 -338.91 
equation (-1.77)* (. 1.89)* (-1.89)* 
A PCY 0.98 1.33 1.33 
(5.35)*** (9.05)*** (9.05)*** 
A NGE -3.57 45.99 45.99 
(-0.07) (0.96) (0.96) 
A us -82.81 -132.50 -132.50 
(-1.63) (-2.83)*** (-2.83)*** 
A NKLAG -0.07 -0.26 -0.26 
(0.79) (-0.03) (-0.03) 
A DUMic 510.12 219.10 219.10 
(2.47)** (1.36) (1.36) 
R-Square 0.92 0.90 0.90 
DW 1.36 1.27 1.27 
*** 1% level of significance ** 5% level of significance * 10% level of significance 
Notes: 1. Numbers in the parentheses are t-values of each variable. 
2. A g= real growth of gross domestic product (GDP); A s= real growth of domestic savings; A in= real 
growth of defence spending; A TB= real growth of trade balance; A L= size of employed labour forces (first 
difference); A H= human capital investment (first difference); A T= civilian R&D expenditures to GDP (first 
difference); A NGE= share of non-military government expenditures in total government expenditures (first 
difference); A i= inflation rate (first difference); A EXCH= real exchange rate (first difference); A PCY = 
real growth of per capita GDP; A US= share of US grant in the total defence spending of US-South Korean 
alliance (first difference); A NKLAG= real growth of North Korean defence spending in the previous year; 
DUMecon= impulse dummy variable for economic crises in 1980 and 1998; DUMic= dummy variable for 
Inter-Korean conflicts for the period 1963-2000. 
3. OLS tests have been carried out by SPSS 10.1., and the results from 2SLS and 3SLS tests have been 
computed by LIMDEP 7.0. 
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In the defence equation, North Korea's defence spending is insignificant to South Korea's 
for the period 1980-2000. Inter-Korean conflicts are significant only in the OLS estimation. 
Per capita GDP and US military aid are the most influential factors determining South 
Korea's defence spending like other periods (1963-2000 and 1963-1979), with US military 
aid being negative since 1984. The trade-off between defence spending and non-military 
government budget is not found in this period. Since the 1980s, the share of defence in total 
government spending has continually reduced while the share of social development 
expenditures has steadily increased. Therefore, South Korea's defence-growth relationship 
seems to be negative for the period 1980-2000. Although the direct effect of defence on 
growth is positive, the indirect and negative effect of defence on growth via the trade 
balance is large and the overall effect of defence on growth is negative. Following the 
estmation method of Deger and Sen (1995), the multiplier effect of defence on growth 
(dgldm) is -16.17 in the 3SLS test. 
As shown in Tables 6.5,6.6 and 6.7, our empirical estimation is robust and unbiased. 
The R' representing the overall significance of equations are reasonably high and the 
Durbin-Watson statistics are generally acceptable. In the defence-growth model of South 
Korea based on the Deger (I 986a) framework, some different empirical results are found 
according to the time period. For the period 1963-2000, the overall effect of defence on 
growth is non-significant- i. e. South Korea's defence spending neither helps nor harms its 
economic growth in this period. By contrast, the effect of defence on growth is significant 
and positive for the period 1963-1979, while it is negative for the period 1980-2000. Hence, 
According to Deger and Sen (1995), the multiplier effect of defence on growth can be measured by following 
forrnula: 
dg a, +a, (b, + b, c, )-a, c, 
dm I- (a2b2+ ab3C2+ a3C. 
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our conclusion is that the defence-growth relationship can change according to the 
time-period and development stage even in the same country. In the develOPing stage, 
defence must have contributed to South Korea's growth through the externalities and spin- 
offs, but it seems to have been an obstacle to its growth becoming a middle-income country 
since the 1980s. After the 1980s, the externality and spin-off effect of defence was 
diminished, because the civilian economy was more developed and advanced than the 
defence sector and defence had no avenue to contribute to raising growth. In contrast, 
defence crowded-out more productive civilian investment and affected adversely the trade 
balance. These different results according to different development stages are supported by 
Galvin (2003). She suggested that the effect of defence burden on growth differed between 
income groups. Galvin (2003) found that the negative effect of defence on growth is only 
significant for the middle-income countries. This implies that the negative effect of defence 
spending on growth is more significant for the developed countries than for the developing 
countnes. 
6.5. SUMMARY 
Previous demand and supply side studies have generally applied either Deger (I 986b)-type 
three stage simultaneous equation or Deger's (1986a) four stage simultaneous equation in 
the analysis of defence-growth relationship. This study has investigated the defence-growth 
relationship of South Korea in the Deger (I 986a) framework, and it shows a different result 
from previous Deger-type studies (Deger and Smith, 1983; Deger, 1986a, b; Dunne and 
Nikolaidou, 2001). Through the tests, it is estimated that the overall effect of defence on 
economic growth is neither positive nor negative for the period 1963-2000. The direct and 
indirect effects of defence on growth are insignificant in South Korea in the long-run (1963- 
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2000) as Park (1993) and Heo (1997) found. However, the positive effect of defence on 
growth is found for the period 1963-1979 and this positive effect becomes negative since 
the 1980s. This might be caused by the difference between development levels. The 
wealthier countries have a more developed social infrastructure (e. g. telecommunications, 
roads, dam, etc. ) and have a more productive labour force and less to gain from defence 
(Deger, 1986a; Galvin, 2003). Also, it is believed that the change of defence policy from 
the "self-reliant" policy to the import- substitution strategy contributed to the negative effect 
of defence spending on growth via the trade balance since the 1980s. As a result, the 
empirical tests for the period 1980-2000 using simultaneous equation estimations present 
a negative effect of defence on growth. The impact of disarmament and a peace dividend 




7.1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter summarises the empirical results of the earlier chapters and presents the final 
conclusions of this thesis. The main chapters of this thesis are divided into three parts. First, 
the defence economy and military balance between South and North Korea were studied. 
Second, based on the arms expansion of the two countries, the existence of a South-North 
arms race has been detected by applying an alternative Richardson model. Third, the effect 
of South Korea's defence spending on its economic growth was examined using the Deger- 
type demand and supply side model. Chapter I hypothesised that the action-reaction pattern 
of arms races might exist between South and North Korea, and that South Korea's defence- 
growth relationship was not clear. This study made an original contribution to detecting the 
existence of the South-North anns race and the effect of South Korea's defence on its 
growth since the early 1960s. 
Chapter H described the defence economy, and military capabilities of the two Koreas and 
evaluated the military balance between the two countries. The two countries' military 
expansion was intensified between the 1960s and 1990s, but it has been alleviated since the 
mid- I 990s. US military aid is believed to contribute to the economic development of South 
Korea by helping the South to free ride. South Korea's defence industry contributed to its 
61 self-reliant" defence and also its civilian economy through the technology spin-offs until 
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the 1970s. But, since the 1980s, South Korea's defence has depended heavily on imports, 
including high technology weapons and now South Korea is the world's fourth largest 
importer of defence equipment. The share of defence spending in the government budget 
is still high compared with other developed countries, although it has been rapidly reducing 
with the increasing need for social welfare spending since the economic crisis of 1998. 
Thus, one of South Korea's policy aims should be the reallocation of resources from 
defence to the civilian sector following the effective deterrence ofNorth Korea's threat (see 
Annex). 
In Chapter IfI, the literature on arms races was reviewed. Although there are many 
alternative arms race models, they are mostly influenced by the Richardson's action- 
reaction model. Thus, the review of arms race literature was mainly focussed on the 
Richardson-type action-reaction models, because the arms race between the two Koreas was 
also modelled on this action-reaction mechanism. This chapter introduced the classical 
Richardson model and its variants, the Intriligator-Brito (1976) model, and other arms race 
models including the budgetary process approach, and the bureaucratic and organisational 
politics models. The literature review found that a nation's military expenditure is not only 
stimulated by the extemal threat but is also affected by intemal factors. 
In Chapter IV, two research questions were posed and answered. First, it detected the 
existence of the an-ns race between South and North Korea using an alternative Richardson 
model for the period 1963-2000. Second, two different sub-periods, the years 1963-1989 
(the Cold War era) and 1990-2000 (the post-Cold War era) were compared to study how 
the pattern of the South-North arms races have changed. As the result of empirical tests, it 
was found that the South-North anns race follows an asymmetric fonn led by the US-South 
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alliance. It was found that South Korea's defence spending is affected positively by the 
North Korea's threat and inter-state conflict, while negatively by the economic burden. By 
contrast, it was found that North Korea's defence spending follows a submissive 
Richardson model. It reacted negatively to the defence spending of US-South alliance for 
the period 1963-2000. In contrast, North Korea led the South-North anns race in the 
number of military personnel and tactical aircraft in the Cold War era. North Korea's 
domination in the number of military personnel and tactical aircraft might indicate its 
hidden cost in defence spending, but also reflect the problem of weapons in their quality 
and vintage. In conclusion, despite some differences between data, it was generally found 
that the anns race between the South and North was more intense in the Cold War era and 
the military power of US-South alliance was steadily strengthened for the period 1963- 
2000. South Korea's defence spending exceeded North Korea's in the 1980s and North 
Korea's behaviour became submissive to the US-South alliance after the end of the Cold 
War, because the North did not have capabilities to react to the US-South alliance due to 
its economic difficulties. 
Chapter V reviewed the studies on the defence-growth relationship. The supply, demand, 
and combined demand and supply side and Granger-causality models were studied. The 
supply-side model considers defence as an input in the traditional production function 
increasing output. Defence might be an important factor affecting production with capital, 
labour and technology. Defence might have a positive effect on growth through 
externalities and spin-offs from defence to civilian sector. In contrast, the demand model 
focusses on the negative effect of defence on growth based on the Keynesian demand 
function. In the demand-side model, defence crowds-out the more productive civilian 
economy and harms growth. The combined demand and supply side model estimates both 
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the direct and indirect effects of defence on growth. The Deger-type simultaneous equation 
model is generally used to estimate the overall effect of defence on growth, and most of 
these models find an overall negative effect of defence on growth in spite of some 
exceptions. The Granger-causality tests estimate the presence and direction of causation 
between defence and growth, but the test results are different according to the sample 
period and across countries. The review of empirical results found 10% of positive, 40% 
ofnegative, and 50% of insignificant relationships between defence and growth. Therefore, 
most previous studies on the defence-growth relationship show that defence has a negative 
or non-significant effect on growth. In South Korea's defence-growth relationship, most 
previous studies found a negative or non-significant relationship except for one case. There 
were 3 negative, 2 non-significant and I positive relationships among 6 studies. 
Two key research questions were answered in Chapter VI. First, it examined the effect of 
South Korea's defence spending on its growth for the period 1963-2000 to find the long- 
terin relationship between the two variables. As a result, the relationship was non- 
significant. Defence had neither direct nor indirect effect on growth via savings and the 
trade balance. Second, how the defence-growth relationship changed according to the 
development stage was also estimated. The results were different according to the time- 
period. In the first sub-period (1963 -1979), the defence-growth relationship in South Korea 
was estimated to be positive. Not only the direct effect of defence on growth was positive 
but the indirect effect via the trade balance was also positive in this period. The indirect 
effect via savings was insignificant. But, in the second sub-period (1980-2000), defence 
had 
an overall negative effect on growth in South Korea. The direct effect of 
defence on growth 
was positive, but the indirect effect through the trade balance was negative. Therefore, it 
is concluded that the effect of defence on growth can be different according to the time- 
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period (the economy's stage of development) even in the same country. 
The thesis posed three major research questions. The major findings and contributions to 
knowledge of this thesis can be surnmarised as follows: 
The arms race between the two Koreas exists and is affected by other 
exogenous variables, such as inter-state conflicts and US military aid. Itfollows 
an asymmetric Richardson model led by the US-South alliance. The US-South 
alliance significantly reacts to the North's threat, while North Korea's behaviour 
became submissive to the US-South alliance since the end of the Cold War. 
2) Thepattern ofSouth-North arms race changed between the Cold- War and the 
post-Cold War era. The arms race between South and North Korea was more 
intense in the Cold War era due to North Korea's reaction to the South's numbers 
of military personnel and defence equipment. But, the domination of US-South 
alliance in the defence spending over North Korea was more strengthened in the 
post-Cold War era. 
3) South Korea ý defence-growth relationship is non-significant, positive and 
negative according to the time-period. The effect ofdefence on growth is different 
according to the economy ý stage ofdevelopment even in the same country. South 
Korea's defence-growth relationship is non-significant for the period 1963-2000, 
positive for the first sub-period 1963-1979, and negative for the second sub-period 
1980-2000. 
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7.2. PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Theoretically, the Richardson's arms race model was improved by including the conflict 
factor between states and aid from the military alliance. Social and political conflicts 
between two nations are a significant factor influencing a nation's military spending besides 
an opponent's military spending. Aid from military alliance is also an influential factor in 
the arms race model, because it provides a free-ride to the alliance country, while it is a 
threat to the opponent country. Also, the Deger-type demand and supply side model was 
improved by including human capital and technology as well as labour force in the growth 
equation. Human capital was used by some authors, such as Sezgin (1999) in the supply- 
side model, but it was not used in the combined demand and supply based model. Civilian 
technology is also an important determinant of growth, but previous demand and supply 
side models disregarded this factor. The improvement of the existing model provided a 
better fit to explain an arms race and defence-growth relationship in South Korea. Those 
developed models in this thesis might be applied to other countries or regions in a similar 
situation. Examples include Greece-Turkey and India-Pakistan which are also developing 
nations in an arms race situation. 
Empirically, this thesis contributed to revealing the arms race mechanism between South 
and North Korea. Mathematical arms race studies using the Richardson model have not 
been attempted before in South Korea and proved an asymmetric an-ns race led by the US- 
South alliance in defence spending. In the South-North arms race, not only defence 
spending but the numbers of military personnel and defence equipment were also studied 
and this enabled an in-depth analysis of arms race in the Korean Peninsula. 
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In the analysis of South Korea's defence-growth relationship, this thesis showed that the 
effect of defence on growth can be different according to the development stage in the same 
country. Some authors showed that defence tends to have a negative effect on growth in the 
high-income countries and have a positive effect in the low-income countries in their cross- 
sectional studies, but it has not yet been proved in single country analysis. 
However, the empirical results of this thesis are not always clear. Autocorrelations are 
doubted in some results. Some of the DW statistics are in the inconclusive zone, although 
they are generally acceptable in most cases. Data consistency is another major problem of 
this thesis. South Korea's defence data are quite reliable, but the discrepancies between 
institutions are large. For example, the data from SEPRI and IIISS have a large difference 
between each other. The situation of North Korea's defence data is much worse. They have 
many missing variables and do not even exist in most institutes. North Korea's hidden 
defence spending could not be estimated. Hence, the empirical research of this thesis 
mainly depended on the official data from the Korean Ministry of National Defense 
(NIND), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the results from these data were compared with 
each other. ' Although the actual defence spending of both countries are veiled, it is 
assumed that the official data have little difference from the actual data, and the research 
was performed based on these official data. Nevertheless, the veiled data need to be 
unveiled to obtain better empirical results. 
I The economic data were quoted ftom "Major Statistics of Korean Economy" published by Korea National 
Statistical Office and" WorldDevelopment Indicators" published by World Bank. Other sources, including "International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook" from International Monetary Fund (IMF) and "National Accounts of OECD Countries" 
from OECD were also referred. 
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There are further areas for future research. First, some critics point out that the South-North 
arms race has been changed from a two- person zero sum game to a six-person non-zero 
sum game. They suggest that the major powers, such as USA, Russia, China and Japan are 
involved in the arms race between the South and North. However, in this thesis, only US 
military aid to South Korea was considered. The US-South alliance tends to have been 
developed into the US-South Korea-Japan alliance to cope with North Korea and China in 
the East Asia. However, South Korea does not have any military relationship with Japan, 
and China does not support North Korea militarily. China and Russia still have an intimate 
relationship with North Korea, but did not make a military alliance with it. Hence, these 
factors were not reflected in this thesis. Nevertheless, the nuclear development of North 
Korea might cause a new military conflict between the South and North involving major 
powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Thus, the anns race in the Korean Peninsula 
might need to be re-examined according to the political and military change in this region. 
Second, the military data of both countries need to be improved. Although the specific 
situation of the two Koreas should be considered, the secrecy of military data prevents 
acquinng more accurate and consistent empirical results. North Korea's actual defence 
spending is still veiled, and thus researchers must depend on official data. But, it is inferred 
that North Korea's actual defence spending is much larger than its official data. 
Third, North Korea's defence-growth relationship was not investigated due to the lack of 
data. If the related data are available, the effect of North Korea's defence spending on its 
growth might be estimated. In terms of the economic transition of centrally planned 
economies (CPE), studying North Korea's defence-growth relationship is crucial to estimate 
the effect of disarmament on growth in North Korea. Most studies emphas'se the posItive 
-209- 
effect of defence reductions on an economy. However, defence reductions did not 
contribute to economic growth in the former communist countries, although most of these 
countries are transfonning from a centrally planned economy (CPE) to a market economy. 
Accordingly, the sudden reduction of North Korea's defence sector might entail adjustment 
costs and harm its economy like other CPEs and this must be a burden to the unification of 
the two Koreas. 
Fourth, the effect of growth on defence was not studied in this thesis. South Korea's 
defence-growth relationship was examined bi-directionally using Granger-causality tests 
in some previous studies, but the empirical results were not identical but different from 
each other. Although it was found that defence spending had no significant effect on growth 
for the period 1963-2000, growth might have led defence spending for the same period in 
South Korea. Hence, the Granger-causality analysis might be used to investigate the bi- 
directional relationship between defence and growth in South Korea using longitudinal 
data. 
Besides the above issues, the reform of South Korea's anned forces and its defence 
industrial base (DEB) might be included in the future researches. Further analytical and 
empirical work is required to assess the economic impact of disarmament and a peace 
dividend for the two Koreas (see Annex). 
The results of this thesis are not universal. The anus race models and defence-growth 
relationship might be different across countries. The specific circumstances of each country 
are different and these factors should be reflected in single country analysis. This thesis 
made an effort to reflect the specific factors of South Korea and reached the result that the 
-210- 
South-North arms race is asymmetric led by the US-South alliance and the pattern of anns 
race differs between the Cold War and the post-Cold War; South Korea's defence spending 




DEFENCE REDUCTIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 
SOUTH KOREA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this Amex, the effect of defence reductions on economic growth is estimated based on 
the model presented in Chapter VI. A major research question is whether a reduction of 
South Korea's defence spending would promote its economic growth and produce a peace 
dividend. If the reduction of defence spending helps its growth, there will be an 
economically beneficial peace dividend to South Korea including peace itself If a bilateral 
disarmament is accomplished between South and North Korea, it will be possible that 
diminished fears of war might contribute to increased savings and investment, and lead to 
the peace dividend in South Korea as found by Russet and Slemrod (1993). Using the 
simultaneous equation model as shown in Chapter VI, the adjusted economic figures 
assuming South Korea's defence retrenchment will be simulated over the period 1980-2000. 
In the 1980s, South Korea's defence spending reached approximately 5-6% of GDP and 
exceeded North Korea's in its real level. Although South Korea's Force Improvement Plan 
(FIP) initiated in the early 1980s contributed to the increase of its defence burden, and is 
believed to have crowded-out some public and private investment, South Korea attained 
high economic growth consistently in this period until it was faced with the economic crisis 
in 1997. Hence, the purpose of this Annex is to investigate whether the diversion of the 
resources from defence to other civilian sectors, such as human capital could have raised 
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South Korea's growth for the period 1980-2000. 
In the second section, previous studies on the effect of defence reductions will be reviewed. 
In general, there are two different theories on disannament. Most studies (UN, 1989; Klein, 
1990; Ward and Davis, 1992) cautiously highlight the positive effect of defence reductions 
on economic activities, while UNIDIR (1993) and Intriligator (1994) pointed out that if 
disanuament involves high conversion costs and relatively low benefits, the social rate of 
return from disarmament could be small or even negative. In South Korea, a positive effect 
of defence reduction on its growth is expected for the period 1980-2000 according to the 
empirical results in Chapter VI. In the third section, the disarmament plans of the two 
Koreas will be studied. The disannament plans of the two countries have a significant gap 
between each other and show that the anus reductions are not simple in the Korean 
Peninsula. In the fourth and fifth section, the effects of defence reductions will be modelled 
and simulated based on Chapter VI, and their results will be presented. In the sixth section, 
costs and benefits from the two Koreas' unification are briefly described based on 
Germany's experience. The conclusion will be presented in the final section. 
2. PREVIOUS STUDIES ON DISARMAMENT 
In general, disarmament contributes to peace and economic development by reducing a 
nation's or region's defence burden (Fontanel, 1995). Resources released from defence can 
be reallocated for other alternative uses, such as social welfare or public and private 
investment, and contnbute to developing the civilian economy (UN, 1989; Klein, 1990; 
Davis and Chan, 1990; Aben and Daures, 1993). Nevertheless, the effect of disarinament 
i ng a positive defence-growth relationship is not yet detected precisely. in the countries havi II 
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Although peace itself might increase savings and investment by providing a secure 
environment in the long run, the defence reductions might also cause damages to the 
economy and regions depending heavily on defence industries and military bases. However, 
previous studies on the economic effect of disarmament are mostly focussed on the positive 
economic effect of defence reductions. 
2.1. Positive Effects of Defence Reductions 
Most previous studies on the economic effect of defence reductions assume the hypothetical 
reduction of defence spending and simulate its effect on the rest of the economy. Using the 
LINK model, Klein (1990) explains that a 10 % reduction of defence spending with an 
improvement in international aid (0.7 % of the GNP of the developed countries) might lead 
to a 1.7 % GNP growth in developing countries and 0.2 % growth in the developed 
countries if 60 % of the aid is spent on capital goods. Barker, Dunne and Smith (199 1) also 
evaluated the impact of UK defence cut on the rest of the economy using a multi-sectoral 
macroeconomic model. The simulation reduced the real value of defence spending in 1992 
by one-half by the year 2000 implying an annual average reduction in real defence spending 
of just over 8.5% per annum, starting in 1993. For simplicity, they assumed that defence 
reductions are matched by balanced increases in other public spending which leave total 
public spending unchanged. They also assumed that the cuts fall broadly, proportionately 
on the major components and that the current balance between personnel, equipment and 
other spending is maintained. Simulations were undertaken for the situation where there is 
no compensatory adjustment and for the situation where there is a resource reallocation 
from defence to other sectors. As presented in Table A. 1, the simulation results show that 
the reduction of UK defence spending to one-half of its 1992 level by the year 2000 
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decreases the UK GDP by 3.64% and increases unemployment by 0.46 mIlljon In the 
uncompensated situation. However, in the compensated situation, the reduction of defence 
spending leads to the decrease of unemployment by 0.52 million and the increase of GDP 
by 1.84% between 1992 and 2000. Their previous study (Dunne and Smith, 1984) using the 
Cambridge Growth Project model also presents similar results. Dunne and Smith (1984) 
found that a cut in the share of UK defence spending from 5% of GDP to 3.5% of GDP, the 
European average, balanced by matching increases in other forms of defence spending leads 
to a net increase in total employment of some 100,000 jobs. Hartley (1997) estimated the 
UK resources released from defence based on simple extrapolations of linear trends for the 
period 1985-1990. Over the period 1990-1996, there were cumulative savings of almost 
P-3.5 billion of defence spending (savings in 1995-1996 were equivalent to some 0.25% of 
GDP); manpower savings of over 50,000 service personnel in 1995; and over 100,000 
defence industryjobs in 1993-1994. Bayoumi, Hewitt and Schiff (1995) also examined the 
peace dividend from the reduction of world military spending using the IMF MULTIMOD 
model. ' In their study, the cut of world military spending by 20% could produce a long-run 
increase in private consumption and investment in industrial countries of 1% and 2%, 
respectively. Those countries that implement the largest cuts achieve the largest long-term 
benefits in consumption and investment as well as the largest short-term costs in output. 
The long-run impact of reduced defence spending on LDCs is also large, because these 
countries benefit both directly from the direct defence reduction and indirectly from lower 
interest rates and increased demand for their exports. Non-military consumption is 
estimated to rise by some I% and investment by 3.5% producing overall gains in economic 
i MULTIMOD is a system of linked models designed to analyse the interaction of economic policies and 
developments among the industrial countries, as well as to examine how changes in economic conditions in the industrial 
world affect developing countries as a group. The system contains econometric models (estimated on the basis of annual 
data) for each of the G7 countries, the smaller industrial countries as a group, high-income (capital-exporting) developing 
countries as a group, and other (capital-importing) developing countries as a group. 
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welfare. Hence, their major finding is that substantial benefits from the reduction of defence 
spending are mainly generated in the long run. In the short run, output is generally lower 
than it would have been otherwise, reflecting the negative impact on demand of lower 
govemment spending and entailing adjustment costs. 
Table A. I. Simulation Results for a 50% Reduction of UK Defence Spending 
Uncompensated Compensated 
Economic Factors 1993 1996 2000 1993 1996 2000 
Private consumption -0.31 -1.97 -4.41 0.22 1.73 5.39 
Gov. consumption -1.87 -6.99 -12.13 -0.21 -1.31 -2.79 
Investment -0.3 -1.77 -3.64 0.25 1.58 4.27 
Exports (G&S) -0.01 0.06 0.69 -0.02 -0.25 -0.79 
Imports -0.50 -2.34 -4.39 0.09 0.99 3.21 
GDP factor cost -0.45 -2.03 -3.64 0.10 0.63 1.84 
Trade balance (pp) 0.16 0.93 2.17 -0.04 -0.40 -1.36 
Unemployment -0.057 -0.252 0.46 -0.046 -0.221 -0.52 
(Mil. ) 
I I I . -- -j 
Notes: 1. G&S= goods and services; pp= percentage points. 2. The compensated results are for the simulation 
where the reduction in defence spending is reallocated proportionately to other categories of government 
current and capital expenditure while for the uncompensated simulation there is no reallocation. 
Source: Barker. T, P. Dunne and R. Srnlth (1991) "Measuring the Peace Dividend in the United Kingdom", 
Journal of Peace Research, 28(4): 345-358. 
However, disarmament does not always have a positive effect on the national economy. The 
failure of management of adjustment costs could bring economic problems. The basic 
economic danger is that defence reductions could result in the unemployment or under- 
employment of resources, including labour and capital, thereby leading to social and 
economic problems (UNIDIR, 1993; Intriligator, 1994). Another danger is that arms- 
producing countries might continue to produce weapons for export to avold the sOc'O- 
economic problems stemming from disarmament. Disan-ning countries might also sell 
existing weapons and defence plants to the countnes engaged in arms races instead of 
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destroying and dismantling them. Unemployed military scientists and technicians might 
emigrate into arms developing countries rather than work for civilian industry. Hence, 
delayed adjustment and resource reallocation might be dysfunctional for disarming 
countries in the long run as well as in the short run. 
2.2. Negative Effects of Defence Reductions 
Thomas, Stekler and Glass (199 1) estimated the economic effects of US defence reduction 
for the mid- I 980s and 1990s. In their simulations, reducing the level of defence spending 
caused a decrease of real output, the price level, and employment, although the effects of 
such a reduction tend to attenuate after about five years. An explicit example of adjustment 
failure can be found in the former Soviet Union. It is assumed that there has been a large 
reduction of defence spending in Russia since the end of the Cold War as all members of 
the fonner WTO concentrated on civilian production and overall reonentation of their 
entire economies (Klein, 1995) However, Russian statistics of all sorts are still weak. 
Employment and real GDP have decreased in spite of its adjustment efforts (Lavigne, 1999; 
Davis, 2002). As shown in Figure A. 1, Russia's real GDP index decreased from 100 in 
1992 to 73.4 inI999, although its index of real defence spending decreased from 100 
in 1992 to 46.8 in 1999 (1992= 100). Russia's real defence spending was reduced from 47.5 
billion roubles to 22.4 billion roubles in this period (1995 constant prices). The 
unemployment rate also increased from 5.8% to 8.5% between 1993 and 1997 (Figure 
A. 2). Since the end of the Cold War, many bold statements were made about 
demobilization and about reduced production of arms in the entire WTO, but now the 
countries struggling with their economic reforms are rebuilding their an-ns industries (Klein, 
1995). In Russia, the Putin Administration has raised the priority of defence sector and 
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increased real defence spending again (Davis, 2002). 
Figure A. I. Real GDP and Defence Spending Index in Russia, 1992-99 













Real GDP IndexIv' Real ME index 
Source: Davis, C. (2002) "Country Survey XVI: The Defence Sector in the Economy of a Declining 
Superpower: Soviet Union and Russia, 1965-2001 ", Defence and Peace Economics, 13(3): 145-177. 













Russia --a- Ukraine-<>- Estonia--w- Latvia ,, Lithuania 
Source: Lavigne, M. (1999) The Economics of Transition. -From Socialist Economy to Market Economy, 
London: Macmillan. 
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The success of disarmament is also likely to be affected by the economic fundamentals 
of a nation. The countries having a high economic growth and large civilian production 
will be able to quickly absorb the unemployed labour forces from the defence sector and 
transforni defence industry into civilian industry. Accordingly, defence reductions are 
more likely to have a positive effect on the countries having highly developed civilian 
economies, because they have more opportunities to reduce both adjustment costs and 
the adjustment time-period. By contrast, centrally planned economies, such as the 
former Soviet Union and WTO countries have relatively weak civilian economies, 
including the lack of efficient markets and thus it is not simple to reallocate the 
resources released from the defence sector. In addition, the defence-oriented countries 
in the market economy can have a negative effect on their economy by disarming, 
because reductions in the defence sector might cause a decrease of demand, 
employment and national output, and it might also take longer to transform the 
defence-weighted industrial structure. The empirical results of studies on the economic 
effects of disarmament are presented in Table A. 2. This Table shows that the reduction 
of defence spending has a positive effect on the economy in the long run, especially in 
the developed countries, but the effect is often negative in the short run. However, the 
effect of defence reductions can be different across countries according to their 
economic systems and capabilities as shown in Russia and WTO countries. 
In conclusion, disarmament can bring both peace and economic gains, but it can also 
result in economic problems if disarming nations fail to adjust their economy. 
Furthermore, defence reductions might impede economic growth in the countries having 
a positive defence-growth relationship and thus it is doubted whether these countries 
can also have an economic peace dividend through defence reductions. 
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In terms of literature, most studies depend on simulations to estimate the effect of 
defence reductions in the future. But, their simulation results are uncertain, because 
their studies are based on assumptions, and do not consider unexpected political and 
economic events which might occur in the future. For example, people simulating the 
effect of defence reductions on the US economy from 1995 to 2005 could not expect 
the 9.11 terror and Iraq War. Although these are the most significant factors affecting 
US defence spending by 2003, they could not be expected in the 1990s. Hence, a major 
gap of simulation is that its results are just unreliable and uncertain. In South Korea, 
using simulations to estimate the future effect of defence reductions might also be 
inaccurate and uncertain, because the political and military situations are not always 
stable and the South-North relationship is changeable. As a consequence, South Korea's 
defence-growth relationship was studied by some scholars introduced in Chapter V, but 
the effect of South Korea's defence reductions on its economy has not been studied 
empirically. To remove the uncertainty of simulation, this research will compare the 
actual defence spending and GDP with the hypothetical reallocation of defence 
resources to the civilian sectors and its effect on GDP for the period 1980-2000. 
Through the study, the effect of defence reductions in South Korea will be revealed, and 
it will contribute to investigating whether the hypothetical reduction of South Korea's 
defence spending and the reallocation of resources released from defence to other 
civilian sectors might help or impede its growth. 
In the disannament process, the design of public policies, such as creating newjobs and 
supporting the change of industrial structure is particularly important to reduce the 
negative economic effect of defence reductions, such as adjustment costs. Adjustment 
costs are one of the most crucial factors which cause the failure in disan-nament. The 
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development of retraining and retooling programmes is also needed to prevent the rapid 
increase of unemployment and decrease of productivity (Sandler and Hartley, 1995). 
Table A. 2. Empirical Results on the Economic Effect of Defence Reductions 
Author(s) Model Sample Economic effects 
Domke, Eichenberg Resource allocation 4 NATO allies: US, No trade-offs between 
and Kelleher (1983) model UK, Germany and defence and welfare in 
France, 1948-1978 the short term, but 
they are detected in 
the long term. 
Dunne and Smith Cambridge growth UK, 1983-1987 Positive effects on 
(1984) project model employment 
Harris, Kelly and Longitudinal regression 12 Asian developing Few trade-offs 
Pranowo (1988) model nations, 1967-1982 between defence and 
welfare. 
Davis and Chan (1990) Physical Quality of Life Taiwan, 1961-1985 No trade-offs between 
Index (PQLI) model defence and welfare. 
Barker, Dunne and Multi-sectoral macro- UK, 1992-2000 Positive effects on UK 
Smith (1991) economic model economy in the 
compensated 
situation. 
Thomas, Stekler and Macroeconomic model US, the mid-1980s Negative effects in 
Glass (1991) and input-output model and the 1990s short and medium- 
term, but they are 
attenuated after 5 
years. 
Ward and Davis (1992) Input-output model US, 1948-1996 Positive impact on 
economic growth. 
Aben and Daures Input-output model France, 1992-1996 Diverting resources 




Bayourni, Hewitt and MULTIMOD model US and industrial Negative effects in the 
Schiff(1995) countries, 1992-2000 short-term and 
positive effects in the 
long-term. 
Hartley (1997) Simple extrapolations UK, 1990-1996 Peace dividend is 
of linear trends obtained in savings 
and manpower. 
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3. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IN THE KORFAN PENINSULA 
3.1. Arms Control Regime in the Korean Peninsula 
The military confrontation between the South and North since the Korean War (1950- 
53) has led both countries to a ceaseless anns expansion. The East-West Cold War also 
intensified the military build-up of the South and North until the 1980s. Accordingly, 
in this high state of tension, arms control between the two countries has been rarely 
discussed. Although North Korea has often suggested the South-North dialogue for the 
anns control between two countrieS2, it was only a propaganda strategy to disturb the 
South (Chun, 1993). In the military strategy, the approach to arms control is completely 
different between the two countries. North Korea has focussed on the superiority to the 
South in the number of conventional striking weapons, such as tanks and armoured 
vehicles due to its advantageous geographical condition, while South Korea has stressed 
its defensive policy to cope with the North's threat. On the other hand, the large gap of 
defence spending between the US-South alliance and North Korea, and the North's 
economic difficulties might induce the North to insist on the disarmament of both 
parties. As shown in Chapter IV, North Korea's inferior defence spending in the South- 
North arms race might lead to proposals for disarmament, but at the same time, the 
North's anxiety about the overwhelming military power of US-South alliance might 
have led it to develop strategic weapons, such as nuclear and bio-chemical weapons, 
and long-distance missiles. However, South Korea had been relatively passive on the 
arms control issue until the mid-1980s because of the presence of US forces as well as 
its inferiority to the North in the number of conventional weapons and military 
2 North Korea suggested the arms control between the South and North over 236 times until the late 1980s. 
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personnel. But, the South started to be more concerned about arms control from the late- 
1980s and agreed on constituting the "South-North M111tary JoInt CommIttee" In the 
South-North dialogue in 1992. This Committee was constituted to implement and 
secure the South-North Non-aggression Agreement, and achieve disarmament between 
the two countries based on "Inter-Korean Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non- 
aggression, Exchanges and Co-operation Between the South and the North" concluded 
in 1992. However, these efforts for peace and disannament failed due to the nuclear 
crisis which occurred from 1993 to 1994, and the US and South Korea restarted joint 
military training (Team Spirit) from 1993. By 2002, the US-Southjoint military training 
was stopped, but the discussion on disannament between the South and North is at a 
standstill, although the economic exchange and co-operation has increased. 
The proposed disarmament by the South and North focussed mainly on their strategic 
dominance. The military tension caused by the South-North arms race has prevented the 
considerable reduction of defence spending for both countries. As shown in Chapter II, 
the overwhelming military spending of US-South alliance prevented North Korea from 
disarming, while North Korea's military threat and hostile behaviour to the South 
contributed to South Korea's military expansion. Hence, two countries are not willing 
to lose their strategic dominance in pursuing disarmament. In this state, the optimal 
strategy of both countries is maintaining the status quo, or reducing the number of 
military personnel (e. g. paramilitary or reserved army). By doing so, both countries 
might reduce their defence spending and use these labour forces for other economic 
activities. However, it is difficult to fulfill the full-scale anns reduction as long as two 
nations are engaged in an arms race. Disarmament can involve one or more of the 
following (UNIDIR, 1993): 
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1) Reductions in military expenditure due to unilateral initiatives or to bilateral 
and/or multilateral agreements; 
2) The reduction or destruction of specific weapons (nuclear, chemical etc. ); 
3) The reduction in the number of military personnel and closure of military 
bases; 
4) A ban or limitation on the production of certain types of military equipment; 
5) Controls on defence R&D for military purposes; 
6) Limitations on arms transfers; 
7) A monitoring and verification process. 
3.2. Disarmament Policies of South and North Korea 
Although the disannament policies of South and North Korea include the above 
conditions, they are hardly put into action. The proposed disarmament plans by South 
and North Korea appear to have little difference from each other, but partly differ 
according to the strategic importance of both countries. South Korea suggests firstly, 
the formation of political trust, secondly, the formation of military trust and finally, 
gradual disarmament. First, the formation of political trust can be achieved by 
approving the other's political and ideological system, ending the provocative acts 
towards each other, and establishing liaison offices in Seoul and Pyongyang. Second, 
the formation of military trust includes the mutual visit and exchange of military 
officers, the mutual openness and exchange ofmilitary information, the pre-information 
of corps movement and inspection of manoeuvres from the brigade level, the 
installation of a hot line between defence ministers to prevent an accidental anned 
collision, and the peaceful use of the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone). Third, gradual 
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disarmament should follow after the establishment of mutual political and military trust. 
The South's disarmament contains the following elements: first, the change of an 
offensive military structure to a defensive military structure by reducing offensive 
weapons (e. g. fighters, missiles, etc. ); second, the maintenance of military balance, that 
is, a side holding larger number of weapons and military personnel should disarm more 
while the other side holding less should disarm less, and thus both countries attain a 
military balance based on numbers. This model representing that the balanced 
disannament between two opponents reduces the probability of war by enlarging the 
cone of mutual deterrence as shown by Intriligator and Brito (1976,1977,1984,1987) 
in Chapter 111; third, the number of military personnel should be reduced with the 
reduction of weapons simultaneously; fourth, the mutual verification of disarmament 
is necessary; finally, the level of military power of both countries is detennined by the 
South-North agreement considering the defence of unified Korea in the future. 
Therefore, South Korea's disarmament policy stresses the military balance in the 
numbers of military personnel and weapons between the South and North to reduce the 
threat from North Korea. 
By contrast, the North's disarmament proposal is focussed on the immediate arms reduction 
and the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea. First, it suggests the formation of 
mutual trust between the South and North as South Korea's plan does. Second, the North 
proposes the immediate arms reduction between the South and North in a few years. Third, 
it insists on the withdrawal of foreign (US) troops from the Korean Peninsula. Finally, It 
suggests a disannament and peace treaty between the two Koreas. The detalls of North 
Korea's proposal are as follows: (i) the mutual trust between the South and North should 
be formed through the restriction of military exercises and training. That Is, it proposes to 
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ban all joint military exercise and training with foreign troops, the exercise and training 
from the divisional level and the exercise near the military demarcation line, and also pre- 
inform any military exercise by each other. It also suggests the change of DMZ into a peace 
zone and a safety plan to prevent an accidental collision, including the installment of a hot 
line between high-level military authorities and the prohibition of provocative military 
action near the military borderline; (ii) it suggests a specific arms reduction level between 
the South and North, including a reduction in the number of military personnel to 100,000 
in 3-4 years and the abolition of all reserves and paramilitary forces. It proposes to reduce 
and destroy military equipment proportionately to the reduction of armed forces personnel, 
and restrict the development of new military technology and equipment, although it does 
not provide the detailed method of restriction. It also includes the exchange of information 
on the arms control process and mutual verification; (iii) the North stresses the withdrawal 
of US troops from the Korean Peninsula. It includes de-nucleansation of the Korean 
Peninsula, withdrawal of US troops and equipment corresponding to the South-North 
disarmament and closure of US bases in South Korea; (iv) it proposes to constitute the 
South-North militaryjoint committee to discuss and resolve the arms control and conflict 
between the South and North, and declare and conclude a non-aggression and peace treaty 
between the two Koreas. However, unlike its proposals, North Korea is developing nuclear 
and bio-chemical weapons and testing long-distance ballistic missiles, and this has 
exacerbated the arms race between the two Koreas. Hence, the purpose of its disarmament 
proposals is not trustworthy and is doubted by South Korea. Table A. 3 summarises and 
compares the disarmament plans of South and North Korea. 
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Table A. 3. Arms Control Plans of South and North Korea 
Nation Arms Control Plan 
South Korea 40 Approval of political and ideological system 
" Ban of provocative acts to each other 
" Establishment of liaison offices in capital cities 
" Formation of Military trust including exchange of MIlitary information and 
officers and the installation of a hot line 
0 Gradual disarmament including the reduction of offensive weapons and 
nuffitary personnel, the maintenance of military balance and mutual verification 
North Korea 40 Focus on nulitary trust 
40 Rapid arms reduction with the restriction of military exercise 
0 Withdrawal of US troops from South Korea and a peace treaty between the two 
Koreas 
40 Rapid reduction of Military personnel and the disrnissal of all reserves and 
paramilitary forces 
0 Restriction of the development of new military technology and equipment 
3.3. Dilemma of Disarmament in South and North Korea 
The two countries agree that mutual trust should be formed between the South and North 
before they disarm. However, the South focusses on the establishment of both political and 
military trust, while the North focusses mainly on military trust. In other words, the South 
requires the North to stop provocative acts and thus alleviate the political and military 
tension between the two countries at first,, while the North insists that the South should 
reduce its military threat and capabilities. Even though it is unrealistic, the North also 
requires the South to stop military exercises and training, and abandon the US-South 
alliance to create military trust. 
On arms reductions, the two Koreas have three major unyielding differences. First, the 
speed of arrns reduction is different from each other. The North insists on an imminent 
reduction of military personnel, whIle the South stresses the maintenance of military 
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balance between the two countries. For North Korea, it is important to convert the military 
personnel to civilian labour forces to increase economic output, but one of the important 
strategic reasons is that it is easier for the North to mobilize civilians and change them to 
military personnel in wartime due to its totalitarian system. By contrast, for South Korea, 
it is important to reduce the number ofNorth Korea's weapons stock and military personnel 
to correspond to the South's. Also, the rapid reduction of military personnel might damage 
South Korea's economy by the sudden release of labour forces from the defence sector and 
the possible increase of unemployment. Second, North Korea focusses on banning military 
training, exercises and joint military exercises with foreign troops. it is assumed that the 
intensive US-South military training has been a great threat to the North and it is going to 
weaken the military preparation of the South and disintegrate the US-South military co- 
operation. Another reason is that the North can also use its military personnel for economic 
activities, such as the construction of infrastructure, by reducing military exercises and 
training. However, the North's superiority in the number of weapons and military personnel 
is a serious threat to the South, and the South requires the North to reduce its number of 
weapons and military personnel to the South's level first. 
In recent years (2001-2003), North Korea's nuclear development programme is a serious 
international issue, and South Korea and USA are requiring the North not only to reduce 
conventional weapons but also to abolish and relinquish its nuclear and bio-chemical 
weapons, and missile development programmes. Third, North Korea has consistently 
insisted on the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea. North Korea is still defining the 
Korean War as the National Liberation War and there is no evidence that its ultimate goal 
to drive out US power from the Korean Peninsula and thus communise the South has 
changed. The North also insists that the presence of US troops obstructs the reconciliation 
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and unification between the South and North. However, It Is perceived that the US-South 
military alliance is a must rather than an option not only for South Korea but also for East 
Asia, because the potential military threat from the North, such as the development of 
nuclear and bio-chemical weapons, and long-distance missiles, is still not diminishing but 
rather increasing the tension in this region. 
Therefore, two different approaches are needed to analyse the disannament of the two 
Koreas. On one hand, both countries agree on the arms reductions to alleviate military 
tension and avoid a war between the South and North. However, on the other hand, both 
countries seek to maintain their military power. The North attempts to maintain its military 
strength by developing nuclear and bio-chemical weapons instead of reducing its number 
of military personnel and conventional weapons. The South also attempts to strengthen its 
military power and the relationship with USA to cope with the increasing threat, such as 
nuclear and bio-chemical weapons from North Korea. Thus, this contradictory situation 
prevents the disarmament of both countries, although they have agreed on the non- 
aggression to each other. 
Figure A. 3 shows the game theoretic approach of two nations' disarmament. Two nations 
depend on a dominant strategy, giving a greater payoff to one nation regardless of the other 
nation's actions. In spite of its disarmament policy, arms escalation is a dominant strategy 
to South Korea, because its payoffs (4 and -6) in the escalate row are greater than the 
corresponding payoffs (of 2 and -8) in the limit row. Similarly, North Korea's payoffs (of 
4 and -6) in the escalate column exceed the corresponding payoffs (of 2 and -8) 
in the limit 
column. Both nations increase their armaments (or defence spending) to play their dominant 
strategy and end up in an arms race in the cell marked with an asterisk. Paradoxically, even 
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though both nations spend more on defence, they get negative payoffs in the matrix 
reflecting the fact that a positive opportunity cost in terms of less civilian goods is paid with 
no resulting benefits. The esc al ate- escalate cell in Figure A. 3 is a Nash equilibrium 
representing that neither nation is willing to disann unilaterally. Either South or North 
would lose 2 if it disarms unilaterally, because payoffs would change from -6 to -8. Hence, 
in the Phsoner's Dilemma game, each nation's optimising choice is increasing armaments 
(or defence spending) when its opponent increases them. Figure AA represents an ordinal 
rank of payoffs from best to worst. The best payoff is assigned a rank of 4, the second best 
outcome is 3, the next-to-worst payoff is 2, and the worst payoff is 1. These ranks are given 
in the corresponding matrix of Figure A. 3. 
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3.4. Economic Effects of Disarmament 
In the economic aspects, it was found that defence spending helped economic growth in 
South Korea until the late 1970s, but since the1980s, it impeded growth. Hence, the 
reduction of defence spending is expected to help South Korea's growth since the 1980s. 
The economic effects of defence reductions on North Korea's economy are not estimated, 
but the former Soviet Union and WTO countries exemplify the negative effect of defence 
reductions on the centrally-planned economies. North Korea's economy depends heavily 
on its military industries and its export of defence products, such as long-distance missiles 
exceeds South Korea's as shown in Chapter 11. Hence, the rapid reduction of North Korea's 
defence might harm its econornyby increasing unemployment and reducing national output. 
For a successful disarmament, it should increase civilian investment gradually and absorb 
its labour forces in the civil market so that it can reduce its adjustment costs for conversion. 
Namely, the economic base for civilian industries should be formed before a disarmament 
in North Korea. Therefore, a possible scenario for North Korea is that it will enhance the 
economic relationship with the developed countries, including South Korea and attract 
foreign investment. By galvanizing its civil market, North Korea can reform its collapsed 
economy and depend less on the military sector, However, as long as North Korea does not 
relinquish the development of strategic weapons, such as nuclear and bio-chemical 
weapons, it will not be easy to solve its economic difficulties. But, it is evident that those 
weapons are a leverage for North Korea for the deal with USA and the protection for its 
political system. 
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4. MODELLING THE DEFENCE REDUCTIONS IN SOUTH KOREA 
4.1. The Model 
This section estimates how the reduction of South Korea's defence spending affects its 
economic growth. The effect of South Korea's defence reductions on its growth has never 
been studied before empirically. According to the early studies of Benoit (1973,1978), 
defence spending generally promotes economic growth in developing countries, while other 
studies (Deger, 1986a, b; Deger and Smith, 1983; Deger and Sen, 1983) show that defence 
spending inhibits economic growth. In Chapter VI, it was found that South Korea's defence 
spending impeded its growth for the period 1980-2000. Hence, it is assumed that the 
reduction of defence spending might have a positive effect on the South Korean economy, 
but the effects of reduced defence spending will be different according to the method of 
defence reductions. In other words, the simple reduction of defence spending without the 
diversion of resources released from defence to other more productive sectors will have a 
negative effect on growth (i. e. it might worsen South Korea's economy by reducing the total 
output). Therefore, it is assumed that the resources released from defence spending are 
reallocated to other sectors, such as investment (or savings), human capital and civilian 
R&D. In Chapter VI, it was proved that savings, human capital and civilian technology are 
significant factors leading to South Korea's growth. Thus, it is assumed that the resource 
reallocation from defence to these sectors might be more helpful for South Korea's growth. 
Also, the reduction of defence spending might affect the trade balance by reducing the 
import of weapons and III the export of civil goods. As shown in Chapter VI, South 
Korea's defence spending had a significant negative effect on its trade balance. South Korea 
has surpluses in its total trade, while it has significant deficits in the anns trade. Hence, 
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reallocating the resources released from defence spending to other civilian sectors might 
also help improve the balance of payments. Besides the explanatory variables used In the 
growth equation in Chapter VI, two exogenous variables, social welfare and public 
economic services are added in the following model. Social welfare has become one of the 
important factors affecting growth since the 1980s by providing better conditions to 
increase productivity. Public economic services, such as telecommunication system, energy 
and transportation are also necessary to attain higher growth. 
Based on the regression analysis of South Korea's defence-growth model, the growth 
equation used in this chapter is as follows: 
g= -32973.30 + 11.70m + 1.821 - 0.41 TB - 7.43L + 11 89.50H 
(-0.60) (2.42) (4.82) (-2.71) (-1.35) (5.27) 
+ 16077.44T+ 2257.94W+1647.16PE 
(1.24) (0.98) (3.04) 
R2=0.999 
where 
g= real level of gross domestic product (GDP) 
real level of defence spending 
I= real level of domestic investment 
TB = real level of trade balance 
L= size of employed labour force 
(1) 
H= ratio of students entering high school (%) (proxy for human capital investment) 
T= civilian R&D expenditures to GDP (%) (proxy for technology) 
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W= share of social welfare expenditure in total government budget 
PE = share of public and economic services expenditure in total government budget (%) 
and the figures in parentheses are t-statistics. R2 is very high at 0.999. Therefore, the given 
equation is well-fitted to explain South Korea's growth. 
4.2. Assumptions 
The following assumptions are made: 
(i) It is assumed that 10% of real defence spending is reduced every year from 1980 
to 2000 and the resources released from defence spending move to other civilian 
sectors, including civil investment, human capital, civilian R&D, social 
development and public economic services. ' These sectors are believed to be more 
productive for South Korea's growth than the defence sector. Thus, these are the 
alternative scenarios to estimate how the resource reallocation could contribute to 
South Korea's growth. Each scenario (defence-+ civil investment, defence-+ human 
capital, defence--+ civilian R&D, defence-+ social development, and defence-+ 
public economic services) will be simulated and the adjusted growth will be re- 
estimated for the period 1980-2000. 
(ii) It is assumed that the labour force released from the military do not affect the 
unemployment rate (le. the civilian market absorbs all redundant labour and the 
3 Public and economic services include expenditures on economic development, general public and econornlic 
ser\ iccs, such as fuel and energy, agriculture, forestry, mining, transportation and communication etc. 
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unemployment rate is not changed for the period 1980-2000), although it is 
unrealistic in the object economy. The labour force released from the military will 
be absorbed slowly into the civilian economy, but the speed of absorption 
depend on a nation's economic condition. Also, it requires aggregate demand to be 
maintained. In other words, even though the demand for defence is reduced, the 
demand for civilian sectors is increased, and so the aggregate demand is unchanged 
in the scenarios. 
(Ili) The diverted resources released from defence to the civilian sectors do not have 
inflationary effects on the rest of the economy. The diverted resources from defence 
to the civilian sectors, such as public and private investment or consumption might 
increase the domestic demand, and cause inflation. But, the inflationary effect is 
ignored here, because it is assumed that government will control the expected 
inflation caused by the defence reductions using fiscal policies. 
Based on these assumptions, how the diversion of resources released from defence to the 
civilian sectors, such as civil investment, human capital, civilian R&D, social development 
and public and economic services affects South Korea's growth will be simulated. 
5. SIMULATION RESULTS 
The simulation is based on the period 1980-2000 and compares the actual results (real GDP 
in 1995 constant pnces) with what might have happened under various disarmament 
scenarios. As mentioned earlier, based on the econometric model provided In Equation (1), 
five different scenarios will be simulated. 
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5.1. Scenario 1: Increased Civil Investment 
In the Scenario 1, the resources released from defence spending are all reallocated to civil 
investment. In other words, it is assumed that 10% of real defence spending is diverted to 
civil investment every year for the period 1980-2000. As shown in Table A. 4, this 
reallocation results in a large increase of GDP throughout the period. The reallocation fTom 
defence to civil investment raises GDP by 21.2% throughout the period. The total real GDP 
during the period is US$ 5,400,350 million, while the reallocation from defence to civil 
investment is expected to produce US$ 6,546,182 million of GDP for the same period. The 
GDP simulated by Scenario I is greater than the real GDP every year without exception. 
Even in the economic crises during the period 1997-1998, the simulated GDP is about 8.8% 
greater than the real GDP on average. As a result, it is proved that disannament through the 
resource reallocation from defence to civil investment could raise South Korea's growth 
for the given period. 
5.2. Scenario 2: Increased Human Capital 
Disarmament through the resource reallocation from defence to human capital is estimated 
to increase South Korea's GDP by 1.0% during the period. Unexpectedly, human capital 
expressed by the ratio of students entering high school did not contribute much to South 
Korea's growth. The adjusted total GDP is US$ 5,469,247 million. This is much smaller 
than the GDP in Scenario 1, although it is larger than the actual GDP. According to Table 
A. 4 , it is expected 
that the reallocation from defence to human capital could increase GDP 
until the late 1980s, but it is harmful for growth since the 1990s. Considering South Korea's 
employment structure, this might be explainable. In 1989, the total number of unemployed 
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high school graduates was 23 1,000, but it was increased every year and reached 713,000 
in 1999. Even though the ratio of students entering high school is increased through the 
increase of government expenditures on education , it could not lead South Korea's growth 
due to the high unemployment rate of high school graduates. As a result, it is found that the 
effect of reallocation from defence to human capital is small and even negative because of 
the under- employment of high school graduates since the 1990s. 
5.3. Scenario 3: Increased Civilian R&D' 
According to Scenario 3, the reallocation from defence to civilian R&D raises GDP by 
2.45% on average dunng the sample period. For the period 1980-2000, the expected GDP 
is larger than the real GDP every year. The adjusted total GDP is US$ 5,532,666 million 
during the period. Even though Scenario 3 is more productive for South Korea's growth 
than Scenario 2, it is less effective than Scenario 1. However, the diverted resources from 
defence to civilian R&D could have helped South Korea's growth. As shown in Chapter H, 
South Korea reduced the development of indigenous military technology and dual 
technologies for both military and civilian uses since the 1980s. That is because the direct 
investment in civilian R&D is more helpful for growth than the transfer of military 
technology to civilian uses. Hence, Scenario 3 shows that the defence reductions for the 
development of civilian technology have a positive effect on growth in South Korea. 
4 Civilian R&D expenditures exclude the research expenditures on military, humanities and social science. 
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5.4. Scenario 4: Increased Social Development' 
The diversion of resources released from defence to social development has a positive 
effect on growth throughout the period. The adjusted total GDP is raised about 2.38% 
compared with the actual GDP. The adjusted total GDP is US$ 5,529,229 million. Hence, 
the reallocation of defence reductions to social development is proven to be more beneficial 
to South Korea's growth than the reallocation to human capital (Scenario 2), but less helpful 
than the reallocation to civil investment (Scenario 1) and civilian R&D (Scenario 3). Since 
the 1980s, the importance of social development was increased and its share in government 
budget was also escalated. Social development expenditures are significant for growth by 
securing and raising the standard of living. As mentioned in Chapter 11, the South Korean 
government started to pay greater attention to social development since the 1990s, because 
it perceived that the social welfare, including health and social security is an important 
factor for productivity. Nevertheless, the diversion of resources released from defence to 
social development is less beneficial than the other two scenarios, because it does not 
contribute to growth directly. Increasing expenditures on social welfare might lead to a 
higher growth by increasing people's efficiency and productivity, but social welfare is not 
an input raising growth. Also, many European countries having a high standard of social 
welfare system attain a relatively low growth compared with South Korea. Therefore, 
increasing social welfare expenditures may not always be good for growth, because it 
requires a balance between efficiency and equity (or distribution). 
Social development expenditures include expenditures on social security and welfare, housing, and health. 
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5.5. Scenario 5: Increased Public and Economic Services 
The reallocation of resources released fTom defence to public and economic services raises 
total GDP by 1.56% according to the simulation. The reallocation to public and economic 
services is more productive than the allocation to defence, but it is less beneficial to growth 
than Scenarios Iý3 and 4. The adjusted total GDP is US$ 5,484,5 54 million for the period. 
As shown in Table A. 4, the resources released from defence could be an important financial 
source for public and economic services until the late 1980s. Until 1989, the adjusted total 
GDP is 3.80% larger than the real GDP and this indicates that the reallocation to public and 
economic services could be more important for growth in the 1980s than in the 1990s. 
Since the 1990s, the adjusted total GDP is only 0.49% larger than the real GDP. In the 
1980s, public and economic services by government could have more opportunities to 
contribute to South Korea's growth, because South Korea was not fully developed and still 
needed infrastructure. However, the necessity of public and economic services was 
gradually reduced, because most economic services were provided by the civilian economy 
since the 1990s. The civilian economy is largely involved in these services except for some 
necessary public services, such as postal service, water supply and sewage disposal. Hence, 
it is better for raising growth to reallocate defence spending to civil investment, civilian 
R&D or social welfare than to reallocate to public and economic services since the 1990s. 
In conclusion, as shown in Table A. 4, it is believed that defence spending crowded out 
civilian economy and impeded growth in South Korea for the period 1980-2000. The 
diverted resources released from defence to other sectors, including civil investment, 
human capital, civilian R&D, social development, and public and economic services result 
in a higher growth for the period 1980-2000. Among those scenarios, it was shown that the 
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reallocation of resources from defence to civil investment brought the highest increase of 
total output, while the diversion of resources to human capital resulted in the lowest 
increase of total output. Since the 1990s, the reallocation of resources to human capital 
expressed by the ratio of students entering high school could have reduced the total output 
by increasing the unemployment rate of high school graduates. 
Through the above simulations, it is found that the reduction of South Korea's defence 
spending and the reallocation of resources released from defence to other civilian 
sectors could have increased its total GDP and produced economic peace dividend. 
However, this analysis has limitations in that, unemployment rate and aggregate demand 
are fixed, and there are no inflationary effects. In the object economy, the reduction of 
defence spending is generally expected to entail adjustment costs and thus reduce peace 
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6. A PEACE DIVIDEND FROM KOREAN UNIFICATION: THE GERMAN 
EXPERIENCE 
Previous simulations are restricted to the effect of defence reductions on South Korea's 
growth. However, the alleviation of military tension between South and North Korea is 
essential for a substantial disarmament. Although the North's military threat to the South, 
including the nuclear development programme still exists, South Korea is preparing for the 
unification of two Koreas. South Korea's economic aid to the North might be regarded as 
a South's strategy to reduce the unification cost, because North Korea's economic 
development might reduce South Korea's economic burden after the unification of the two 
countries. In this aspect, South Korea might take Germany as a precedent. As shown in 
Table A. 5, the level of Gennany's defence spending has gradually decreased since the 
unification in 1989, but its economic indicators have not been much improved. In other 
words, it is thought that the peace dividend from defence reductions was small or even 
negative due to the sudden increase of adjustment costs caused by the difference between 
two Germanies' economic capabilities. 
In Table A. 5, Germany's real level of defence spending was steadily reduced from 2.9% 
of GDP in 1988 to 1.5% of GDP in 1998. For the period 1988-1998, Germany's GDP grew, 
but the growth rate was not high compared with other European countries, such as France 
and UK. Furthermore, the economic indicators, including investment growth, R&D and 
unemployment rate were not much improved in this period. R&D/GDP (%) became lower 
and the unemployment rate increased. This indicates that the reduction of defence spending 
from the unification does not contribute to the increase of civilian investment and the 
reallocation of resources released from defence to other sectors might entail 
high 
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adjustment and environmental 'clean-up' costs, such as the relocation and retraining of 
military personnel and the dismantlement of military equipment and bases in the former 
East Gen-nany. 
Table A. 5. Economic Statistics of Germany 1988-1998 













1988 54022 1862827 1.27 
1989 53840 1922857 1.28 
1990 56760 2027143 1.37 - 
1991 52533 2284043 1.14 5.6 0.24 1.65 
1992 49951 2378619 1.1 6.6 0.13 -6.2 
1993 44930 2364737 0.98 7.9 0.1 7.18 
1994 41906 2465059 0.89 8.4 0.09 -0.15 
1995 41160 2421176 0.86 8.1 0.5 -3.28 
1996 40343 2521437 0.83 8.8 0.23 5.79 
1997 39106 2444125 0.82 9.8 0.49 - 
1998 39012 2600800 - - 0.88 
Sources: SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook, various years; World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000. 
In spite of Gen-nany's strong economic capability, the defence reductions from unification 
were not enough to promote its growth. It is believed that unification costs, such as the 
costs for the reform of former East Germany's economy, social infrastructure and welfare, 
and the exchange rate problem between West and East Gen-nany were so large that the 
benefits from the two nations' unification, such as defence reductions had no positive effect 
high 
on its economy. Intnligator (1993,1994) said that the defence reducti 
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conversion costs and relatively small benefits could provide a small or negative social rate 
of retum. 
From Germany's experience, South Korea might learn how to reduce the costs and increase 
the benefits from the unification of two Koreas. Germany's GDP is about 6 times larger 
than South Korea's and its defence spending is also 3 times larger than South Korea's in 
2000. South Korea might have two options for unification. On one hand, it might open 
North Korea by providing economic aid and increasing the trade volume between the two 
countries. The trade volume between the South and North was US$ 22,559,000 in 1989, 
but it was increased to US$ 397,334,580 in 2000 in real terins (1996 constant Price). Also, 
South Korea is supplying rice to the North to resolve its chronic food shortages. South 
Korea's direct investment in North Korea has also been increasing since the peace talks in 
2000. The South and North restored the railway around the borderline and agreed on 
constructing industrial complexes in some North Korean cities. Tourism by South Korean 
people became an important financial resource for North Korea. Investment in North Korea 
might increase the per capita income of North Korea and its economic growth. Actually, 
North Korea attained a positive growth since the late 1990s due to the increasing economic 
co-operation with South Korea. Hence, the steady investment in the North might help 
reforming North Korea's economy and reduce the economic burden and conversion costs 
of a united Korea in the future. 
In contrast, South Korea might reach early unification by a collapse of North Korea's 
economy. The intense arms race led by South Korea can increase the defence burden of 
North Korea and worsen its economy. In the 1980s, the US-Soviet arms race led the Soviet 
it is not 1 Union to economic and political collapse. However, I simple to adopt this strategy. 
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First, this strategy might increase military tension between the two Koreas and precipitate 
North Korea's nuclear development and a pre-emptive strike. Furthermore, the North might 
increase arms export to resolve its economic difficulties. In fact, the economic blockade of 
North Korea might not be so effective, because the North could run its economy through 
trade with China and Russia, and its political system is unlikely to collapse in spite of 
economic difficulties. Therefore, the second option might make the South-North 
relationship worse without any gain. Consequently, South Korea is better to help North 
Korea reform its economic structure and reduce the economic gap with the South, and 
induce the change of North Korea's economic and political system before unification. The 
study on the economic effects of the two Koreas' unification is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but it was briefly analysed in terms of defence reductions and peace dividend. 
7. SUMMARY 
Defence reductions in the Korean Peninsula have not been successful in spite of the 
bilateral non-aggression agreement between the South and North, because the two Koreas 
have not yet resolved their deep distrust of each other. The prospects of full-scale 
disarmament between the two Koreas are still unclear in spite of the South-North peace 
talks. It is expected that there might be no disarmament in both South and North Korea, 
especially in defence equipment whether of conventional or strategic weapons in the near 
future. 
In simulating hypothetical reductions of defence spending, the effects of reducing South 
Korea's defence spending on its growth are generally positive for the period 1980-2000. As 
shown in the simulation results, the diversion of resources released from defence to other 
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civilian sectors increases GDP and promotes growth. The adjusted GDP xvere larger than 
the actual GDP in all scenarios. Therefore, it is concluded that defence spending hampered 
growth by crowding-out the civilian economy in South Korea for the period 1980-2000 as 
shown in Chapter VI. The reallocation of resources released from defence to the civilian 






As the result of simple correlation test between the two Koreas' defence spending, the 
defence spending between the two nations are significantly correlated at 0.53 in the Pearson 
test and 0.59 in the Speannan's rho test. Through these correlation tests, a possibility of the 
arrns race between South and North Korea can be found. 
Table 11-1A. Pearson Correlations 
SME NME 
SME Pearson Correlation . 528** Sig. (2-tailed) . 001 N 37 37 
NME Pearson Correlation . 528** 1 Sig. (2-tailed) . 001 N 37 37 
**. Correlations is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Note: SME is South Korea's defence spending and NME is North Korea's defence spending. 
I Roman number denotes the chapter. 
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Table 114B. Nonparametric Correlations 
SME NME 
SME Spearman's rho 1.000 . 587** Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 N 37 37 
NME Spearman's rho . 587** 1.000 Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 N 37 37 
**. Correlations is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Note: SME is South Korea's defence spending and NME is North Korea's defence spending. 
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Appendix 11-2. 
As the result of simple correlation test between defence and growth in South Korea, the 
relationship between the two vanables is non-significant in both the Pearson and 
Spearman's rho tests. 
Table 11-2A. Pearson Correlations 
GROWTH DEFENCE 
GROWTH Pearson Correlation 1 -. 216 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 200 N 37 37 
DEFENCE Pearson Correlation -. 216 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 200 N 37 37 
**. Correlations is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Table 11-213. Nonparametric Correlations 
GROWTH DEFENCE 
GROWTH Spearman's rho 1.000 -. 213 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 206 
N 37 37 
DEFENCE Spearman's rho -. 213 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 206 
N 37 37 
Correlations is significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Appendix IV-1. 
The empirical results of log-linear model in Table IV- IA show the asymmetric arms race 
between South and North Korea led by the US-South alliance. The R' s are high compared 
with a simple linear model, but the signs of coefficients are different from the expectations 
presented in Chapter IV. Fatigue coefficients are not negative but positive, and inter-state 
conflict factor has a negative effect on South Korea's defence spending. Hence, it provides 
very different results from the linear model, but still shows South Korea's leadership in the 
arms race with North Korea. 
Table IV-IA. Regression Results of Log-linear Model (1963-2000) 
Dependent Coefficients of independent variables Statistical values 
Dependent Threat Fatigue Conflict US Aid Grievance R2 F- DW 
variable value 
(1) IVIND 
South 0.15 0.90 -0.096 -3.2E-05 -0.35 0.99 891.18 1.34 
(2.38)** (14.25)*** (2.27)** (-0.24) (-0.83) 
North -0.09 0.96 0.09 1.08 0.87 73.94 2.08 
(-1.65) (10.63)*** (1.23) (2.19)** 
(2) SIPRI 
South 0.14 0.95 0.04 1.25E-04 -0.56 0.99 1372.5 1.00 
(1.80)* (14.38)*** (1.36) (1.15) (-1.55) 
North -6.2E-03 0.90 0.05 0.75 0.95 192.34 1.35 
(-0.09) (8.65)*** (1.15) (2.66)** 1 1 11 
Notes: I. Threat factor in North is the coefficient of the total defence spending of the US-South Korea 
alliance. 
2. Figures in parentheses in the coefficients of independent variables are t -statistics. 
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Table IV-3A compares the numbers of military personnel and tactical aircraft between 
South and North Korea for the period 1963-2000. 
Table IV-3A. Number of Military Personnel and Tactical Aircraft 
Year South Korea North Korea 
Military Personnel Tactical Aircraft Military Personnel Tactical Aircraft 
1963-1964 627000 128 375000 500 
1964-1965 600000 128 411000 500 
1965-1966 604000 200 411000 500 
1966-1967 571600 200 411000 500 
1967-1968 612000 230 412000 500 
1968-1969 620000 230 433500 620 
1969-1970 620000 250 466100 700 
1970-1971 645000 250 467300 700 
1971-1972 634250 276 466700 685 
1972-1973 634750 276 468200 708 
1973-1974 633500 245 504700 748 
1974-1975 625000 265 562000 818 
1975-1976 625000 337 567000 907 
1976-1977 635000 351 567000 910 
1977-1978 635000 499 570000 910 
1978-1979 642000 464 612000 1065 
1979-1980 619000 442 692000 1006 
1980-1981 600600 562 700000 1106 
1981-1982 601600 543 768000 1171 
1982-1983 601600 672 782000 1160 
1983-1984 622000 686 784000 1290 
1984-1985 622000 693 784000 1292 
1985-1986 598000 700 784000 1496 
1986-1987 601000 710 838000 1550 
1987-1988 629000 729 838000 1648 
1988-1989 629000 731 870000 1572 
1989-1990 650000 670 980000 1378 
1990-1991 750000 654 990000 1500 
1991-1992 750000 590 995000 1550 
1992-1993 633000 590 1010000 1550 
1993-1994 633000 650 1030000 1555 
1994-1995 633000 690 1030000 1595 
1995-1996 633000 636 1040000 1446 
1996-1997 660000 636 1055000 1422 
1997-1998 672000 706 1055000 1417 
1998-1999 672000 706 1082000 1421 
1999-2000 683000 752 1082000 1510 
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